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# Conflict in Jerusalem: Urbanism, Planning, and Resilience

*Palestinian  
Community Initiatives to  
Promote Urban Rights*

# **Conflict in Jerusalem: Urbanism, Planning, and Resilience**

Palestinian Community Initiatives  
to Promote Urban Rights





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## *INTRODUCTION*

This report intends to shed light on Israeli policy in East Jerusalem, including parts of the West Bank that were annexed to Jerusalem in compliance with Israeli law and in violation to international humanitarian law, by reviewing the legal status of East Jerusalem, as well as reviewing and analysing the current structural plans under examination by the Israeli planning authorities. Developments in the city suggest that the policies aim at gaining control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank since their occupation in 1967, along with the Judaisation of Jerusalem and the policies of cultural assimilation. One recommendation the Municipality of Jerusalem's urban planners, as well as urban planning firms, have adopted is the maintaining of the demographic balance at 70:30 ratios between Palestinians and Israelis; that is, not allowing the number of Israeli Jews to drop below 70%. Israeli policies are dedicated to maintaining this goal (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004).

Building permits are not often granted to Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Even if they are obtained, the space granted for construction is very limited. Discrimination in planning is evident and is the result of a policy to maintain the demographic balance between Israelis and Arabs. Palestinian residents are forced to cover all costs of planning preparations for their neighbourhoods themselves, without the guarantee their plans will be approved. Residents are constantly made to amend the plans and meet last minute demands, which entail expending greater amounts of time and money. Many proposed plans are withdrawn by the residents because of the delays and constant demands. This suggests that Israeli authorities are not interested in developing Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. They seem to block any major development plans put forth by Palestinians. The Jerusalem Municipality imposes many restrictions and blocks many outline plans proposed by Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. Most of the housing provision for Palestinians is based on self-built housing on private lands. Another barrier to implementation of planning has resulted from the lack of interest by the Israeli government in completing the land registration program, which began under Jordanian control.

Since 2007, IPCC has been monitoring Israeli urban municipal policies in East Jerusalem that negatively affects the lives of Palestinian Arabs living in East Jerusalem. Furthermore, IPCC holds meetings with Israeli municipal officials and Israeli policymakers to submit outline plans and other necessary documents on behalf of Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. By engaging with Israeli planning authorities on behalf of Palestinians, IPCC pressures Israeli authorities to develop Palestinian neighbourhoods, such as paving roads and establishing public facilities in those neighbourhoods. Whenever a need presents itself, IPCC, on behalf of Palestinian residents, will approach the appropriate authorities demanding implementation of specific plans, as well as standing with the local population while demanding the plans be approved for implementation. Moreover, IPCC has extensive experience in community planning, where the IPCC team encourages and motivates the local community to become engaged in the planning of their own town, city, or neighbourhood. The local community contributes to the formulation of the objectives, goals, planning, and implementation of the projects, in addition to the evaluation of official local planning policies.

This report will also analyse the initial structural plans under consideration in Jerusalem (Local master Plan, Jerusalem 2000 (target year 2020) and will illustrate how the plans attempt to achieve the desired "demographic balance". Further using planning tools to expand illegal Israeli settlement policies in the region, the Israeli authorities are involved in demographic engineering by:

Limiting the potential for developing Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, separating these neighbourhoods from each other, and the inability of Palestinians to geographically connect these neighbourhoods to each other. Thus, this is how Israeli planning authorities have refrained from creating outline plans for Palestinian neighbourhoods, have repeatedly stalled the process for creating the plans, or have prepared plans that did not match Palestinians' need for land for development. Furthermore, planning authorities have only granted permission for Palestinian Jerusalemites to build in limited spaces of land, or only on 25% and 75% of the lands) which is insufficient to Palestinian neighbourhoods, compared to space granted for construction of Israeli settlements (on 75% and 125% of the lands). These building restrictions coupled with the lack of other spatial alternatives, have forced Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem to illegally build residential compounds, which has also led to the high



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Israeli administrative demolition orders for Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem, where the Municipality of Jerusalem's current planning policies have allowed the Municipality to exploit its authority to issue demolition orders in Palestinian neighbourhoods, as part of their general policies. Based on a report by Meir Margalit (2014), it is estimated that the total number of homes demolished since 1967 till 2014 is around 11,500, due to the illegal construction of residential complexes and the lack of building permits. And 63 housing units were demolished by Israeli authorities between 2014 and 2018 (B'Tselem, 2018).

Planning policy is one of the main tools in determining the outcomes of economic development and influencing the environment built. Planning policy is regularly used to encourage sustainable communities and promote economic development. Approval for planning is necessary for obtaining building permits; however, this may sometimes seem nearly impossible, such as in Israeli-controlled territories in Jerusalem. The effort to gain control of land has been crucial, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The continued conflict has gained international and regional media coverage and has positioned the geopolitical issues in the international spotlight. Nevertheless, the underlying circumstances for the continuous conflict are rarely investigated. This report asserts that planning policy maintains a crucial impact on the positive societal and spatial development of urban areas; yet, in some instances, the domestic state of affairs establishes different conditions, as is the case with Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is considered the largest city in Israel regarding its size and number of inhabitants. It constitutes approximately 126 km<sup>2</sup> compared to Be'er Sheva (117 km<sup>2</sup>) and Haifa (69 km<sup>2</sup>). Regarding population, in 2015 there were approximately 865,700 people residing in Jerusalem, which is more than those residing in Tel-Aviv (432,900) and Haifa (278,900), Israel's second and third-largest cities. Many religions are practiced in the city of Jerusalem. By the end of 2015, there were 528,700 Israeli citizens and 323,700 Arabs living in Jerusalem. Among the Arab residents, 95% were Muslim and 5% were Christian. Furthermore, there were 3,200 non-Arab Christians, and 10,100 with no religious affiliations (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2017). The Jerusalem Municipality was founded in 1863. During that time Jewish neighbourhoods began to spread beyond the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is differentiated from other cities by several aspects. Firstly, the city is important to the three monotheistic religions and is a significant religious centre for all of them. Secondly, Jerusalem is claimed as the capital of both countries, Palestine and Israel, positioning it in the middle of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The attempts to divide Jerusalem place the city in a distinctively complicated and symbolic situation. Jerusalem is the largest and poorest city in Israel (Rokem, 2012).

As extensively documented and examined (see Civic Coalition, 2011; Chiodelli, 2012; El-Atrash, 2016), a vital spatial crossroads of Israel's geopolitical circumstances began post June 1967, when East Jerusalem, along with other territories, was occupied by Israel. This was followed by the establishment of the Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law, 5727-1967 which permitted Israel to establish Israeli law in East Jerusalem (Lapidoth, 2006). Consequently, on 30 July 1980, the Knesset passed the Jerusalem Law declaring Jerusalem the united capital of Israel.

The possibility of East Jerusalem being a thriving and autonomous Palestinian city has never been more remote. Since 1967, East Jerusalem has been occupied by Israel and been subjected to a series of policies that have physically and demographically transformed the city in the interest of maintaining Israeli control. Contrary to international law, Israel has used its capacities as an occupying power to dramatically shift the ethnic demographic balance in favour of Israeli Jews, at the expense of the native Palestinian population. Government sponsored housing schemes and generous welfare packages have attracted over 200,000 Jewish Israelis to settle on confiscated Palestinian land.

Under Israeli rule, the Palestinian city has grown into a series of informal residential suburbs characterized by their dilapidated car-filled roads and near absence of pavements, parks or playgrounds. Major Institutions and businesses have been relocated, some forcibly, to Ramallah. With them, the social, political and economic gravity, which East Jerusalem once held in Palestinian society, has also moved.

Three Israeli policies can be accredited with fuelling this urban transformation; closure policies, refusal of permits, imposing punitive measures against those who build illegally, refusal to register lands, and a lack of investment in public infrastructure.

### **Closure Policy**

East Jerusalem has been severed from its West Bank surroundings. East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem form an almost contiguous urban core. However, since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel has made it illegal for Palestinians without permits to enter the city, effectively blocking access for the 2.2 million Palestinian's living in the West Bank. This policy was fully enforced in 2003 with the construction of the Separation Barrier. In terms of migration, this policy has placed a one-way valve around the city allowing Jerusalemites to leave but not to be replaced by Palestinians from other West Bank towns. The policy has left Jerusalemites economically and politically isolated.

Within East Jerusalem, construction has been severely restricted by the inability to obtain permits within the planning system. For most homeowners, it has been impossible to obtain a permit because of inadequate and inappropriate planning, which has zoned most Palestinian areas as either 'no-building zones', unworkably low-density, or not possessing all the required documents needed to meet the Municipality's own standards for issuing a permit. In occasional cases where the Municipality has developed adequate plans, they have been denied approval by either the Local or District Planning and Building Committees, in which there is no Palestinian representation, and little political will for Palestinian development.

### **Denial of Building Permits**

Within East Jerusalem, construction has been severely restricted by the inability to obtain permits within the planning system. For most homeowners, it has been impossible to obtain a permit because of inadequate and inappropriate planning, which has zoned most Palestinian areas as either ‘no-building zones’, unworkably low-density, or not possessing all the required documents needed to meet the Municipality's own standards for issuing a permit. In occasional cases where the Municipality has developed adequate plans, they have been denied approval by either the Local or District Planning and Building Committees, in which there is no Palestinian representation, and little political will for Palestinian development.

### **Punitive Measures**

40-50% of all Palestinian households in East Jerusalem who now live in unlicensed buildings face increasingly severe punitive measures. These include fines, demolition and imprisonment, all of which may be applied to a single household. Between 2009 and 2017, 876 Palestinian buildings were demolished due to the lack of a building permit, displacing 1,723 Palestinians (OCHA, 2018).

### **Unregistered Land**

Israel's refusal to register land in East Jerusalem has limited the availability of housing loans in the majority of East Jerusalem. The absence of suitable mortgage loans is a further chain on development in East Jerusalem. Banks will only offer mortgages on property that is both licensed and built on registered land. The former is limited by the planning system and the latter by the Israeli Land registration system. The vast majority (92%) of land in East Jerusalem is either unregistered, semi registered, or frozen at various stages of the registration process. As such, even if a landowner has received a building permit, it is likely that the entire construction and taxation costs will have to be paid from existing savings, as a mortgage will not be granted without land registration.

### **Lack of Investment**

East Jerusalem's public infrastructure and services have withered under lack of investment. Despite constituting nearly 40% of the population, the Municipality has consistently devoted only around 11% of its budget to Palestinian neighbourhoods. A study by the Municipality conducted in 2010 conservatively estimated that over \$200 million were required to raise East Jerusalem's infrastructure to the level of that in West Jerusalem.



## **Trends**

The effect of current policies on the city is the perpetuation of three trends; rising informality within building stock, the increasingly unaffordable nature of housing and the growing displacement of residents, as more families migrate out of the city.

### **1. Growing Informality**

The inability to obtain building permits through the planning system has resulted in a huge amount of unpermitted construction. Between 2000 and 2010 it is estimated that 70% of new buildings were built without permit. Total housing stock in Palestinian neighbourhoods is now estimated to be 40-50% unpermitted.

### **2. Infrastructural Deterioration**

Lack of planning and underinvestment has undermined infrastructure in the face of a growing population. The current shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem is now estimated at 2,200. Such infrastructural deficiencies will have immeasurable social consequences on the Palestinian population.

### **3. Rising House Prices**

The problem of East Jerusalem's housing finance only contributes to the un-affordability of housing. Even without considering the lack of financial support, East Jerusalem's house price to income ratio's rank among the highest in the world. They continue to be driven upwards by the extreme shortage of housing, estimated at around 8,000 units. As a result, legally secure housing is a luxury only available to high-income households and those with access to existing family property.

### **4. Displacement**

Lack of affordable housing and diminishing living standards are pushing families outside the city. Increasingly, the only options for the majority of East Jerusalem's young families is to either live in the mass informal developments in Kafr Aqab and Shu'fat Refugee Camp, which lie beyond the Separation Barrier but within the municipal boundaries or move outside the city into the remaining West Bank. The latter option carries the risk of residency permit revocation, as Palestinians must prove their 'centre of life' to be Jerusalem to maintain their residency permits. The former brings with it the usual issues of informal developments, lack of housing security and poor public services, in addition to the serious risk of Israel redrawing the Municipal boundary to exclude the areas. Therefore, neither option provides suitable long-term housing security for Palestinian Jerusalemites.

***CHAPTER ONE:***

***MODERN URBAN HISTORY OF  
JERUSALEM/ THE EMERGENCE  
OF NEW  
JERUSALEM***

# ***MODERN URBAN HISTORY OF JERUSALEM/ THE EMERGENCE OF NEW JERUSALEM***

The purpose of this chapter is to document the urban history of Jerusalem since the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the role of the Arabs, Jews and Christian Europeans in the emergence of the current city. Factors affecting the production of the space will be analysed, particularly under the Ottoman Administration and the British Mandate, and we will examine how these factors shaped the course of the conflict in the city. The review of the urban history is offered not only to document the process, but also to critically examine the existing literature dealing with this subject. The chapter will allow us to understand the gaps that exist between the two conflicting parties, the way the disparities have emerged, and how they are related to today's developments in the city.

## **OVERVIEW**

Jerusalem has been demolished and rebuilt numerous times. The city today exists on top of layers of old buildings destroyed by either natural calamities or wars. From 139 to 1850 AD, the urban growth of Jerusalem was confined within its present Old City walls.

Jerusalem underwent immense urban development from the Mamluk Period (1253 AD) until the end of the Ottoman Period (1917 AD). In fact, most buildings that exist to this day were built during the Mamluk and Ottoman periods; the rest were religious buildings erected prior to those periods, such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which was built between 325 and 328 AD, the Dome of the Rock, which was built between 685 and 691 AD, and Al-Aqsa Mosque, built between 693 and 705 AD (Al-Aref, 1961; Asali, 1992, 2000).

During the Mamluk period (1235-1517 AD), Jerusalem witnessed massive urban growth: numerous buildings were added within the Haram Ash-Sharif compound; schools were established, making the city a radiant intellectual centre, markets were established, and quarters evolved and took on an ethnic-family character. In all, there were 33 quarters formed during the Mamluk period (Burgoyne, 1987).

The Ottomans (Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, 1536-1540 AD) built Jerusalem's wall and gates, and supplied the city with drinking water from the Suleiman Pools near the village of Artas (south of Bethlehem).

In spatial terms, Jerusalem under Ottoman rule was a small regional centre, limited to the walled city which was less than one-kilometre square. Under the Ottomans, Christians and Jews were not treated equally as Muslims (Wasserstein, 2001: 15).

In 1831-1840, Egyptian troops led by Ibrahim Pasha occupied the province of Syria (Bilad Al-Sham). Their administration was centred in Damascus, but they appointed strong local governors and set up a system of local councils (Majlis) in which representatives of the local population could influence public policies, such as taxation and the resolution of domestic disputes. Christians and Jews, however, received different treatment under the protection system of the non-Muslim Zima, or Ahl Al-Kitab. The Egyptians allowed a European influence in the area and gave more rights to minorities in order to guarantee the support of the European powers (Wasserstein, 2001: 26-28).

The Ottomans regained power in 1840.

They were supported by a widespread local revolt against the Egyptians. The Europeans, headed by Britain, also supported the Ottomans in a policy bid to sustain the Ottoman Empire (this was part of their anti-French stance).

In return, the Ottomans continued to allow a European influence in the region and introduced reforms, which guaranteed equal status to non-Muslim citizens, and some privileges to foreign representatives. Following the Crimean War, the reforms were further strengthened. In 1856, the Edict of Toleration (Hatti Homayoun) ensured non-Muslims' rights, such as representation in the Majlis, and a right to buy land and have equal status to all religions in the Ottoman Empire. The province of Jerusalem became an independent district with its ruler (Pasha) directly subject to the central administration in Constantinople. This indicates the rise in the importance of Jerusalem, which coincided with an increase in the European activities in the city (Ben-Arieh, 1986: 139).

## WESTERN INFLUENCE

The first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century witnessed greater European influence. During Egyptian rule (1831-1840 AD), Muhammad Ali Pasha along with his son Ibrahim Pasha sought to secure the European powers' support for their control over Syria by adopting a tolerant policy that allowed missionaries and consulates to operate in Greater Syria. That policy led to greater European influence in Jerusalem, where the European powers considered their presence a guarantee for the rights of the Christian minorities. France was the only country to support Muhammad Ali Pasha and his ambitions to control the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia supported the Ottoman Emperor who in return issued in 1839 an official decree called "Noble Re-script of the Rose Chamber" in which he promised equality for non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the Egyptians' short tenure in Greater Syria and the Ottomans' return to Jerusalem, the policy of openness to the West was irreversible (Wasserstein, 2001).

The British Consulate was the first Western consulate established in Jerusalem (in 1834). It was followed by the Prussian (in 1842), the Sardinian (1843), the French (1843), the Austrian (1847), the Spanish (1854), the American (1856), and the Russian (1857). These consulates exercised the right of protecting the minorities in Jerusalem along with the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Each consulate searched for potential protégés: The Russians protected the Orthodox Christians (the Greek Orthodox challenged this policy at a later stage), and the French protected the Latin Christians, but the Italians challenged them at a later stage.

There were few Protestants in Palestine, and the British and Americans sought to convert Palestinian Christians to the Protestant denominations.

Moreover, the British considered themselves the protectors of non-Christian minorities, especially of the Jews, the Druze and the Samaritans (Wasserstein, 2001:32-36).

## OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION OF JERUSALEM

In 1874, Jerusalem was declared an independent province (Sanjaq) from Ash-Sham Province (Greater Syria), and was directly attached to the Ottoman Empire's capital Constantinople. This development transformed Jerusalem from a peripheral city to a central city that formed the center for Nablus and Akko provinces (the boundaries of Jerusalem, Nablus and Akko provinces comprised the boundaries of Palestine under the British Mandate). This new administrative stature of Jerusalem required, and led to, the introduction of modern means of transportation and communication in order to connect it with Constantinople: in 1892 a railroad was established between Jerusalem and Jaffa Port (to transport pilgrims and goods); wider roads were built between Jerusalem and Jaffa (1870), Nablus (1907) and southwards toward Hebron (via Bethlehem); and in the 1870s telegraph lines connected Jerusalem with Egypt, Beirut, and Constantinople and from there onward to Europe; in addition, various postal services (Ottoman, Russian, German, Austrian, French and Italian) were established (Scholch, 1990: 240).

In 1863, the Ottoman Sultan issued a decree to establish the Jerusalem Municipality, which was the second under the Ottoman Empire after Constantinople.

The Municipality had administrative authorities and provided general services: in 1886 the Municipality established a police force and in the mid-1890s it established a fire department; in 1890 the Municipality established a hospital (opposite to what is presently referred to as Mahane Yehuda Market in West Jerusalem) with 32 beds and opened it to the public, as well as to patients from villages surrounding Jerusalem, to receive free treatment thrice a week; in the 1870s the Municipality established a sewage system and in the 1890s garbage was collected on a regular basis and streets were lighted with kerosene lamps. In 1892 a public park was inaugurated on Jaffa Road where a military band played music on Fridays and Saturdays. According to Luncz (1905), by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Jerusalem Municipality had numbered houses and shops and warned that punitive measures would be taken against those who removed the numbers. According to Scholch, the Municipality began issuing building permits and keeping orderly records by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and in 1907 a general law passed by the Municipality made obtaining a building permit obligatory for any new construction as well as for renovating or expanding existing buildings.

**David Yellin describes the Jerusalem Municipality's activity during that period. In 1898 he wrote:**

The Municipality is now remedying many of the faults of our city, long neglected. The streets are now clean, the contractors are closely watched to ensure that they keep cleaning every day (...). Outside the city, the vast amount of dust that has long piled up on the highway has been swept away, and the whole road is sprayed with water twice a day (to settle the dust) (Yellin, 1972: 239).

**Luncz also noted improvements at that time, he wrote in 1905:**

This year the city council has introduced three excellent innovations in our city: (i) various trees have been planted on both sides of Jaffa Road, and many of them have already struck root and begun to blossom; (ii) lamps have been fixed along all the roads and in every neighborhood (...); (iii) special workers have been charged with collecting refuse along all the roads and in every neighborhood (Kark, 1976: 87-88).

While Ben-Arieh notes that Jerusalem's commercial capabilities improved steadily beginning in the second half of the 19th century, nevertheless, according to Scholch, Jerusalem's growing economy remained a consumer's economy, supported by supplies from outside and, in the case of Christian and Jewish communities, by foreign funds.

The economic development affected Jerusalem's population growth. In 1880, the city's population was 35,000 and in 1915 it increased more than two-fold to 80,000. But in comparison with other cities, the population of Jaffa had increased four-fold during the same period (from 10,000 to 40,000) and the population of Haifa increased four-fold from 5,000 to 20,000. Most figures concerning the population of Jerusalem during the 19th century was based on estimates made by European globe trotters and historians, and the most detailed figures were given by Ben-Arieh (1975, see Table 1 and Fig.1). It should be noted that Jerusalem's Muslim population increased by 150% during the 19th century in comparison with a 262% increase among Christian Arabs and 1650% among Jews. Ottoman statistics grossly underestimated in 1871-2 the Jewish population of Jerusalem at 3,780 (see Table 2).

This discrepancy is attributed to the fact that the Ottoman statistics covered only Ottoman citizens and did not cover foreigners, of whom Jews comprised a significant percentage. Ottoman statistics between 1895 and 1899 indicated that the overall registered foreigner population in all of Jerusalem province (Sanjaq) was approximately 5,500. This figure is also an underestimation because most Jews who arrived in Jerusalem before World War I settled in the city illegally and were not registered in Ottoman censuses. Moreover, estimates indicate that half of the Jews who visited Jerusalem during that period returned to their countries due to Ottoman policies and the tough living conditions in the city. Table 2 shows that the majority of Muslim and Christian Arabs lived in the Jerusalem Province, or the so-called Jerusalem Mountain. One sees that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim and Christian Arab residents of Jerusalem lived in Jerusalem's sub-district villages.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS UNDER OTTOMANS

Security increased with the improvement of the road's infrastructure, especially the Jerusalem-Jaffa Road (paved in 1870) which was normally the route taken by European Christian pilgrims. The heightened increase in security was also the result of the Ottoman central government's imposition of its control beginning in the 1860s over the areas surrounding Jerusalem, where villagers and factions used to levy coercive payments from tourists and Arab merchants (especially the Sheikhs of Abu Ghosh village and their allies on the road leading to Jaffa). This increased the number of Christian pilgrims, especially Russian pilgrims. Bertha Spafford, one of the original residents of the American Colony established in 1881, wrote of some fifteen to twenty thousand Russian pilgrims who visited Jerusalem on an annual basis:


They created a demand for all kinds of trinkets, and many kinds of industries in the manufacture of souvenirs; this created business and employment opportunities for the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Candle-dippers worked the year round to have a supply equal to the demands of the thousands of Russian, Greek, Armenian, Coptic, and Macedonian pilgrims who attended the annual celebration of the Holy Fire. Then there were also the makers of ikons (sic) and mother-of-pearl and olivewood trinkets. Shroud makers made a good living stenciling black skulls and crossbones on white muslin to be worn by the Russian pilgrims (Scholch, 1990: 92).

Most economic activities in Jerusalem were linked to its religious importance; hence, the economic and industrial growth in Palestine was not centered in Jerusalem.

**Table 1: Estimates of the Jerusalem Population 1800-1922 according to Ben-Arieh**

<i>Year</i>	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
<b>1800</b>	4000	2750	2000	8,750
<b>1835</b>	4,500	3,250	3,000	10,750
<b>1840</b>	4,650	3,350	3,000	10,750
<b>1850</b>	5,350	3,650	6,000	15,000
<b>1860</b>	6,000	4,000	8,000	18,000
<b>1870</b>	6,500	4,500	11,000	22,000
<b>1880</b>	8,000	6,000	17,000	31,000
<b>1890</b>	9,000	8,000	25,000	42,000
<b>1900</b>	10,000	10,000	35,000	55,000
<b>1910</b>	12,000	13,000	45,000	70,000
<b>1922</b>	13,500	14,000	34,400	62,600

Source: Y. Ben-Arieh, "The Growth of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century," in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 65, 1975,262. Slightly different figures appear in Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century According to Western Sources," in Moshe Ma'oz (ed). *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period*, Jerusalem, 1975. For more details, see Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, *Jerusalem in the 19th Century: The Old City*. Jerusalem, 1984, passim.



**Fig.1 Jerusalem Population 1800-1922 according to Ben-Arieh**

**Table 2: The Population of the City and Sub-district (QADA') of Jerusalem, 1849-1914 according to Ottoman Sources**

	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
<b>Town of 1849</b>	6,148	3,744	1,790	11,682
<b>Jerusalem 1871-72</b>	6,150	4,428	3,780	14,358
<b>Qada' of 1881-93</b>	54,364	19,590	7,105	81,059
<b>Jerusalem 1914</b>	70,270	32,461	18,190	120,921

Source: For the town of Jerusalem see Alexander Scholch, "The Demographic Development of Palestine, 1850-1882," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17/4, 1985; for the Qada' (including the city) of Jerusalem see Kamal H Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, Madison, 1985, 144-145 and 184-185

### FIRST BUILDINGS OUTSIDE THE WALLS

The buildings established outside the walled city were either religious places or mansions erected by wealthy and influential Jerusalemites. Examples of religious places established outside the walled city are Az-Zawieh Al-Jarrahieh (Jarrah Corner) which was built in 1201 AD about one kilometre north of the Old City of Jerusalem. Az-Zawieh Al-Jarrahieh comprises the tomb of Husam Eddin Al-Husseini Ben Sharaf Eddin Issa Al-Jarrah, a leader of Salah Eddin Al-Ayyoubi's army which liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187 AD. The mosque near the tomb was built between 1895-1896 AD. Two other similar religious places were established at a later stage: Az-Zawieh Al-Kabkabebeh was established in 1288 AD near Ma'man Allah Cemetery (presently known as Mammilla), and Az-Zawieh Al-Adhamieh was established in 1361 AD outside Herod's Gate.

The mansions erected by wealthy and influential Jerusalemites were surrounded by orchards planted with fruit trees and normally included wheat mills and olive presses. Arab globe trotters and historians' tales mentioned huge mansions in Al-Baq'a and the suburbs of the Mount of Olives during the Mamluk and Ottoman periods. Historian Shimon Landman cited these sources in his description of the evolution of Islamic urban growth outside the walled city (Landman's use of those sources is considered an exception since European sources were established as the basic sources for documenting urban expansion outside the walled city at the end of the 19th century). Those mansions were called 'summer houses' and some of them were built as early as the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Sheikh Muhammad Al-Khalili built a place at Herod's Gate near the present Rockefeller Museum in 1711 AD, and another in Al-Baq'a area. Landman documented a list of mansions erected by other Jerusalemite families like Al-Ammawi, Al-Khatib and Ash-Shihabi families. The construction of mansions is generally attributed to the crowding inside the walled city and the desire of the wealthy families to move into more spacious houses. The hot weather and the shortage of water during summer months were other reasons for their erection.

By the middle of the 19th century the custom of building summer houses was no longer confined to the wealthy influential families. Such homes began to be built by middle class families, especially Christian families, who were allowed to make use of the Christian endowment lands and buildings. During the 1880s the Sakakini family, who had lived in the Christian Quarter in the Old City, built a summer house in Al-Musrarah neighbourhood. Their neighbours, the Abdo family, also spent summers outside the walled city in a house owned by the Roman Orthodox Patriarchate in a building called Al-Haririeh. It is worth noting that the idea of building summer houses goes back to an old custom among villagers and farmers who used to move with their families to small houses near their farms during the cultivation and harvest seasons. This custom lasted until recent times. The Bedouin concentrations surrounding Jerusalem - as well as the nuclei of such villages as Silwan, At-Tur, Abu Dis, Shu'fat - remained physically detached from the city although they formed centres of religious, cultural, economic and administrative activities. Some buildings in those villages date back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

### **WESTERN BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT IN JERUSALEM**

The European consuls acted only on their governments' orders, and thus tried to create a semi-autonomous body of authority in the city, performing some tasks which would have been the responsibility of the local authority elsewhere. These included the construction of public buildings, such as schools, hospitals and training centres (Ben-Arieh, 1986: 222). Thus, the city gained a semi-colonial character and a multinational atmosphere resulting from the many nations playing the part of its "colonizers". The consuls and religious delegates set in motion a process of building outside the walls, which was to transform the city's urban and social structure.

(See the letters of Laurence Oliphant, 1882-1885 in Oliphant, 1885:309.)

The city of Jerusalem was gradually changing as a result of the rivalries between the different European powers and Christian churches. The first buildings outside the city walls were built by the German and English Protestants. Karmon (1977) suggests that the reason for this was that there were no Protestants in Jerusalem in previous centuries, and therefore they owned a limited amount of land within the Old City. This together with the fact that the Protestants were opposed to the worship of sacred sites caused them to start building outside the walls, where land could be purchased easily. Hence, the first buildings outside the walls were the result of the initiative of the British consul, James Finn. These included Finn's summer house and a house called "Abraham's Vineyard" (1855) where he tried to help the local Jews by providing them work in agriculture in what he termed "industrial groves" (Padan, 1997). Another building outside the walls was the Protestant School, built by Bishop Gobat (begun 1854). The German missionary Schneller founded an orphanage on a plot of land 3 km north-west of the Old City in 1860.

The Russians were next to build a large compound, including a church, a hospital, a hostel and the consul's house, immediately outside the city walls, between 1857-1860. This became possible following a visit to Jerusalem of Russian Prince Constantin, when the Sultan gave him a plot of land north-west of the city walls (Ben-Arieh, 1986:105). Russian buildings are seen in Wilson's survey of Jerusalem, constructed in 1864-5. Another visible building on Wilson's map is marked as "Sanatorium (Protestant Mission)." This is the site on the Street of the Prophets where the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews later built its Mission Hospital.

## Padan cites Oliphant's remarks on the city's development:

“...When I was last here, six years ago, only a very few houses had been built on the Jaffa road outside the walls of the old town, now there is an extensive and constantly increasing French suburb. The price of land has risen 50 percent and is still constantly rising. New hotels and shops have been opened to meet the increasing demand. Within the last 20 years the population of the Holy City has certainly doubled, the increase consisting entirely of Jews and Christians. Apart from its sacred associations the city has no attractions as a residence of any kind, but quite the reverse. This fact possesses a highly important political significance, because it is evident that in the degree in which the vested interests of rival sects and religions accumulate upon this spot it is destined someday to become a bone of contention between them... Nothing strikes one more than the proportion of buildings having some sort of public character or other to private dwellings, and these buildings are constantly increasing. This year the estimated expenditure of Greek and Latin churches will be over 600,000 Dollars for building purposes alone. The number of Russian pilgrims to visit Jerusalem annually is about 5,000, and it is constantly increasing. They are all accommodated in the extensive premises belonging to the Russian Government, in the centre of which the Russian Consulate is situated, and which forms a sort of Russian suburb to the Holy City" (Padan, 1997: 6-7).

Apart from buildings, the European powers also invested in infrastructure. This is another feature characterizing investment in colonial cities.

Following a visit to Jerusalem in 1855, Sir Moses Montefiore discussed with Lord Palmerston the idea of building a railway between Jaffa (the main port city at the time) and Jerusalem. Other consuls objected to this suggestion (Ben-Arieh, 1986:124). The Austro-Hungarian consul suggested a road for carriages to be built by a combined European body, headed by the Austrian Emperor's brother. The Ottomans sensed that these suggestions were designed to facilitate European penetration and control, and therefore opposed such plans. However, European pressure continued. In 1865 the idea of a railway was again raised by a German engineer. In 1872 or 1873, a Frenchman named Forbes managed to get the Sultan's consent on this matter. But the railway was finally laid only in 1892. Schick writes of its opening ceremony, a curious mixture of cultures and power displays:

“The opening of the [railway] line took place on the 26<sup>th</sup> of September 1892. A commissioner sent by the Turkish Government from Constantinople, some members of the Society, or Company, in Paris who have built the road, the Chief Engineers, His Excellency the Pasha and other members of the local government, together with the representatives of foreign nations, and many European and native gentlemen were present. Whilst the military band played, three he-goats were killed as a Corban or offering, then some speeches were delivered, and afterwards the decorated locomotive with the train started on excursions some miles down the line and back again. Everyone, as far as there was room, was allowed to go in the train, and so it went on the whole day. In the evening a grand banquet of 150 guests was held in a tent pitched in the large court before the station. (Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, January 1893: 22 in Letters from Herr Baurath von Schick).

The hilly terrain caused difficulties for the operation of the train, of which Schick writes: "In the mountains the locomotive often will not work or is too weak and stands still" (ibid.). Works on the carriage road continued and its paving began in 1867. Karmon (1977) suggests that one of the reasons for this was the expected opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which was followed by visits of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph and the Prussian Crown Prince to Jerusalem. Work on the road lasted three years, and it was only completed to a high standard in the 1880s. In addition to the road and railway leading to the coast, Jerusalem was connected by the telegraph in 1865 with lines to Beirut, Damascus, Constantinople, Jaffa, El-Arish, and Egypt.

Another means of communication was the postal system, established in Jerusalem in 1834. The foreign consulates requested to have their own independent postal systems. The Ottomans allowed these to operate only internationally, and not within the empire itself. Thus, in the 1840's the English Mission began to operate a postal system in Jerusalem, and in the 1850's French and Austrian post offices were opened. Baedeker's Handbook for Travelers of 1912 mentions Turkish, French, German, and Russian post offices on Jaffa Road, and an Austro-Hungarian post office in the Old City.

A further sign of European penetration was the opening of branches of European banks in Jerusalem. The first institute to call itself a bank was the Valeiro Bank, opened in 1848 by a local Jew of that name, an Ottoman citizen. This bank (which operated until 1915) acted as an agent for the governments of Austria, Germany, Russia and even Turkey until the opening of the Ottoman Bank (Ben-Arieh, 1986:522). Two other banks were opened by foreign citizens: Bergheim's Bank (a Prussian citizen, opened 1851, operated until 1892), and Fruttiger's Bank (a Swiss citizen) opened in 1872 and operated until 1896.

These banks contributed to the city's expansion by investing in land on which new Jewish neighbourhoods were built outside the walls. Fruttiger also invested in the railway line to Jaffa and in the building and selling of houses in the new neighbourhoods. In the 1890's the Ottomans forbade selling land to foreign citizens (including Jewish immigrants). This was part of the Ottoman efforts to stop foreign penetration.

In 1897 a new bank opened in the city, the Deutsche Palästina-Bank, a financial institute of the German Protestant Mission. The French Credit Lyonnais opened a branch in Jerusalem around 1900, as part of a network which encompassed the Middle East, the main branch being in Alexandria. This bank served church and consular institutes. Another international bank was opened in Jerusalem in 1903, the APC Bank (Anglo-Palestine Company), a Jewish bank, following its branch in Jaffa. APC was also involved in purchasing land outside the city walls. Finally, in 1905, a branch of the Banque Ottomane opened in the city (Ben-Arieh, 1986:524-6). An Arab Bank was opened in 1909. All banks were situated in Jaffa Road (Baedeker, 1912:19). Jews also opened smaller banks in the city around the same time.

An important display of power occurred in 1898, with an official visit to Jerusalem of the German Emperor Wilhelm II. The Emperor landed in a German warship in the port of Haifa and stepped on "German territory" in the Templar Colony in that city and arrived in Jerusalem in a procession led by Germans from Jaffa and Jerusalem. The Emperor had wished to enter the city on horseback, in accordance with a romantic-mediaeval image (Ben-Arieh, 1986:459). Instead, part of the wall near Jaffa Gate was demolished to allow his wide coach to enter. This change in plans was made for symbolic reasons: The Ottomans refused to let the Emperor enter Jerusalem riding a horse because only a Muslim liberator had done that. The opening of the wall was another symbolic manifestation of the changes in the city which were set in motion by the European powers.

The situation in Jerusalem during the Ottoman period can perhaps best be seen as what King defines as colonial urbanism:

“...colonial urbanization and cities became instruments by which the colonial periphery was incorporated into the metropolitan core. For each of the main colonial powers, a colonial urban system was established, from the metropolitan capital and port cities, through a network of colonial port cities, colonial capitals, regional and district centres, down to the outlying stations of the colonial bureaucracy and system of military control. All were linked by transport, communications, and subsequently, electronic and other media. As pre-capitalist modes of production, often with little urbanization or towns, were replaced, new capitalist forms of spatial organization, as well as building and urban forms were introduced” (King, 1990: 34).

### **JEWISH BUILDING UNDER THE OTTOMANS**

The Jewish settlements were also urban enclaves, built in order to house both Old City Jews who were living in squalid conditions and immigrants who were arriving in increasing numbers. A number of mid-nineteenth-century sources described the Jews of the Old City as the most impoverished population, with few protectors or patrons and meagre means for bettering themselves. As a correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune, Karl Marx wrote in 1854, “Nothing equals the misery and sufferings of the Jews at Jerusalem, inhabiting the filthiest quarter of the town...the constant object of Mussulman [sic] oppression and intolerance, insulted by the Greeks, persecuted by the Latins, and living only upon the scanty alms transmitted by their European brethren” (15 April 1854; Bartlett, 1843). The majority were funded by charitable donations or building societies supported by European philanthropists

(such as Sir Moses Montefiore and the Rothschild family).

Kark, (1991) documents that in the period 1860-1910, the Jewish development initiatives involved 22 building societies, 30 philanthropic organizations, 16 commercial enterprises, and 11 private projects.

In order to provide the Jews of the Holy Land with better living conditions, in 1860 Montefiore’s established the Mishkenot Shaananim, an abbreviated version of the English almshouse adapted to Jerusalem conditions, with a long terrace of two-room stone houses enclosed within a crenulated wall and gated compound. A windmill was included, offering the possibility of sustenance and self-sufficiency for the residents, which was a typical Victorian moral sentiment of the day. (In any case, it never really functioned properly.) Quite different was the almost contemporary Nahalat Shiva, a project of seven ideologically-motivated owners who accumulated land bought from Arab villagers (fellahin) in order to establish a Jewish presence outside the city wall. They divided the property into seven strips, eventually built houses, and offered portions to other Jews. It was a project motivated by a combination of both profits seeking and nascent nationalism (Halper, 1991).

The most explicit Jewish reinterpretation of the town was the gated compound of Mea Shearim, a series of two-roomed terrace houses that formed the outer boundaries, and the interior area, originally intended as a garden, was taken over by public buildings, including synagogues, a ritual bath, Torah school, a central baking oven, and a market (Ben-Arieh, 1986: 108-112; Halper, 1991: 139-150). Again, small plots of land were bought from Arabs, this time by messianic Jews who debated whether a properly pious life could be undertaken outside of the holy Old City (Halper, 1991: 144). Their aims were mystical but integrated with modern justifications and urban concerns.

The theological ideas of the community's mentor, Rabbi Rivlin, designated Mea Shearim as an eschatological effort, a premise demonstrated effectively by Gil Klein in each planning decision from property ownership to the arrangement of the terraces.

At the same time, the elders of Mea Shearim employed modern archaeological studies to vindicate their ideas, especially findings that seemed to confirm that the ancient Third Wall of Jerusalem had once enclosed their land, thus interpreted to extend the jurisdiction of the Holy City to Mea Shearim.

Although the new Jewish neighbourhoods varied considerably, it is possible to point out certain common features: most importantly, all are urban quarters, with streets and/or inner courtyards and often enclosing walls and gates. Cultivated land was minimal and disappeared quickly when populations grew. Boundaries were especially important, because of Jewish religious law that prohibited travelling or the carrying of objects beyond certain borders on the Sabbath (Kark, 1991: 103-104). Each neighbourhood was founded with written regulations governing religious and secular relationships, all of which emphasized the communal and neighbourhood aspects of the projects. Architecturally they may have resembled the almshouses of England or the ghettos of Poland; but quite consistently, there was an attempt to recreate the town. Most significantly, all involved some form of redemption, either through the moral obligations of charity and work, or in the settling of Jerusalem's land, or in messianic symbolism. It would be fair to say that the Jewish and the foreign Christian foundations were different from each other in many ways, but they had one critical feature in common: all were urban projects; each embodied town architecture (Kark, 1991: 101-185).

## THE NUCLEI OF ARAB NEIGHBORHOODS OUTSIDE THE WALLS

The Nuclei of Arab neighbourhoods outside the walls began to evolve in the 1860s on the basis of family affiliation. The Hussein family neighbourhood appeared in 1864 with the establishment of a summer house by Sheikh Taher Al-Husseini (Father of the Mufti Hajj Amin Al-Husseini) in the Al-Jarrahieh area, which is a plot of land within the city's borders north-west of its walls. This house was rebuilt in 1890-1895 in a more luxurious style. Sheikh Taher Al-Husseini's mansion remained on the outskirts of the neighbourhood which expanded to the southwest toward Az-Zawieh Al-Jarrahieh. Rabah Al-Husseini also built a grand villa in 1870, which later became the luxury hotel American Colony. Toward the end of the century, other mansions were built including the mansion of Ismail Haqqi Al-Husseini, which was no less luxurious than the American Colony. This mansion was completed in 1890 and became the New Orient House Hotel in 1952. It was one of the first Arab hotels opened after the 1948 War. In the late 1970s the New Orient House became the Arab Studies Society research centre and, later, the official headquarters of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Other houses belonging to the Hussein family and built in the same period included the house of Salim Afandi which became a girls' school and an orphanage (At-Tifl Al-Arabi House) after the 1948 War (Kark and Landman, 1980: 1132-1133; Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001: 117-119).

The An-Nashashibi family, a wealthy Jerusalemite family that owned vast areas of land in villages surrounding Jerusalem and Hebron, built its first mansion to the north-west of the Al-Husseini neighbourhood on lands belonging to Lifta village. Hajj Rashid An-Nashashibi built a huge summer house villa that formed the nucleus of this neighbourhood.

This villa is no longer standing: the present Ambassador Hotel was erected on its ruins.

The Jarallah family, which had cooperative relations with the Nashashibi family, built its houses in the same neighbourhood and other families joined it later. According to Schick's Map for the year 1894/5, there were seven houses in this area, which was later known as the Nashashibi neighbourhood (Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001: 120-122).

The Husseini and the Nashashibi neighbourhoods were for the elite and wealthy families, whose influence had increased since the 18th century as a result of taking administrative positions in the Ottoman State regime and being given the right to collect taxes.

Another neighbourhood characterized by family affiliation was the Dajani neighbourhood, which was established near the tomb of Prophet [King] David just outside the wall. The Dajani Daoudi family oversees the Prophet [King] David endowment and has built its houses in the area. The history of this neighbourhood goes back to the 19th century (Al-Aref, 1961: 470).

In spite of the relocation of wealthy Jerusalemite families to outside the walls and the establishment of neighbourhoods characterized by spacious gardens and orchards, the Old City within the walls remained the centre of their lives. The 'family house' or the so-called the 'large house' inside the walled city remained the family's gathering place, especially on social occasions.

The neighbourhoods to which the wealthy families moved at the end of the 19th century were merely residential concentrations and did not have any commercial or service activities. No multi-function neighbourhoods that included housing, transportation, commerce, services and institutions, evolved outside the walled city until the beginning of the 1870s. The development occurred along the main road axes north of the walled Jerusalem, especially on the roads connecting Jerusalem with Jaffa and Nablus.

The first multi-function Arab neighbourhood outside the walls was the Az-Zahreh (Herod's Gate) neighbourhood north of the walled city which evolved during the same period and was registered as an independent neighbourhood in the registrar of Ottoman building licenses in the period between 1902 and 1904. This neighbourhood is located in the area extending from Sheikh Muhammad Al-Khalili's mansion which was erected in the beginning of the 18th century and Az-Zawieh Al-Adhamieh which was established in the 14th century. One of the buildings of Ar-Rashidieh Schools is located in this neighbourhood exactly opposite Herod's Gate. It was established in 1906. Ar-Rashidieh Schools opened the first school in 1866-7 and eventually had eight schools in Jerusalem (Al-Aref, 1961).

The Al-Mas'oudieh neighbourhood (which was named after the Sa'd and Sa'id Mosque on Nablus Road) whose evolution began in 1875, was also one of the first neighbourhoods established outside the walls by the Damascus Gate. According to the Ottoman census for 1905, the number of families with Ottoman citizenship and who lived in this neighbourhood reached 119, comprising 59 Muslim families and 60 Christian families. This neighbourhood included the houses in the Al-Musrarah area. The Al-Musrarah name is derived from As-Sarar land, which is a field area strewn with small stones washed toward Damascus Gate by the rain. Al-Musrarah is considered part of the Al-Mas'oudieh neighbourhood, but the name Al-Musrarah became more popular than Al-Mas'oudieh and referred to the neighbourhood directly outside Damascus Gate and its extension to the West. Al-Musrarah was originally built by wealthy Muslims (Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001: 121). It developed as a commercial and residential neighbourhood starting in 1875. It was a market site for selling wholesale fruit and vegetables. It also constituted a number of pharmacies and stores that sold seeds and building supplies. There were also coffee shops, tailors, medical clinics, bus stops, and parking lots for cars. In the 1920s, its population was mixed with Arabs and Israelis, but it later became exclusively Arab until 1984.

The Al-Baq'a neighbourhood, where Sheikh Muhammad Al-Khalili built one of his mansions in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, began to evolve in 1873. Two Jerusalemite families, An-Nammari and Al-Wa'ari, established the nucleus of a neighbourhood in this area, which developed later during the British Mandate. Additionally, beginning in the 1870s, Jerusalemite families such as Barakat, Al-O'uri and Ad-Dajani began to move to a neighbourhood near At-Thawri village, and in the same year the Al-Hidmi family moved to Wadi Al-Joz and established a neighbourhood called Hosh Al-Hidmi. Houses in these neighbourhoods were rather modest and did not possess the luxurious architectural elements found in the other neighbourhoods. This plain style also characterized some buildings north of the Az-Zahreh and Al-Mas'oudieh neighbourhoods that were built at the turn of the century (Al-Aref, 1961; Tamari, 2002).

### **ARAB EXPANSION IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE**

The nature of Arab construction outside the walls, whose nuclei began taking the form of residential concentrations in the 1870s, cannot be compared with the modern concept of suburbs and their urban development. While such comparisons are frequently made by Israeli and western researchers of the modern history of Jerusalem, they ignore the fact that the walled Jerusalem remained the center of people's lives and institutions as well as the center of the services they received. The appellation "Old City" is relatively new for the Palestinians. Moreover, the walled part of Jerusalem also underwent many architectural, economic, residential and institutional transformations toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when new buildings filled existent empty spaces. . For example, during this period the courts complex was erected (1911); the city hall and numerous governmental schools were built; and so were several churches, schools and Christian institutions.

Furthermore, the Ottomans built several shops attached to each other starting from the main road outside the gates of Jerusalem, especially Damascus Gate and Jaffa Gate. Those shops were extensions of Old City markets, not evolutions of alternative commercial centers based on urban and architectural development.

### **The following points characterize Arab urban development in Jerusalem during the 19<sup>th</sup> century:**

Construction activities were individual initiatives based on family affiliations among members of one family. They were confined to the wealthy class that enjoyed great influence under the Ottoman State. They were characterized by their luxurious style, were influenced by western construction materials (red rooftops) and utilized modern construction methods (reinforced concrete and iron).

Construction initiatives were limited to the availability of land, and the Ottoman Sultan normally only granted land plots to families on the basis of their loyalties and relations with the Ottoman State. Moreover, lands on which suburbs were established near the walled city were owned by residents of surrounding villages whose lands extended over vast areas. Sheikh Jarrah lands, for example, were owned by residents of Lifta village, and Wadi Al-Joz lands were owned by residents of At-Tur.

The Ottoman reforms concerning the issue of land and the Land Ownership Law for the year 1867 positively influenced land and property registration, but the 1913 law for the registration and appropriation of lands and for outlining their borders effectively marked the inception of the process of organizing development and construction in Jerusalem. Prior to the introduction of the 1913 law land plot borders were normally descriptive and many plots were owned collectively by several heirs, which required reaching internal agreements among family members regarding the distribution of plots among themselves before building on them became possible. Family affiliations remained the basis of the construction and development process outside the walls.

The dates marking the inception and early stages of the Arab construction outside the Old City walls are not well documented due to the residential nature and the dependence on family affiliations. Moreover, most neighborhoods did not perform any functions other than residence (such as commerce, institutions, and services).

The Arab urban development outside the Old City walls did not result from economic-social mobility but constituted an aspect of the influence of the elites who sought to improve their living conditions. That development illustrates that the wealthy elites were influenced by the West as a result of education and openness to the West due to the presence of diplomatic missions and missionaries in Jerusalem and the increase of Christian pilgrim tourism. The central Ottoman State's imposition of its control contributed to increased security, and this was an important factor in the city's urban development outside the walls during the last half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The establishment of the new residential concentrations was not intended as the development of the concept of "the new city outside the walls." It was simply another manifestation of the old custom of building summer houses and mansions, whose beginnings outside the city's walls are not accurately documented. Some presently existing buildings date back to the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

The walled Jerusalem, or what later became known as the "Old City," remained the center of Jerusalem's religious, social, economic, commercial, cultural, service, institutional, administrative and organizational life. No alternatives evolved outside the city's walls for the functions performed by the walled city. The residential concentrations outside the city's walls remained linked to the historical city and did not develop any kind of independent services inside the new neighborhoods or around them at least during the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

To be sure, in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Ottoman State established a number of commercial shops directly outside Damascus Gate and Jaffa Gate, but those shops were considered a natural expansion and development of the city within the walls.

The modern residential concentrations outside the walls evolved near already existent buildings that performed primarily religious functions such as the Zawieh (prayer corners) and mosques as well as the Christian institutions and schools that were established in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Finally, the end of the Ottoman era witnessed an increased number of initiatives made by churches, especially the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian Churches, to establish residential concentrations on endowment lands for the community members of those churches. Lands were divided into plots and loans were given to community members of those churches to build on them. The migration of Christians to Jerusalem from all over Palestine contributed to an increased Christian presence in the city.

## **JERUSALEM UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE**

The years of World War I were recession years as far as the city's development was concerned. However, Britain occupied Palestine in 1917 and General Edmund Allenby's entry to Jerusalem on December 9, 1917 and the transformation of the city into the centre of the British Mandate caused the economy to flourish and the population to increase, and it witnessed an intensive construction boom. Arab construction was no longer confined to the wealthy upper class but included the middle class which began to grow during the British Mandate. The boom was powered by professionals, merchants, the educated and employees who served with the Mandate and institutions of western countries.

This period can be considered a new stage of construction and growth of the existing Arab neighbourhoods on the basis of social and class mobility (Tamari, 2002: 30-31).

The nuclei of the Arab neighbourhoods that had evolved in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century grew and became full-fledged residential neighbourhoods representing a mix of several families as well as a mix of Muslim and Christian Arabs, Greeks and Armenians. Mixed Arab-Jewish neighbourhoods also evolved, such as Romema and King George V–Ratisbone. Moreover, Jewish families lived in the Al-Musrarah and At-Talbieh neighbourhoods, which were among the most beautiful Arab neighbourhoods due to the distinct architectural character of the buildings and the scenic orchards. The majority of the population in these neighbourhoods was made up of Christian Arabs, but about 30% of the populations was Muslim (Mustafa, 2000:47-48).

Neighbourhoods that performed commercial functions were established. The Mamilla neighbourhood (Ma'man Allah in Arabic, which is a site comprising an Islamic cemetery where several Muslim scholars are buried), evolved outside Jaffa Gate and included a commercial area with offices, banks, stores as well as governmental installations. Also, Ash-Shamma'ah neighbourhood was to a great extent a commercial area that included shops for selling textiles and car repair garages. These businesses were owned by Arabs and Jews. Furthermore, the westward extension of Jaffa Gate evolved as a commercial centre owned by Arabs and Jews, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. Separation from the Old City occurred later as the Ben Yehuda area evolved into a distinct commercial street and, in the mid-1930s, as separate Arab and Jewish chambers of commerce were established.

Commercial activity was not confined to the extensions and the neighbourhoods linked to the Old City, but included neighbourhoods distant from the walls,

such as the An-Namamreh neighbourhood in Al-Baq'a where a market carrying the name of the family evolved (Landman, 1977: 58-62; Al-Aref, 1961: 469). The following explains how the market evolved:

Initially, there were no markets, mosques, schools, or medical facilities located on Al-Baq'a's unpaved streets. Children walked to the Old City to attend school as did those who needed to go to the market. In violation of the Islamic Waqf law which states that Waqf property cannot be sold, mortgaged or rented for extended periods, the British Mandate authority confiscated 51 dunams (approximately 13 acres) of An-Nammari Family Waqf land to build the British Sport Club. The High Islamic Committee intervened, and the matter was settled through financial compensation for the land. This money was used to build the Namamreh Market which in turn provided income for the Waqf, which reinvested the money in new buildings. In the Namamreh market, goods were bought and sold in both wholesale and retail trade, and a number of workshops were established as well as a pharmacy. The construction of the market and development of the area attracted more people to Al-Baq'a, especially in the 1920s and 30s, which in turn brought additional improvements (Tamari, 2002: 294-7).

Practically, is it possible to say that the Arab neighbourhoods under the British Mandate developed a certain independence from the Old City, but the economic relationship nevertheless remained strong. The Old City represented the central market, the centre of people's lives and their family affiliation, because the families of older generations remained in the Old City, living side by side with the families of newer generations whose capabilities did not allow them to build houses outside the Old City. The Old City was also the settling place of Arab immigrants from other areas, especially the Hebronites' immigration which began in the 1920s. The immigration was based on the need for unskilled labourers, but the immigrants gradually began working in skilled trades and in certain professions (Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001: 152-156).

Urban activity was not confined to the city's neighbourhoods but also included villages within the Jerusalem sub-district, especially the big villages like Lifta, Ein Karem, Deir Yassin and Al-Malhah. In Lifta, architecture took the character of construction in Jerusalem neighbourhoods with luxurious two-story buildings and internal yards and orchards covering the slopes of Lifta At-Tahta (The Lower Lifta), while Lifta Al-Foqa (The Upper Lifta) evolved adjacent to Romema (a mixed neighbourhood) and also included luxurious houses. Unlike other distant villages, Lifta had two coffee shops, two carpentries, barbershops, a butcher as well as a clinic run by two doctors and two nurses.

Lifta's houses, which were deserted after the expulsion of their residents in 1948, have remained abandoned and are now in a state of decay. Other villages in the Jerusalem sub-district also witnessed similar urbanization to varying degrees (Tamari, 2002).

Due to considerations pertaining to the British Mandate, none of the Palestinian villages were included within the municipal borders, while all Jewish neighbourhoods were. This created a Jewish majority within the Mandate's municipal borders. Table 3 illustrates the differences in the urban population of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem, as well as the sub-district under the British Mandate.

**Table 3: Mandate Population of Urban Jerusalem and Sub-district, 1922-1946**

Year	Jerusalem Sub-District		Urban Jerusalem	
	Israeli Jews	Palestinian Arabs	Israeli Jews	Palestinian Arabs
<b>Census 1922 Estimate</b>	34,439	82,870	33,971	28,112
<b>Census 1931 Estimate</b>	54,823	98,803	51,222	39,229
<b>Census 1944 Estimate</b>	100,200	140,530	97,000	59,980
<b>Census 1946 Estimate</b>	102,520	150,590	99,320	65,010

From 1922 to 1946 the population of urban Jerusalem

**Source: Survey of Palestine, I, 18; (Tamari, 2002: 203-205).**

grew by approximately 165%, from about 62,000 to 164,000. During the British Mandate the Jewish population of Jerusalem grew by 190%. This latter percentage was much less than the Jewish population growth in Tel Aviv, where population grew by 750% during the same period, making it the centre of the Zionist Movement settlement as well as the economic and institutional centre of the Jews in Palestine.

This trend is contrary to early Jewish immigration waves which were concentrated in Jerusalem and whose motives were religious; later Jewish immigrants largely came because of ideological, political, economic and colonial factors.

In 1922, Jews represented 11% of the total Palestinian population; of these, 41% resided in Jerusalem. But while the total Jewish population in Palestine increased to 30% by the end of the Mandate, the percentage of Jews residing in Jerusalem actually dropped to 17% (Tamari, 2002: 203-205).

During the Mandate the Arab Muslim and Christian population of Jerusalem increased as a result of natural growth, as well as inner immigration to the city.

Availability of work was also one of the most important factors contributing to immigration to Jerusalem. Table 4 illustrates the numbers of Arab Muslims and Christians, and well as Israeli Jews in Jerusalem during the British Mandate.

**Table 4: Urban Jerusalem Population according to Religious Affiliation during the British Mandate**

	Muslims	Christians	Israeli Jews	Total
<b>Survey of Palestine, 1922</b>	13,413	14,699	33,971	62,578
<b>Census of 1931</b>	19,894	19,335	51,222	90,503
<b>Census estimate of 1944</b>	30,630	29,350	97,000	157,080

Source: Figures obtained from the Survey of Palestine, I. 148-151. \* Total includes “others” (Tamari, 2002: 203-205).

### PLANNING UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE

The area of the Ottoman Municipal Jerusalem was about 13 km<sup>2</sup>, but the area of the space utilized for construction did not exceed 7 km<sup>2</sup>, including the Old City whose area is a little less than 1 km<sup>2</sup>. The British Mandate expanded the area of Municipal Jerusalem to about 63 km<sup>2</sup>, mostly to the West of the Old City, thereby including most Jewish neighbourhoods and excluding most Palestinian villages, some of which continued to evolve as suburbs of Jerusalem during British Mandate years. The Ottomans did not exhibit great interest in city planning. Their efforts focused mainly on inspecting buildings, issuing construction permits to erect new buildings or to renovate existent ones, and levying taxes on buildings outside the walls (Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001: 143-149).

British Mandate authorities prepared several master plans for Jerusalem. The first master plan for the city was requested by General Allenby in June 1918 and prepared by Architect William McLean, Alexandria City Engineer. An additional master plan was prepared by Patrick Geddes in 1919. Neither of these plans defined planning boundaries. But in 1922 Jerusalem’s city architect Charles Ashbee prepared a statutory plan and in 1930 the first formal master plan was drawn by British architect Clifford Holliday and was approved. This plan regulated building limitations and became the basis of lot parcelling. In 1944, Kendall’s master plan was approved. It took into account ethnic sensitivities and public perceptions of the city. This plan in fact adapted Holliday’s plan.

The following tables compare the various mandatory town plans of Jerusalem. (See Tables 5 summarizing the urban plans during the British Mandate):

**Table 5: Jerusalem Plans 1918-1944**

Characteristics	Mclean Plan	Geddes Plan	Geddes Ashbee Plan	Holiday Plan	Kendal Plan
Land Use	<b>Building and development 56%</b> (17,910 dunum)	<b>Building and development 66.2%</b> (11,790 dunum)	<b>Residential &amp; Commercial Activities 64.8%</b> (14,370 dunum)	<b>Residential Area 79.2%</b> (31,918 dunum)	<b>Residential Area (Six sub areas) 77.4%</b> (32,535 dunum)
				<b>Commercial Area 2.5%</b> (942 dunum)	<b>Commercial Area 2.3%</b> (985 dunum)
	<b>limited building and development 33.5%</b> (5,990 dunum)	<b>Open Area 29.1%</b> (5,160 dunum)	<b>Open Area 21.9%</b> (4,860 dunum)	<b>Open Area 13.1%</b> (5,431 dunum)	<b>Open Area 14.8%</b> (6,220 dunum)
	<b>Prohibited planning and development 10.5%</b> (1,900 dunum)	<b>The Old City 4.7%</b> (1,900 dunum)	<b>Special Areas 6.5%</b> (1,420 dunum)	<b>The Old City and Silwan 1.7%</b> (733 dunums)	<b>The Old City and Silwan 1.8%</b> (742 dunums)
			<b>Industry 6.8%</b> (1,510 dunum)	<b>Industrial Area 1.8%</b> (736 dunum)	<b>Industrial Area 2.2%</b> (948 dunum)
			<b>Cemeteries 1.4%</b> (680 dunum)	<b>Cemeteries 1.3%</b> (600 dunum)	
Building Regulations	Prohibiting construction in the Old City and encouraging it towards the west. Northwest and south west. Area to the east of the city was kept open	Prohibiting construction in the old city and encouraging it towards the west, northwest and south west. Area to the east of the city was kept open	Prohibiting construction in the old city and encouraging it towards the west, Northwest and south west. Area to the east of the city was kept open	Building permitted on eastern side of Al-Masharef Mt. & Mt of Olives and prohibited on western side of them to ensure an open area overlooking the old city Zoning was confined to control and regulate construction and development in Jerusalem	Residential areas were classified into sub areas Attention was given to designing the urban space through preserving the skyline

Characteristics	Mclean Plan	Geddes Plan	Geddes Ashbee Plan	Holiday Plan	Kendal Plan
Date	1918	1919	1922	1930	1944
Total Area Covered	17,910 dunums	17,800 dunums	22,160 dunums	40,440 dunums	42,030 dunums
Boundaries	Al-Masharef Mountain, the Mount of Olives, Ras Al-Amoud and Silwan to its east, and the new area that was prepared for development to the west				Palestinian citizens mainly north-south route through the city (along the Hebron and Nablus roads), Jewish citizens resided primarily in quarters on either side of the route coming from the west (the road to Jaffa).
Basis	Old City as separation line	Mclean Plan	Mclean & Gheddes Plan	<b>(First Codified Plan)</b> Calculated quantitative program & detailed system of regulations & Instructions	<b>(2<sup>nd</sup> Codified Plan)</b> Detailed Program (Aspect –Prospect) based on spatial and social level
Cornerstone	Rail Station to the west of the Old City	Hebrew University on al Masharef Mount.		Old City As core of all Development plans	
Road Network	The plan proposed seven roads, including a railway, beginning at the northern and western boundaries of the Old City			Road network divided into 3 levels of cohesive of circular and longitudinal roads Jaffa road as Backbone of road network	Road network divided into 4 levels of and the design of the previous plan was adopted


Source: Based on Kendall, 1948; Kark, 1991; Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003

To understand how complex Jerusalem's spatial and social fabric is, a brief description of its history should be discussed. On 2 November 1917, Britain's foreign secretary Lord Arthur Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild declaring the British government's support of establishing "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. The letter was later known as the Balfour Declaration. Despite the goals stated in the declaration under Article 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as promises offering support for Arab independence in World War I, Palestinian Arabs living in Palestine were denied national and political rights under British rule (Barakat, 2016).

On 9 December 1917, the British Mandate overtook the city of Jerusalem from the Ottoman Empire that ended about 400 years of Ottoman rule. The British immediately began to establish urban plans that continued till 1948. There were two objectives for urban planning: the first was to preserve the City of Jerusalem from a historical point of view, considering the city is holy to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The second objective consisted of transforming Jerusalem into a modernized city, since it lacked the characteristics of a modern city, such as spaced roads, hotels, sports facilities, playgrounds, and green public spaces (Jabareen, 2016). Jerusalem's first urban plan during the British Mandate was developed by William McLean in 1918 before World War I ended, where the city was divided into four zones:

(1) the Old City, where construction was prohibited in order to preserve its historical aspect; (2) a zone around the Old City where no construction was to take place and unwanted buildings were to be destroyed to clear the area and leave it to its natural state, as indicated by the brown line in Figure 1 below; (3) a zone located to the north and east of the Old City where construction could take place under the condition the plans acquire special approval; and (4) a zone located to the north and west of the Old City that was set for modern development. After the war, a large number of planners and civic engineers arrived in Palestine and many of them had experience in planning or managing colonial spaces. McLean had prior experience in planning, having worked in Alexandria as the city's engineer. Patrick Geddes, his successor, had experience in planning from working in India before going to Jerusalem and also worked on projects for the Zionist Commission. Charles Robert Ashbee, an architect and designer who worked in Egypt before heading to Jerusalem, was Jerusalem's first civic advisor who was appointed by Military Governor Ronald Storrs. Ronald Storrs was not an urban planner; however, he was a member of Cairo's Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l'Art Arabe during his time in Egypt prior to the war, and it was this experience that led him to create the Pro-Jerusalem Society (PJS) in order to progress the preservation of Jerusalem as the city's governor (Roberts, 2013). While each of these individuals had different experiences, skills, and an understanding of space in Palestine, they all expected that planning would benefit Britain by bringing order to a city they believed was in chaos.

Figure 2: William McLean's "Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme No. 1"



Source: William McLean "Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme No.1," 1918. From C.R. Ashbee, ed., Jerusalem 1918–1920: Being the Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the Period of the British Military Administration (London: John Murray, 1921), No.21.

The Council of the Pro-Jerusalem Society was founded in September 1918 in Jerusalem and incorporated in October 1920. It was founded by Sir Ronald Storrs and C.R. Ashbee and was created to match Storr's own image of the Holy City. The major objectives of the Society are listed below. Storr wanted to preserve Jerusalem's history, yet, it was not clear which aspects of history he wanted preserved and which ones he wanted forgotten. The objectives are all linked to the preservation of the city's architecture and native industry.

The Society was also involved in the fostering of craft and business within the city's walls, however, commerce was to be upheld in harmony with Jerusalem's biblical image (Murphy, 2016).

## Major Goals of the Pro-Jerusalem Society

- (i) The protection of and the addition to the amenities of Jerusalem and its district.
- (ii) The provision and maintenance of parks, gardens, and open spaces in and around Jerusalem and its district.
- (iii) The establishment of museums, libraries, art galleries, exhibitions, musical and dramatic centres or other institutions of a similar nature for the benefit of the public.
- (iv) The protection and preservation, with the consent of the Government, of antiquities in and around Jerusalem.
- (v) The encouragement of arts, handicrafts and industries in consonance with the general objects of society.
- (vi) The administration of any immovable property in the district of Jerusalem which is acquired by the society or entrusted to it by any person or corporation with a view to securing the improvement of the property and the welfare of its tenants or occupants.
- (vii) To co-operate with the Department of Education, Agriculture and Public Health, Public Works so far as may be in harmony with the general objects of the Society.

Source: Murphy, 2016.

On 8 April 1918, there were six development plans drawn up for Jerusalem during British rule, which were based on an ordinance issued by the then military Governor of Jerusalem, Robert Storrs. The plans restricted new construction within a 2500-meter radius of Damascus Gate (Bab Al-'Amud), with the exception of those granted permission under the military government. Through this process, Britain formally regulated and controlled urban planning and construction in the Old and New City of Jerusalem. In this sense, the Old City was to undergo a process that would transform the city to match it with the British image of a classical city, while the New City would be transformed into a modern European city to promote the settlement and immigration of Jews into the newly designed neighbourhoods (Barakat, 2016). One year after McLean's proposal, Sir Patrick Geddes introduced a new plan for Jerusalem, as seen in Figure 3.

Geddes was a Scottish sociologist and a town planner and had arrived in Palestine in 1919 in order to sketch an outline plan for the Hebrew University for the Zionist Commission. He was also asked by Storrs to comment on McLean's plan, which was previously criticized as being unsuitable considering the country's mountainous topography. Geddes utilized his experience from working in India as a planner to accentuate the need to preserve the Old City and to avoid congestion in the city. He advocated for the preservation of old buildings because he admired local cultures in contrast to the colonial practice of planning new cities centred on grids of streets. McLean's proposal had included preservation of the Old City with a grid plan beyond the city's walls. Contrary to McLean's proposal, Geddes' plan established a clearly defined natural green space or greenbelt that surrounded the Old City.

The greenbelt became constricted to the west as urban development beyond the walls was by then prominent, while it stretched extensively to the northeast and southeast. The plan had also accentuated the role of future ring roads or beltways. The new beltways would link new neighbourhoods to the Old City, replacing the inflexible grid of streets proposed by McLean (Gitler, 2003).

**Figure 3: Patrick Geddes' Plan for Jerusalem (1919)**




Source: Geddes' plan for Jerusalem (1919). Prof. Patrick Geddes, 1919, Jerusalem: Town Planning Scheme No. 2 From: C.R. Ashbee, Jerusalem 1918–1920: being the records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council during the period of the British military administration edited by C.R. Ashbee (London: J. Murray for the Council of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, 1921).

C.R. Ashbee was Jerusalem's first Civic Advisor in 1918 and Secretary of the Pro-Jerusalem Society from 1919 to 1922. Part of his work required him to photograph and document Palestinian life in the Old City. One key proposal of Ashbee's was a ring of gardens that would encircle the Old City (see Figure 4). This greenbelt was to shape the spine of the broader Park System. He wanted anyone looking towards the city from a distance to view the fortified walls and towers within a green backdrop, like a gemstone enriched and detached from its more monotonous and contemporary urban setting in the New City.


Furthermore, the view from within was to be observed from a walkway that would be constructed into the defensive stone walls of the Ottoman wall. However, Ashbee's greenbelt plans necessitated the demolition of structures built around Jaffa Gate to create his most wanted pastoral scenery, as seen in Figure 5 (Pullan and Kyriacou, 2009).

**Figure 4: Ashbee's Greenbelt Plan**



Source: *The Spine of the Park System*. A plan by Ashbee that proposed encircling the Old City with a continuous series of gardens that could be viewed from the rampart walk along the top of the Old City walls. This garden belt

**Figure 5: Ashbee's Proposed Plan for Land outside Jaffa Gate**



Source: *Jaffa Gate, existing and proposed*. Top: A photograph looking towards Jaffa Gate from outside the Old City showing the buildings along the road to Jaffa Gate. Bottom: A drawing by Ashbee of the same view towards the Old City following the clearance of these buildings and the establishment of his desired pastoral landscape. Source: Illustrations 44,45 from *Jerusalem, 1918-1920*. London, J. Murray.

## ARAB NEIGHBOURHOODS: NEW CLASS, NEW FEATURES

The following characteristics can be considered common denominators describing the Arab neighbourhoods that developed during the British Mandate:

The nuclei of the main neighbourhoods that had developed during the Ottoman years of 1860-1900 expanded. Although approximately 20 new neighbourhoods appeared during the British Mandate and were added to a similar number from the Ottoman period, the older, already established neighbourhoods witnessed greater and faster growth under the British, especially the neighbourhoods located to the south and southwest of the Old City.

Family affiliation was no longer the major basis in the development of old or new neighbourhoods during the British Mandate. The neighbourhoods were inhabited by Jerusalemite families as well as families that immigrated to Jerusalem due to the availability of work opportunities and due to the evolution of Jerusalem into an economic-commercial centre. Moreover, members of some established families moved to different neighbourhoods. For example, members of An-Nashashibi family built in the Ethiopian neighbourhood and the family's construction was not confined to Sheikh Jarrah. The same applies to Al-Husseini family; some of its members built in Az-Zahreh neighbourhood.

Construction initiatives were individual, private, and financed from private capital, contrary to Jewish construction, which was initiated by societies and bodies affiliated with the Zionist Movement and financed primarily from abroad. In addition, the Jewish private sector had contributed to building apartments for profit since the end of the 19th century, but this had not happened on the Arab side.

The developmental role of the British Mandate authority was confined to preparing city plans and its work was limited to monitoring the implementation of these plans. The Mandate authority did not allocate budgets for development. It merely used tax revenues to implement its fiscal policy. Moreover, the Mandate authority built very few public institutions, which reflected negatively on the Arab side because Jewish construction in Jerusalem included construction of public institutions financed from abroad.

The second decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a deepening of the Palestinian national feeling and a national movement grew to counteract the Zionist Movement. This feeling grew among the upper and middle classes and facilitated the process of their political merger. Escalation of the conflict deepened the segregation between the Arabs and Jews. The Palestinians considered Zionist Jews to be imperialists, whereas Jews who lived in Palestine under the Ottoman rule were considered part of the prevailing social structure.

The urban growth in Jerusalem neighbourhoods changed the nature of the relationship between the city and the surrounding villages. This was in part due to the sale of lands owned by village residents as well as village residents' activity in the construction industry. Some villages became adjacent to the city and were practically transformed into suburbs. This transformation reflected itself in a lesser dependence by the village on agriculture in comparison with the pre-Mandate era, especially in the villages close to the city's neighbourhoods.

The Old City remained the centre of the Arab life and the relationship between the new city and the Old City interconnected. Many inhabitants of the new neighbourhoods had their commercial interests in the Old City, while children of the Old City studied in schools outside the walls and vice versa. Nevertheless, the role of the new city was limited.

Some Arab neighbourhoods with a Christian majority evolved joint initiatives with other families (but they were limited in size), while others evolved via church initiatives, though the neighbourhoods were not confined to Christians. For example, Muslims lived in some of those neighbourhoods like Al-Qatamon, At-Talbieh, the German Colony and the Greek Colony.

The end of the British Mandate coincided with the declaration of the State of Israel. The defeat of the Arab countries by Israel created the enormous Palestinian tragedy, Al-Nakba (Catastrophe). In Jerusalem this meant 30,000 Palestinian residents of the new city found themselves suddenly refugees in other areas of the city, while 2,000 Jews were expelled from the Old City (Tamari, 2002). Jerusalem became divided into two parts: the western part, comprised of most of the formerly Arab urban neighbourhoods and all the Jewish neighbourhoods, and the eastern part, a less developed urban space whose area did not exceed 3 km<sup>2</sup> including the Old City.

Finally, Chapter One illustrated two types of urbanization: one was colonial which was supported mainly by externally organized groups (Jewish and European Christian groups), and one was organic which was composed of individual initiatives (by Arab Muslim and indigenous Christians). The course of the ethno-national conflict between the Jewish and the Arab people revolved from the beginning around control of land, space and demography. The following chapter will follow the developments that occurred after the end of the British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948.



**CHAPTER TWO:  
JERUSALEM FROM DIVISION  
TO FRAGMENTATION,  
1948-2018**

# ***JERUSALEM FROM DIVISION TO FRAGMENTATION, 1948-2008***

## **JERUSALEM: THE DIVIDED CITY: 1948-1967**

The British Mandate was terminated on 15 May 1948. As a result of the 1948-9 Arab-Israeli War, Jerusalem was partitioned. Over 60,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their western Jerusalem neighbourhoods and the surrounding villages. Thirty-seven of the forty-one Palestinian villages were totally demolished (Tamari, 2002: 127). The negotiations between Israel and Jordan led to the Rhodes agreement of 16 March 1949, which formalized the division of the city (Ginio, 1980). The city was divided into Arab East Jerusalem and Jewish West Jerusalem. There were subsequent efforts by the international community to implement an international regime – UN Resolution 181 – but these efforts were ineffective. In December 1948, a Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) was created by the UN General Assembly, composed of representatives from the United States, France and Turkey. The CCP unsuccessfully attempted to reach a compromise between the de facto partition and the UN's resolution on internationalization, and by the end of 1949 the CCP had removed the Jerusalem question from its agenda. In April 1950 the UN Trusteeship Council made yet another attempt at a workable formation, taking internationalization as the basic model, but strong opposition from both Israel and Jordan condemned it to languish. After that effort,

there were no further active attempts to implement internationalization or indeed to confront Jerusalem's new situation of division (Asali, 1989: 261).

On 2 August 1948 David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of the new State of Israel, declared that the laws of Israel were to be imposed on Jerusalem; efforts were made quickly to move the state institutions to Jerusalem. The Israeli Knesset began its session in Jerusalem in December 1949, and in January 1950 government offices were transferred to Jerusalem. On 23 January 1950 the Knesset proclaimed West Jerusalem the capital of the State of Israel. The president's official residence moved to the city in 1953, thus obliging diplomatic credentials to be presented there. The last office to move there was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on July 12, 1953 (Dumper, 1997).

Development of West Jerusalem concentrated westward; the areas close to the Armistice line were the most neglected. West Jerusalem became a frontier city surrounded by West Bank areas on the north, west and south. The city enjoyed a very modest economic growth; eight of the twenty-four neighbourhoods could be classified as a poor. The trend of developing Tel Aviv as an economic and institutional centre continued after the 1948 war, but important governmental buildings were constructed in Jerusalem (such as the new campus of the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Ein Karem Hospital, and the Government House) in the 1960s. New neighbourhoods of public housing were built in Qatamom (Gonen), Kiryat Moshe, Talpiot and Qiryat Ha Yovel.

The new neighbourhoods constructed in West Jerusalem were built for the absorption of new immigrants. These buildings were built as low cost long structures, using primarily concrete, and were not faced with stone.

Segregation of ultra-orthodox and secular communities became clearer than before. Educated elite Israelis settled eventually in upscale former Palestinian neighbourhoods which became very expensive areas, with the exception of Musrara where descendants from the MENA region lived by the Separation Barrier.

The city centre of the new Jerusalem, which during the Mandate period was in the Jaffa Street area, continued to serve as a city centre of West Jerusalem, and almost no additional commercial buildings were constructed between 1948-1967 due to slow growth and the peripheral type of the economy that evolved in West Jerusalem.

The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was annexed to Jordan on 1 December 1948; administrative institutions were transferred from East Jerusalem to Jordan's capital Amman. In 1953 the Hashemites granted East Jerusalem the status of "amana" (trusteeship) and made it the "second capital" of Jordan, but this was primarily in response to the Israeli government's attempt to force international recognition of West Jerusalem as its own capital. Plans to formalize the status by constructing Jordanian government offices were never put into action. The municipal boundaries remained the same as defined in the early 1950s (expanded from 3 km square to 6 km square) and no development budget was allocated for Jerusalem. Jordan devoted its resources to the development and the strengthening of the capital city Amman; incentives were given to private sector investment. All efforts of Palestinian elected parliamentarians from Jerusalem to allocate funds for city development faced obstacles by the Jordanian bureaucracy and their will to channel all investment to Amman and the East Bank.

Thus, in the absence of any investment in the city, or any corresponding increase in the powers of East Jerusalem's Municipality, or any permanent location of institutions of national importance, the conferring of this new amana status remained largely a cosmetic exercise (Rubinstein, 1980).

In the early sixties new neighbourhoods began to emerge north of Sheikh Jarrah along the main road to Ramallah. Jerusalem urban families built their houses on the Shufat and Beit Hanina village lands along the main road. Also, emigrants from Hebron (Al-Khalaila), known for their merchant skills, left the Old City at the end of the 1950s and built their own private houses in Wadi Al-Joz, At-Tur (Mount of Olives) Ath-Thuri (Abu Tur) and Silwan. New suburban neighbourhoods developed in Dahyet El Bareed (such as the housing project initiated by the post office workers in the late 1950s early 1960s) and Al-Matar (Qalandia Airport). The nearby villages of Al-Eizariya and Abu Dis also witnessed an urbanization process and developed as suburbs. Between 1952 and 1967 the average rate of urban construction activity in Jerusalem and its suburbs increased 303 percent (Mustafa, 2000: 62-63).

The population of East Jerusalem grew from 46,700 in 1952 to 60,500 in 1961 within the municipal boundaries (an increase of 29.5 percent compared to 227.6 percent in Amman during the same period with 108,300 in 1952 to 246,500 in 1961). The most important public buildings under the Jordanian period were three hospitals (one used now as the police headquarters) in Sheikh Jarrah and the YMCA-East Jerusalem on Nablus Road.

Despite the official Jordanian impediment to allow Palestinian development policy, Jerusalem came to be the central Palestinian city and the capital of the Palestinian people, especially after the fall of the

two important coastal cities Jaffa and Haifa. Under the Israeli sovereignty, their intellectual nationalistic elites lived mainly in these two cities and in the new city of Jerusalem, which became West Jerusalem under Israeli control. Jerusalem also became the main commercial and transportation centre of the entire West Bank; a new modern city centre began to emerge north of Bab Al-Amud (Damascus gate) and Bab Al-Sahira (Herod's Gate) on Sultan Suleiman, Salah Al-Din and Al-Zahra Streets. This development started in the 1950s and intensified in the early sixties. Office space, hotels and shops were built mostly on Waqf or Family Waqf's lands. According to Dumper, the Waqf is responsible for 129 shops in the Bab Al-Sahira business district: 116 units served as offices, and 4 large houses were rented to banks, in addition to a parking lots, several hotels and schools (Khamaisi, 2003: 244). The remaining section of the Prophet Street at Musrara was the only pre-1948 commercial strip that continued to operate after the division of the city and it hosted mainly a wholesale market which served the entire West Bank.

### **ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF JERUSALEM**

By noon on Wednesday, 7 June 1967 Israelis completed the occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in addition to the Egyptian Sinai desert and the Golan Heights). Six hundred-forty-five Arabs were killed, including 240 civilians who died as a result of the Israeli shelling; the Israelis counted about 200 dead, including fifteen civilians (Wasserstein, 2002: 208). The first major event in the post-war days was the demolition of the Maghariba quarter in the Old City next to the Wailing Wall. It began on the evening of 8 June and in just a few days most of the buildings in the quarter, a historical Waqf property, were rubble. By the end of the year a total of 2,959 people, most of the Arab residents in the quarter,

had been removed (Wasserstein, 2002: 215). John

Tieel has written in "I Am Jerusalem":

"After the victory, the Israeli authorities did not waste time in changing the face of Jerusalem. Starting from what they have most at heart, the Wailing Wall, they emptied the North African Maghariba quarter, removed all of the families living there, and levelled their dwellings with bulldozers. In no time, a 10 dunum open space (one dunum equals 1,000 square meters) was created from people's homes. And the façade of the massive Western Wall was exposed, which for centuries had remained out of direct view and had been accessible only through a narrow alley. In addition, a row of buildings was demolished that had embraced the exterior of the city wall, extending from Jaffa Gate around past the New Gate until Damascus Gate" (Tieel, 2000).

### **ANNEXATION, SETTLEMENT-BUILDING AND "GREEN LAND" DESIGNATION**

On June 28, 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed a law that formally extended Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and civil administration over 70 km<sup>2</sup> of Arab East Jerusalem and 28 km<sup>2</sup> of surrounding West Bank villages. The new borders brought within the city a large cordon of mostly uninhabited land on the northern, eastern and southern outer fringes of the city. On this land, over the next thirty years, extensive rings of settlements were built. The Israeli Ministry of Interior issued a special decree dissolving the Jordanian Municipality Council and extended the jurisdiction of the Jewish Municipality over the entire annexed area (Benvenisti, 1981). Israel conducted a census which classified Palestinians as Permanent Residents of the State of Israel; Jerusalemites who worked or resided in other countries (such as the many Palestinians who had

worked in the Gulf countries since the 1950s) were classified as absentees and had no right to return to their city.

In addition to these formal political-legal acts, Israel also set in motion a series of policies designed to “create facts on the ground”. A two-fold strategy was adopted and implemented with great speed and energy. First, as a means of establishing a strong Jewish physical presence over all of East Jerusalem, a massive program of Jewish settlement was carried out beyond the pre-1967 dividing line. Second, the Israeli authorities sought to maintain - and if possible even enlarge - the Jewish demographic majority by encouraging Jews to settle in Jerusalem, while at the same time restricting the migration of Arabs from the West Bank into the newly annexed areas of East Jerusalem (Romann and Weingrod, 1991).

Following the geopolitical act of annexing East Jerusalem, the Israeli government confiscated more than 30,000 dunums (34% of the East Jerusalem territory) of Palestinian land for the building of new Jewish settlements. Fifteen settlements have been built since 1967 in East Jerusalem with a population of 205,220 at end of 2014 (B’Tselem, 2017). In addition, large tracts of Palestinian private owned land (31,000 dunums, or 7,750 acres) were designated “green areas” through zoning ordinances. As a result of the above policies, Palestinian neighbourhoods (built up areas and available land for future development) consisted of only 14% of East Jerusalem. Israel imposed a restricted policy on Palestinian construction and economic development which led to the emigration of the Palestinians from the city to new areas which had developed as suburbs of the city. Between 1982 and 1992 only 270,000 of the 5,000,000 square meters of built-up Jerusalem were designated for Palestinians (IPCC, 2007).

## **Jerusalem municipal Palestinian neighbourhoods can be classified into the following groupings:**

### **A. The Old City**

Neighbourhoods developed on village’s land where the core village (but not its land) was excluded from Israeli municipal boundaries such as Kufr Aqab, Beit Hanina, and Anata. Neighbourhoods developed as an expansion of core villages annexed to the municipal boundaries or an expansion to the core village. Examples of that would be Silwan, `Isawiya, as Sawahira, Beit Safafa (divided village between 1948-1967) and Sur Bahir. Urban neighbourhoods from the 19th and early 20th centuries remained in the Eastern section of the divided city, e.g., Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Al-Joz and Bab Al-Sahira. It is worth mentioning that most of the Palestinians who lived in urban neighbourhoods were exiles, as a result of Al-Nakba in 1948: the elite, middle class and educated groups were forced to leave the urban neighbourhoods which later became West Jerusalem. The exiles numbered approximately 30,000 thousand; they had lived in 8 urban neighbourhoods and 39 villages; most of the villages were demolished after the war (Amirav, 1992). The areas zoned by the Israeli Municipality as an open space are coloured green (dark and light) on zoning maps. These are areas where construction is totally forbidden. In a neutral planning system this regulation is a requirement to protect the greenery and to keep urban open spaces both on the neighbourhood level and on the broader region level. However, in the East Jerusalem case this regulation is meant to restrict Palestinian growth and development and to isolate and “protect” the Israeli settlements. Wide belts of open space and exaggerated “green areas” are imposed on East Jerusalem.

Such zones create great fear amongst the Palestinians who plan to build a home only to find out that most of their hopes are painted green on the mayor's table. And it should be stressed that these green areas, as far as the Palestinians are concerned, are almost the only land reserved for their future development. In most cases these lands are barren, very rocky, and not potential agricultural land.

The Israeli settlements form loop belts that disrupt Palestinian geographic and demographic continuity. They are established to achieve territorial, demographic, physical and political control and at the same time to obstruct the development of the Palestinian land. On the other hand, Palestinian areas have been developed by desperate private initiatives of land owners (usually on family land) and small-scale contractors, without physical plans, or the support and incentives of the central and local governments, and with only limited financial, technical, and administrative resources. Areas around Palestinian built-up areas are designated as green open spaces, i.e. not available for future expansion, whereas areas around the Jewish settlements are zoned as unplanned, i.e. available for any future proposal for change in the land use (Margalit, 2006:37). Experience shows that the so called "green" Palestinian areas are used as a "reserve" that will later serve the expansion interests of Israeli settlements built in East Jerusalem. In the last decade, there are at least two cases of the so called green areas being transformed into an area for the development of settlements: Har Homa, which was established in 1996 with a total area of 2,523 dunums and a population of 2,925 by the beginning of 2005, and Rekhes Shu`fat (Ramat Shlomo), which was established in 1994 with a total area of 1,126 dunums and a population of 13,888 at the beginning of 2005 (Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2007).

### **Forced Suburbanization in the Jerusalem Area**

The restriction of Palestinian development and the exercise of excessive designation of "green area" have affected East Jerusalem and its inhabitants and forced them to migrate towards Jerusalem's outer boundaries. Many Jerusalemites who could not find a residence or space to build in East Jerusalem had to look for housing options outside the municipal line, such as in the Al-Ram area and Al-Izzariya, which lie in the direct surrounding areas of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem.

Since the mid-1980s many Palestinians have left the city and built their houses in areas outside the municipal boundaries. The scarcity and cost of land in the city is, of course, a major reason for this. By contrast, lands were readily available in areas around Jerusalem and at much more reasonable prices compared to the city. But other significant factors fueling this migration were:

Israeli restrictions were imposed on Palestinians' right to build and develop buildings and land. Israeli authorities made it particularly difficult for Palestinians to obtain building permits in the city, especially in areas subject to Israeli military administration laws in the West Bank, which include the areas surrounding Jerusalem. The imposition of high construction taxes and municipal fees that cannot be borne by individuals. By contrast, construction initiatives on the Israeli side are undertaken by public parties or by the private sector, which leads to lower fees and taxes. The difficulties of registering land ownership, since most lands in Jerusalem have not been through parcellation and registration. The social system, family ownership and the inheritance system have been problematic to the registration of lands. The suburbs around municipal Jerusalem served as a "middle ground" between West Bank towns and the city.

They contributed to its expansion and development as a major transportation hub linking the southern West Bank with the north. Moreover, the suburban area became a new home for institutions and businesses forced to move out of cordoned Jerusalem in order to continue serving their West Bank clientele or to maintain their West Bank employees (Nasrallah, 2006: 378-379).

### **Back to the City**

In 1996, Israeli authorities unintentionally brought a halt to this suburbanization. That year they retroactively applied a new "center of life" policy that required Palestinian Jerusalemites to prove (by presenting myriad documents) that their "center of life" remained within the Israeli municipal boundaries or risk losing their residency status and the Israeli social benefits package that comes with that status. Palestinian residents were forced to show that they worked in the city, had paid all their property and municipal taxes, and that their children went to schools in Jerusalem (Margalit, 2006; Brooks, 2005). The move was regarded as a direct attempt to steer the development of suburbanization into a favorable outcome in the ongoing Israeli demographic battle by freezing out East Jerusalemites who had migrated to the suburbs. While previously, Israeli regulations had only threatened those living overseas with the loss of Jerusalem residency, the new law effectively considered the growing suburbs as foreign territory. The new regulation caused thousands of suburban Palestinians to panic, pick up their lives, and return to residing inside the municipal boundaries.

The wave of returnees to the city not only stunted suburbanization but also caused an East Jerusalem housing shortage, skyrocketing housing costs, and an overcrowding of serious proportions.

Many of those returning from the suburbs moved in with their relatives or endured poor housing conditions; some simply maintained two addresses, one of them inside the city. This return flight not only affected residents, but also businesses. Approximately one third of Al-Ram's businesses and small manufacturing workshops moved from the suburbs to areas within municipal Jerusalem, particularly to Beit Hanina and the industrial area of Atarot (Brooks, 2007).

More recently, a second wave of returnees has developed. The construction of an Israeli series of walls, fences, barbed wire, patrol roads, and army watchtowers in the Jerusalem area, which began in 2002, is the logical continuation of the policy of severing East Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterlands and has thus caused a second panicked migration back to the city. The Separation Barrier blocks access to the city center through the establishment of permanent checkpoints, which, more often than not, mean long waits and unpredictable travel times. These realities make a daily commute impossible and heighten the need to reside within the city itself. While maintaining an "alibi" address inside the city boundaries was once a pragmatic solution for some commuters, this is no longer a feasible option (Nasrallah, 2006: 378-379). The lack of zoning and planning and the myriad of Israeli bureaucratic red tape that must be negotiated in order to obtain a building permit have forced those who return to the city to build illegally. The construction of a house even "illegally" ironically granted a legal right to reside in the city: the houses built without permits were registered in the municipal tax record, an essential proof that Jerusalem is the center of life of the owners. Building illegally, of course, risks the investment.

Such properties are under threat of demolition by the Israeli authorities.

Indeed, 595 unlicensed houses were demolished in the period 1994-2005 (Margalit, 2006:22); in addition, owners have to pay fines for the unlicensed construction. Margalit reports that between 2001 and 2005, 29.6 million US dollars were collected by the Israeli Municipality as fines from East Jerusalem Palestinians (Margalit, 2006:25).

### **TRANSFORMATIONS ON THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE**

As Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion asserted the applicability of Israeli law on all of Jerusalem in August 1948; the Knesset convened in Jerusalem in December 1949; and the government's administrative headquarters and ministries began moving to Jerusalem at the beginning of 1950. Also, in 1950, Jerusalem was declared to be Israel's political capital in addition to its status and role as a spiritual and religious centre.

Jordanian reaction to Israel's declaration was swift: it declared the eastern sector of Jerusalem as a second capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Dumper, 1996). The Israeli declaration was not immediately translated into an actual fact on the ground; the capital transformation process had its own dynamics that were enforced over time in phases. Undoubtedly the most important phase came with Israel's occupation of the eastern sector in 1967 which brought the expropriation of religious and ethnic symbols. For example, the Islamic shrine Al-Buraq Wall became the Israeli Wailing Wall (Western Wall) and the Jewish Quarter emerged from the demolished Moroccan Al-Magharbeh and the Ash-Sharaf neighbourhoods.

These changes became national symbols that steadily became part of the Israeli collective memory and part of the national consensus and identity. Other national symbols were created, such as the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital on Mount of Scopus, which were situated in an enclave in no man's land in the sector under Jordan's control (Dumper, 1997; Wasserstein, 2002).

At the end of the nineteen seventies, Israeli public discourse gave considerable emphasis to the slogan, "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel". In 1980, they enshrined the slogan in a law and Jerusalem's importance in Israeli political rhetoric increased (Lapidot, 2003; Abu Zayda, 2007). Meanwhile, the Israeli government doubled its efforts to create an intensive settlement reality inside Jerusalem and around it, and the theory of Jerusalem as a metropolitan centre instead of a peripheral city became a reality imposed on the ground.

The official Israeli establishment, which sought to impose sovereignty, spatial control and demographic superiority, did not seek to annex the population as much as it sought to annex the land. The Israeli law was not fully imposed on the Palestinian population. Aside from the termination of their sovereign institutions, the Palestinians were accorded semi-autonomy in fields related to their lives, such as health and education. Private schools, for example, were not required to adopt an Israeli curriculum and continued to employ the Jordanian education scheme taught in the West Bank until it was replaced with Palestinian curricula following establishment of the Palestinian Authority.

Admittedly, Israel attempted in the beginning of the 1970s to impose Israeli curricula in public schools, but parents refused to send their children to those schools, forcing the Israeli authorities to retreat from their decision (Dumper, 1997).

Palestinian influence and independence in Jerusalem began to strengthen at the end of the 1970s. From the beginning of the 1980s, the process of establishing civil society organizations and service institutions accelerated due to PLO support and financing allocated at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1974. Several universities, cultural centres, social services institutions and media centres were established. The Israeli motive behind "allowing" such institutions to exist rested on the false assessment that their existence would lead to the formation of a Palestinian leadership comprised of West Bank and Gaza Strip residents as an alternative to the PLO. However, those institutions effectively formed an arm of the PLO, especially during the First Intifada (1987-1992). Indeed, the role of the PLO increased to the point of replacing the role of the traditional leaderships and weakening Jordan's role in important institutions such as the Waqf Department, syndicates and unions. Those institutions ended their affiliation with Jordan when it declared disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, and the resulting vacuum was filled by the PLO (Dumper, 1997). Cohen described that period as follows:

• **“Because of the status of Jerusalem in the Palestinian ethos they established their national institutions in the city; the main newspapers were published from Jerusalem; trade unions, national theatre, media groups, all were allocated in Jerusalem. The city turned from being a symbolic capital to a real capital. Large amounts of financial support by the PLO were channelled to the Jerusalem based organizations” (Cohen, 2007: 35-36).**

The West Bank and Gaza Strip's importance increased following the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, when the conflict and its leadership moved from “outsiders” (PLO exiles at first in Lebanon, later Tunisia) to the “insiders” (personalities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories). The Palestinian leadership had not played any role in the outbreak of the Intifada and in the conduct of early Intifada actions, but soon afterwards the unified national leadership's communiqués were released in Tunis and distributed throughout the occupied territories. It is possible to state that during this period Jerusalem was transformed into the undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories due to its position as the centre of representative political and service institutions, in addition to its commercial centrality and its status as an important metropolitan centre for the entire West Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian side distinguished between the operation of the PA and operation within the framework of the PLO on the basis that the understandings reached with Israel allowed the PLO to operate in Jerusalem. However, legally and practically, Israel did not distinguish between any form of Palestinian operation, regardless of the extent of its affiliation with the PA and considered any representation or any action affiliated with or related to the Palestinian leadership to be illegal. In spite of the Orient House's diminishing role following the establishment of the PA, its role as Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem remained important both in the political presentation of the issue of Jerusalem and in the existence of an official address.

Palestinians came there to resolve their problems and to address their needs. Israel's closure of the Orient House in August 2001 ended any Palestinian political or institutional representation in Jerusalem (Israel also closed important service institutions at the same time.). Earlier, the death of Faisal Husseini in June 2001 also had the effect of diminishing the role of this institution even before Israeli closed it (Nasrallah, 2005; Ju'beh, 2007).

The Palestinian influence and role in Jerusalem have continued to diminish up to the present day. Several institutions closed by Israel have opened alternative offices in Dhahiyat Al-Bareed area just outside Jerusalem's municipal borders. But their ability to operate inside the city has remained limited due to Israeli harassments and restrictions on Palestinian operations, whether on the social, service or political levels (Nasrallah, 2005; Ju'beh, 2007).

### **THE SEPARATION BARRIER**

The Israeli Separation Barrier is the most significant change to the city since its occupation in 1967. It will eventually extend 725 km, surrounding and intruding into the entire West Bank. As of writing this report, 409 km of the barrier has been completed; 68 km is under construction, and work has yet to commence on 248 km. Its route through and around Jerusalem (which constitutes the so-called Jerusalem Envelope) will run 167 km, of which 78.5 km (or 47%) is completed; 30.6 km (18%) is under construction; and 58.2 km have yet to begin. The overall design of the Separation Barrier is intended to separate Israel from the built-up Palestinian areas in the West Bank, to annex the major Jewish West Bank settlements to Israel disregarding Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, to fragment East Jerusalem, and divide its neighbourhoods, while separating it from its surroundings and rendering it unsuitable as the site of any future Palestinian national capital

(OCHA, May 2008; Ir Amim report, April 2008). Territorial and demographic considerations are the key criteria behind the planning of the Barrier in Jerusalem and its environs (Brooks, 2007). The concept of Israeli territorial control through annexation of settlements in greater Jerusalem and major parts of the open space areas around these settlements (to the east, northwest and southwest of East Jerusalem) enjoys a political consensus of both the left and right wing in Israel. The Barrier's route excludes areas of future development for Palestinian neighbourhoods in and around Jerusalem and enclaves them. The Barrier will have a dramatic impact on the future of Jerusalem and its surroundings and is considered an urban trauma in Jerusalem (Garb and Savitch, 2005).

### **The following are the major impacts of the Separation Barrier on Jerusalem:**

#### ***Impact on East Jerusalem Centrality and its Relationship to the West Bank***

The Barrier isolates Jerusalem from its West Bank suburbs and hinterland and will finally end the centrality of Jerusalem for the West Bank as a main economic, social, service, religious and culture centre. As Cohen has noted, the changes that occurred after the construction of the Barrier "turned Jerusalem from a central city - the core of a metropolitan extending from Ramallah in the north to Hebron in the south - to a frontier edge city isolated from its villages around it" (Cohen, 2007). Cohen argued that the Israeli effort to prevent East Jerusalem from becoming a Palestinian capital has succeeded, thanks to the spatially new reality of constructing the Barrier among other measures such as economic and institutional pressure and the prevention of the right of association and political activism (Cohen, 2007: 187).



### *Impact on Urbanization and Slum Creation*

The Barrier will create new facts on the ground that will increase the fragmentation of Jerusalem neighbourhoods. It will fracture East Jerusalem's functional integrity and sever the urban continuity with its natural expansion and potential development areas. All lands that can be allocated for Palestinian development and construction in the city will lie outside the Barrier. This means East Jerusalem must struggle to absorb suburban returnees to the inner-city neighbourhoods and cannot build new neighbourhoods to accommodate them. In fact, the Barrier will accelerate the transformation of the city's neighbourhoods into high-density poverty slums, which will lead to the sociological and economic degradation of large groups of city residents. That fate is especially likely in neighbourhoods which until recently were characterized as elite or middle class, such as Ath-Thuri, Ras Al-Amud, Wadi Al-Joz and As-Suwana (Brooks, 2007).

### *The Enhancement of Israeli Jerusalem*

In stark contrast to East Jerusalem's demise as the primary Palestinian centre, the Barrier will significantly enhance West Jerusalem as an Israeli metropolis. That process began to evolve in 1973 and developed with the establishment of Jewish settlements around Jerusalem but inside the Palestinian territory. In order to assure the role of West Jerusalem as a Jewish metropolitan centre, since the end of the 1990's Israel has intensified this process by establishing an infrastructure of roads, tunnels, bridges and settlement by-pass routes that reduce distances between these settlements and West Jerusalem and strengthen the linkage of the settlements with the Jewish capital.

These physical facts on the ground have created two road networks: the first is a modern and developed system that has contributed to the strengthening and development of Jerusalem's Jewish settlements, and the second is an old

network that the winding Barrier has transformed into a disjointed collection of dead-end roads which are used only by the Palestinian side. Whereas the road system was once a regional network composed of main roads that linked East Jerusalem with the north and south West Bank and eastward to Jericho and Amman, its function is now limited essentially to travel between Palestinian neighbourhoods within East Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006).

### *Escalation of the Conflict and Hindering its Resolution*

The Barrier imposes a geopolitical settlement which will guarantee the optimal position of the Israeli territorial demands and will secure the minimization of the perceived demographic threat which is a central element in Israeli policy. Israel launched the Barrier project based on the claim that it would enhance security, in response to a wave of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. This is not the first time that the claim of security has been used to increase control over the Palestinians and to appropriate their territory. And, while violence has declined, this is a short-term effect. As Yiftachel and Yacobi argue, "the political, social and economic pressures created by the Separation Barrier will feed the frustrations of an already distraught Palestinian community in Jerusalem and escalate violence further. 'Security' will not likely be the result, but apartheid most probably will". That condition will minimize the chances to reach a peace agreement between the two sides on the future of Jerusalem and the de facto annexation of settlements. The concentration of Palestinian population in wall-created enclaves will form a new physical barrier to a peaceful existence in a two states solution (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2007: 170).



*View of Anata in the foreground and Pisgat Zeev Settlement in the background, ©IPCC*

# Jerusalem Urban Morphologies Timeline




Fig.6 Jerusalem Urban morphology timeline (Ottoman period till 2014)

## JERUSALEM: STATE OF AFFAIRS 2018

Although Israel has been criticized for its Separation Barrier in the Occupied Territories, land confiscations, demolition of homes and separating the West Bank from Jerusalem, one of the most devastating effects of the Separation Barrier is the damaging of the social fabric in East Jerusalem. The Barrier's purpose is to tighten Israel's grip on occupied Jerusalem, where it severs all links (commercial, familial, religious, educational, and medical) that permits East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas to function as a united and interconnected social and economic unit.

As previously noted, the Palestinian population living in East Jerusalem in mid-2016 was 426,533. Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem may have their residency revoked at any time because Israel has not provided them with a legal residency status. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Interior (2017), Israel revoked the Jerusalem residency of 14,595 Palestinians between 1967 and 2016. Regarding construction, only 13% of land in East Jerusalem has been allocated for Palestinian construction by the Israeli authorities. Currently, Palestinians are facing a 48,000-housing unit shortage in East Jerusalem, and there is a growing demand of 1,500 housing units per year. In attempt to satisfy the needs of the Palestinian population, the Jerusalem Municipality approves 100 building permits a year for Palestinian housing (IPCC, 2012). Because of the low number of building permits approved, Palestinians resort to illegal construction, which are later faced with demolition orders.

According to a report by B'Tselem (2018), between 2004 and 2018, 769 homes were demolished by Israeli authorities displacing its occupants, many of whom were children.

In 2016, about 72.9% of Palestinians in East Jerusalem were living below the poverty line where 78.2% were children. According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (2018), this is the highest poverty rate recorded in Palestine. Approximately 52% of Palestinians in East Jerusalem are in the labour force, of which only 22% are women.

After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Israel reestablished Jerusalem's municipal borders before annexing Jerusalem to Israel. This happened despite the international community's objections against the forceful acquisition of the lands. The official annexation of Jerusalem occurred and was formalized by the Knesset in 1980 when they declared united Jerusalem as inseparable from the State of Israel. The new boundaries cut through numerous Palestinian villages and included an additional 64 km<sup>2</sup> taken from the West Bank territories. The Israeli planning committees, in drawing the maps, were careful not to include too many built-up Palestinian areas in an attempt to limit the demographic weight of Palestinian Arabs in the City of Jerusalem (PASSIA, 2000).

As PASSIA (2003) notes, the first step in physically separating the West Bank and Gaza from Jerusalem took place in 1993, when Israeli military forces set up checkpoints across the West Bank and prohibited many Palestinians from entering Jerusalem and Israel.

During Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's term in 1994, the barrier in the Gaza Strip was built where one year later, a special commission was formed to discuss furthering the separation plan between Israelis and Palestinians. However, this was brought to a halt after Rabin's assassination in 1995. In October 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved plans to establish checkpoints and barriers all across the West Bank to stop Palestinians from entering Israel.

When Ariel Sharon took office in January 2001, Sharon's government proceeded with the plan and eventually drew up a map of a route for the Separation Barrier that cuts deeply through the West Bank. In June 2002, Israel's Cabinet Decision No. 2077 approved phase one of the Separation Barrier to the east of the Green Line and circling Jerusalem, in addition to a 20 km buffer zone to the west of the Jordan River, as well as the persistent heavy presence of Israeli military forces throughout the West Bank.



Shufat Camp Checkpoint, ©IPCC

The Separation Barrier's total length is 712 km where 85% of it will cut through the West Bank territories, as well as in East Jerusalem. The Barrier in occupied Jerusalem is approximately 142 km, of which only 4 km runs through the Green Line.

Construction of the Barrier has physically separated Palestinian residents from either side of the Barrier (approximately 90,000), where those in the West Bank have been physically separated from the urban centre. Residents suffer from impeded access to services, lack of municipal services in situ, a security vacuum and increasing lawlessness and crime (2018), see Fig.7.



Shufat Camp ©IPCC



East Jerusalem has 15 Israeli settlements that had been built on the occupied territory. About 213,000 Israeli settlers occupy these settlements, where they are estimated to have 60,000 housing units. About 3,000 Israeli settlers live in the heart of Palestinian neighbourhoods in outposts concentrated in the so-called ‘Visual Basin of the Old City’ area.

It comprises of Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, Silwan, Sheikh Jarrah, At-Tur (Mount of Olives), Wadi Al-Joz, Ras Al-‘Amud, and Jabal Al-Mukabber. Settlement blocks around Jerusalem include a total population of over 100,000 Israeli settlers who are incorporated within “Greater Jerusalem” (IPCC, 2018).



View of Sur Bahir in the foreground and East Talpiot Settlement in the background,©IPCC

**Table 6 summarizes the institutional changes that have occurred from 1948 until present**

**Table 6: Institutional Transformations in Jerusalem**

<p><b>The Divided Jerusalem (1948-1967)</b></p>	<p>West Jerusalem became the declared capital of the state of Israel and most legislative and executive authority institutions, as well as cultural institutions, were moved there beginning at the end of the 1940s.</p> <p>East Jerusalem was officially declared the second capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but official institutions remained concentrated in Amman, which began developing at a fast pace. East Jerusalem remained the centre of traditional local institutions (benevolent societies, the Waqf, the Chamber of Commerce, cooperative unions, etc.)</p>
<p><b>The Israeli Occupation Era (Since 1967)</b></p>	<p>Israeli domination and enforcement of the legal and administrative annexation. Prohibition of all sovereign institutions, while according the Palestinians semi-autonomy in service sectors such as education, health, culture, and social services. Jordan continued to administer the Waqf and the Haram Ash-Sharif.</p>
<p><b>First Intifada 1987-1992</b></p>	<p>Evolution of Palestinian civil society organizations (supported by the PLO), whose influence increased in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These institutions included universities, cultural and media centres, research centres, service institutions and others. They served the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and transformed Jerusalem into an undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967.</p>
<p><b>The Peace Process 1992-1995</b></p>	<p>Evolution of Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem represented by the Palestinian negotiating team to the Madrid Conference whose headquarters was the Orient House. A leadership from inside the Palestinian territories managed the negotiations in Madrid and Washington under guidance and instructions from the PLO outside leadership in Tunisia. The Orient House formed a political address for the internal leadership, and diplomatic and political activities were concentrated in this semi-official headquarters. Direct secret talks between Israel and the PLO in Oslo weakened the Orient House's importance. Its work was reduced to representing the issue of Jerusalem. All other authorities were transferred to the PA, which was established in 1995.</p>
<p><b>The Palestinian Authority 1995-2000</b></p>	<p>Several civil society organizations moved to Ramallah and some merged with PA institutions. Ramallah's importance increased since 1996 and the city was transformed into an important administrative and economic centre.</p> <p>Israel passed laws and regulations restricting Palestinian institutional operation in Jerusalem and barring the visits of high-ranking diplomatic figures to Orient House.</p> <p>The operation of local Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem was confined to serving the city's residents as Israel tightened the closure of Jerusalem and prohibited West Bank residents from entering the city for work or to receive services.</p>
<p><b>Palestinian Institutions closing down 2001-2008</b></p>	<p>Termination of the Palestinian political representation inside Jerusalem with the closure of Orient House and several service institutions on the pretext of their affiliation with the PA, and the relocation of several other offices to Jerusalem's surroundings due to the legal harassments and the restriction of movement and the closure that prevented most Palestinians from entering the city.</p> <p>Institutions closed in 2001 still under the same police order to keep them closed until today. International request to reopen these institutions was not respected by Israel.</p> <p>Israel stops all the Palestinian political functions.</p> <p>Israel didn't allow most Palestinian social, sport, and cultural events due to the accusation that these events are sponsored by the PA.</p> <p>The rise of Ramallah as a de facto PA "capital" has attracted institutions and skilled labour away from East Jerusalem.</p>

Source: Nasrallah, 2005: 218-219

As we review Table 7, we recognize that the institutional transformations that have occurred since 1948 have significantly reduced the role and status East Jerusalem has for Palestinians. At first, after Al-Nakba, East Jerusalem was the centre of Palestinian society, the fulcrum of West Bank life, and it was open to the East to Jericho and Amman and the wider Arab region beyond. Then in 1967, a forced occupation accomplished what Ben Gurion's law of August 1948 had failed to do: the subjugation of East Jerusalem and an enforced demographic Jewish super-majority. Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s East Jerusalem gradually regained its status as the hub of Palestinian political and diplomatic activities and embodied the initial steps toward what might become the Palestinian entity.

But in the early 1990s came Oslo, accompanied by closures and by restrictions on the PA and PLO, resulting in a shift of power to Ramallah. In the years since, Israel's "husbanding" of East Jerusalem has been a form of malign neglect. East Jerusalemites, who in the past were saluted for their self-reliance, are now stymied and can hardly address their own daily needs and functions. The city suffers from a harsh Israeli political domination which thwarts any Palestinian effort to re-establish a political and institutional base.

***CHAPTER THREE:***

***MASTER PLAN of  
JERUSALEM 2020***

## MASTER PLAN OF JERUSALEM 2020

The first comprehensive urban plan devised for Jerusalem as a whole (western and eastern parts) is the Jerusalem master plan 2020 and was announced to the public on September 2004. This is the second and last outline plan that was authorized since 1959 and known as Plan number 62, which only applied to West Jerusalem. It is a comprehensive and in-depth spatial vision of Jerusalem presented by the Israeli authorities, where, for the first time in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, their objectives are plainly articulated in an official document.

The Israeli master plan of 2020 states that it is an inclusive plan with the aim of developing the city as a capital of Israel and a metropolitan centre, provided that the image of the city and the standard of living of all its resident are preserved.

In August 2004, a final report of the proposed 2020 plan was presented to the public. This new master plan is the first plan since 1959 (when Plan 62 was approved). There have been separate town plan schemes but no overall integrated plan. It is based on the strategies of the TAMA 35 Plan, the Israeli “national” plan that the government approved in December 2005. In addition, it assumes that Jerusalem within the municipal boundaries (as defined by the Israelis) is one urban unit under Israeli sovereignty (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004).

The overall objectives of the plan are to strengthen and empower Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to introduce the values of a high quality of life, economic stability, social justice, and environmental viability.

In addition, the plan seeks to create economic conditions for efficient urban functionality on the metropolitan level. Or, as stated in its report, the main goal is, “to introduce a new thought on planning and an inclusive plan which aims to continue developing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and a metropolitan centre for the benefit of its residents and their quality of life” (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004).

The Jerusalem master plan 2020 translates the Israeli geopolitical vision and socio-economic goals into planning strategies and policies. Through this, the Israelis believe they secure both demographic superiority and territorial domination. In addition, they promote the Jewish character and image of the city.

The master plan consists of seven thematic plans for land use: the city centre, open areas, building patterns, historical heritage and ancient areas, transportation and roads, infrastructure, and environmental sensitivity. The master plan includes a textual description of the seven plans and a code of standards that clearly specifies their allowances and restrictions. According to the code of standards, the plans that refer to land use, city centre, building patterns, and historical heritage and antique areas will be obligatory, while the other plans will be instructing (i.e. for guidance) only (see Map 4).

In the planning system, public interest has precedence over private interest. The system is centralized and very complex. Also, the district level committees for planning have the upper hand over local authorities. The planning system and plan contents translate and pronounce the ideological, strategic, policy and geopolitical goals of the state and of the government.

The plan was based on the population of Jerusalem as of publication of the plan in 2004 which was 650,000. The expected population by the year 2020 is 950,000 (Palestinians: 38%, Israelis: 62%). The plan is based on the total area of Jerusalem which is 126,000 dunums. The construction capacity in Jerusalem is 131,200 building units on the Jewish side, and 35,400 on the Palestinian side. The number of potential housing units to be built by 2020 for Palestinians does not take into consideration the existing 15,000-18,000 “illegal” houses built between 1996 and 2003. Conspicuously, the plan does not refer to any operational methods to upgrade the infrastructure, services, public buildings and the road system in East Jerusalem, which is the direct responsibility of the Municipality. This plan allocates only 2,300 dunums for Palestinian building in areas mainly within the existing built-up area, compared to 9,500 dunums for the Israelis, mainly in new settlements (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004).

Achieving the plan’s Projected Number of Residential Units will be through three main paths: first, an increase in the density (up to 18 floors in West Jerusalem and up to 6 in East Jerusalem); second, fill-in of vacant areas; and third, building new settlements for the Jews (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004).

This plan establishes a direct connection between the migrations of the Jewish Jerusalemites to the new periphery settlements and the resulting low living standards and environmental qualities of the city. Introducing a higher quality of life is considered by the plan as a necessary condition to attract new population and to minimize the emigration of Jewish people from Jerusalem, especially of young, middle class and educated people. The master plan clearly states that “building new Jewish neighbourhoods” is - and will continue to be - used to guarantee a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. New settlements will be built on pre-designated “green land” in East Jerusalem (Bimkom Report, May 2006).

In addition, the plan refers to the need to assemble an administrative organization to enforce rules and regulations in the Old City. Despite the major effect of the Barrier on the Palestinians, and the severance of some neighbourhoods from the city and from the West Bank, this plan totally ignores the existence of the Separation Barrier and its social and economic impact on the city and its surroundings.

With respect to the economy, the plan does not suggest new industrial and employment areas or commercial zones for economic development in the east part of the city. It also ignores the enhancement of cultural and institutional activities in the city. At the same time, it does not show any intention to develop the public transportation system in East Jerusalem, although it includes the light railway that passes within only one neighbourhood in East Jerusalem (Shu’fat); it functions mainly to serve Israelis living in settlements in the north of East Jerusalem.


The master plan has yet to be approved despite it being first proposed in 2000 and revised numerous times, but it does reflect the policy behind Israeli thinking in Jerusalem. The master plan clearly supports the spatial separation of the Palestinian and the Israeli population in Jerusalem and considers that to be a positive process in order to minimize the friction between the different groups of population. The division of Jerusalem into planning zones was also based on ethnic affiliation; no zones combine both the Palestinians and the Israelis. This approach is different from the unification and integration approach stated by the Israeli Municipality in its previous plans (Kroyanker, 1988: 27).

Finally, Jerusalem is more divided as a result of the 1967 “unification” and the resulting Israeli domination and hegemony. The Israeli policies and physical realities created in favour of the Israelis did not achieve their goals (Amirav, 2007). If proof be needed that Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem has failed, consider the Intifadas of 1987 and 2000 and the mass disdain for the occupation that continues until this day. Consider further that the international community has yet to recognize West Jerusalem as a state capital and has yet to legitimize the occupation. Indeed, it has declared it illegal. The city is still searching for a peace agreement, a formula that can bring normality and dignity. The fate of Jerusalem today remains undetermined and contested despite thirty-five years of unilateral Israel actions. Attempts to reach peace in Jerusalem will be the focus in the next chapter.

As with similar outline plans, the Jerusalem master plan 2020 addresses different themes, such as archaeology, economy, employment, and education among others, however, the main emphasis is placed on housing (focusing on demographic balance) and tourism (focusing on the Old City basin) (see Fig.9).

The new master plan 2020 was developed to tackle the problems of residential planning in Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, unplanned construction in those areas, and the Municipality's initiative to preserve the demographic balance in Jerusalem. While the master plan supposedly proposes to improve the existing plans, specifically regarding increasing construction to meet the growing residential needs of Palestinian Jerusalemites, the reality is that the plan will not benefit Palestinian residents. Although the plan demonstrates the prospect for residential development, at the same time, it presents several provisions that render it impossible for Palestinian residents to actually benefit from this new potential. Indeed, the plan does not address the inadequate number of schools and classrooms, nor does it allow for the improvement of roads, infrastructure, public buildings, and services. Additionally, the plan reveals no intention of establishing new commercial and industrial zones, and as a result, forcing East Jerusalem's economy to be wholly dependent on that of West Jerusalem (Bimkom, 2014; IPCC, 2012).

Fig.9: Jerusalem Local Outline Plan 2020



## Population and Housing

As previously mentioned, restricting construction units for Palestinians in East Jerusalem is one method of limiting the number of Palestinians in the Old City and maintaining a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. As population increases, the need for additional residential buildings increases, in addition to the need for more schools, healthcare and social services. The master plan does not satisfy the growing needs of the Palestinian population neither in terms of available space for construction purposes, nor in terms of administering additional lands to develop the Palestinian neighbourhoods. The Jerusalem master plan 2020 is used by Israeli policymakers to restrict and control development in Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, designate very few spaces for Palestinian construction, and strengthen Israeli Jewish dominance in the whole of Jerusalem.

By mid-2016, the number of Palestinian residents in Jerusalem was approximately 426,533 despite the Jerusalem Municipality projecting a lower number in the master plan (205,200 residents). The Palestinian population has increased approximately 19.33% since mid-2006 (PCBS, 2017). The master plan mentions providing an additional 13,550 new residential units to accommodate the growing number of Palestinian residents, however, only 10,000 units will be ready for construction by 2030 (the initial target date was 2020), during which the population is expected to increase between 400,000 and 500,000. Housing needs will also increase between 70,000 and 90,000 units (Ir Amim, 2010). The proposed number of residential units for Palestinian residents is insufficient and even if the Municipality constructs the whole 10,000 units by 2030, East Jerusalem will be experiencing a tremendous housing shortage by then.

By not considering the increasing population growth of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and continuing with the original plan of constructing only 10,000 housing units, the Jerusalem Municipality and planning authorities are neglecting their responsibility of providing an adequate number of housing units and are avoiding the housing issue that will arise in the next 10 to 15 years as a result of the growing Arab population. In other words, Palestinian residents will continue to live in crowded housing within existing residential units, migrate beyond the city's walls (where they risk the loss of their residency rights), and build illegally (where they will be under the constant threat of demolition).

### Construction

As specified in the plan, Jerusalem is divided into residential neighbourhoods according to the number of floors on a building where Palestinian neighbourhoods are divided as follows (Hamdan, Na'amneh, and Bsharah, 2009):

1. Area 1 “up to 4 floors”. This includes parts of Jabal Al-Mukabber, At-Tur, and Wadi Al-Joz. Construction in these neighbourhoods is ranged between 100%-160%, meaning an increase in the number of constructions there. However, this is far from meeting the current and future needs of Palestinians in the neighbourhoods. Although the plan states that building permits approved for construction in Palestinian neighbourhoods are between 25-75% of all building permits approved, the actual number is much higher because of illegal construction that is the result of a shortage in housing, in addition to the lack of building permits granted to Palestinians in Jerusalem.

2. Area 2 “up to 6 floors” and includes parts of Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah only.

3. Area 3 “up to 6 floors, based on set conditions”.

It includes the neighbourhoods of Sur Baher, Emlason, Al-Isawiyya, and others. It is worth noting that these types of conditions do not exist for neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem. The conditions are a way of restricting Palestinians from exploiting the use of their lands. According to the instructions set in the master plans, one condition for designing an outline plan that would allow for more than 4 floors per building is for the space to be more than 10 dunums, and to limit the space with a road 12 meters wide. These two conditions specify the potential for construction, where the possibilities for individuals or families with strong economic ties who are capable of designing and presenting such a large outline plan (10 dunums of space) are virtually non-existent, especially not in Palestinian neighbourhoods. And although construction of buildings of up to 6 floors in residential neighbourhoods’ range between 160%-200%, still, the possibility for construction according to the master plan is nearly impossible.

4. Area 4 is considered “zones that are not densified” and includes Anata. The plan does not mention the possibility for extending or adding to existing buildings. The major parts of Anata have already been used and what is left for future construction is very limited.

5. Area 5 are residential zones based on a comprehensive plan or residential neighbourhoods in Area C and includes areas that have already been built upon and already existing buildings in Palestinian neighbourhoods, as well as other unutilized lands. Based on provision 4.2.2 (A) of the master plan, it is impossible to present a map that allows for construction in these areas unless the whole scheme for each area has been approved, or at least a large part of it. The lack of such a scheme in the majority of Palestinian neighbourhoods is to delay construction in those areas for years to come, which is based on the history of planning in Palestinian neighbourhoods that has ignored the needs of Palestinian residents for housing and other services. The same holds true regarding conditions for obtaining building permits.

### **Green Zones – Regions Restricted to Development and Detached Regions**

There are large areas across East Jerusalem that are designated to be green spaces such as open spaces, open spaces with specific sets of instructions, woodlands, parks (metropolitan, city, and neighbourhoods), walking trails, and different archaeological sites. Development in these areas is forbidden for building residential units, schools, healthcare facilities, or otherwise. In other words, green zones are strictly forbidden for any current or future development for Palestinian neighbourhoods (Hamdan, Na'amneh, and Bsharah, 2009).

## IMPLICATIONS OF JERUSALEM MASTER PLAN 2020 ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITY

### A. Expropriation of Palestinian Land

After East Jerusalem was conquered in 1976, the municipal boundaries of the city were expanded by the confiscation of about 71 km<sup>2</sup> of lands from the municipal districts of twenty-eight Arab villages, mainly from the jurisdictions of Ramallah and Bethlehem, and 6.5 km<sup>2</sup> of land encircling the Old City of Jerusalem, where Israel announced the unilateral expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, including the reunification of East Jerusalem as part of the State of Israel (Civic Coalition, 2011).

The expanded municipal boundaries were to be the framework by which the pre-existing city layouts would be transformed by the Israeli authorities to guarantee full control over the city. Thus, the expropriation of private Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem was considered imperative by Israeli municipal authorities for transforming East Jerusalem into a Jewish city. According to the Jerusalem master plan of 1968, the majority of lands annexed to West Jerusalem, where new Jewish neighbourhoods would be built on, were privately-owned lands held by Arabs. Special laws were put into effect that gave Israeli municipal authorities the right to expropriate private lands which were essential for the city's development (Imseis, 2000).

The following Israeli settlements/neighbourhoods were constructed on expropriated private lands: Givat Shapiro ("French Hill"), Ramot Eshkol, Neve Ya'akov, Ma'alot Dafna, Ramot (Ramot Allon), East Talpiot, Gilo, Givat Hamivtar, and Pisgat Ze'ev, in addition to industrial zones. By the beginning of 1995, approximately 38,500 housing structures were built for Israeli Jews, while no residential buildings were built for the Palestinian population on the privately-owned expropriated lands (Felner, 1995).

Guided by these special laws, the Israeli municipal planning authorities began to form and execute a mass expropriation policy for the purpose of stripping Palestinian owners of their property rights and seizing vast tracts of their lands within the expanded boundaries of East Jerusalem for private Jewish use. Between the years 1948 and 2000, more than 60,000 dunums, or 86.5% of land seized for expansion of East Jerusalem municipal boundaries, of Palestinian land have been expropriated without compensation (Imseis, 2000).

The Israeli municipal authorities rely heavily on the use of force and special laws, such as Military Order No. 70 (1967), Military Order No. 150 (1968), and Military Order No. 321 (1968), to warrant and legitimize the expropriation of Palestinian lands. The methods used to confiscate lands are seizure for military purposes, declaration of state lands, seizure of absentee property, seizure for public needs, and initial registration (Peace Now, 2009). The Municipality of Jerusalem is granted authorization to dispose of seized lands as it seems fit, and once land is transferred to a Jewish owner, it can never be resold to a non-Jew.

## B. Construction of Illegal Jewish Settlements

Israel's planning strategy after 1967 began to prioritize the building of Israeli settlements, increasing security measures beyond the 1967 borders, maintaining consolidation with already established settlements, both socially and economically, within the 1967 borders, and continuing the development of the infrastructure. The purpose for this was to transform East Jerusalem from a city that mainly accommodated Palestinian Arabs into a city hospitable to new Jewish immigrants. Consequently, Israeli authorities focused on developing East Jerusalem. The settlements are constructed on the eastern, northern, and southern outskirts of East Jerusalem to disconnect the city from the West Bank. The purpose of this is to build new housing units for Jewish immigrants on lands that were originally private lands owned by Palestinians and increase the Israeli Jewish population, while trying to erase any claims to entitlement made by Palestinians to the city by creating a Jewish majority East Jerusalem (Habiballah, 2016).

By mid-2016 there was an increase in the number of demolitions of Palestinian structures, where 546 structures had been demolished, including 79 structures in East Jerusalem. This is by far higher than the whole of 2015, where 453 structures were torn down, including 78 in East Jerusalem. Approximately 796 people had been displaced as a result of the demolitions in mid-2016, compared to 580 people displaced in the whole of 2015. The communities that are most affected by these demolitions are the Bedouin communities, specifically those living in Area C. They are the ones most at risk of forcible transfer (UN, 2016).

In East Jerusalem, countless families live under the risk of forcible relocation through the confiscation of residence buildings by Israeli Jewish settlers, particularly in the neighbourhood of Silwan and the Old City, and by developing green parks on lands designated as "green zones" across East Jerusalem, signifying a strong connection between the frequency of demolitions, compulsory relocations, and expansion of Israeli settlements.

The Israeli planning authorities devised spatial plans for the construction of Jewish settlements in various stages. The planning authorities sought to connect East and West Jerusalem through new Jewish settlements along the seam zone and around the Old City. These settlements were constructed in the early 1970s. After construction, the planning authorities began to establish water, electricity, and road networks in order to connect them to important cities and neighbourhoods in Central and Western Jerusalem.

Settlement construction was dedicated to strengthening the presence of Israeli Jewish residents in East Jerusalem. In the 1970s, Israeli Planning Authorities began to work on the Jerusalem master plan 2020, which was designed to maintain the demographic between Israelis and Palestinians at 70% for Israeli Jews and 30% for Palestinian Jerusalemites (Thawaba and Al-Rimawi, 2012). The decision to increase construction of Israeli settlements and to increase the Jewish presence was made as a result of the Rogers Plan of 1969 that called for an end to the persistent Israel-Palestine conflict, and to the UNSC Resolution 242 that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Palestinian territories (Rogers, 1969). As a form of defiance, new plans for construction were authorized in the north and south of Jerusalem. They included Ramot, Pisgat Ze'ev, Gilo, East Talpiot, and Neve Ya'acov.

All settlements are connected to each other. There are approximately 1,661 km of road networks that link each settlement to one another and to Israel. These roads must be used by Israeli settlers and IDF soldiers and are restricted to Palestinian use by the imposition of 460 roadblocks and 85 checkpoints (OCHA, 2007). These restrictions have negatively affected Palestinian life. Palestinians are highly dependent on these roads for accessing schools, work, hospitals, and other cities in the West Bank.

Israeli settlements impact Palestinians' lives in numerous ways. They escalate tensions over the control of scarce natural resources such as land and water networks, which the Palestinian communities are in dire need of, considering the growing Palestinian population. Furthermore, because settlements are guarded by heavy security forces and their proximity to many Palestinian communities, it will lead to higher insecurity for Palestinians through increased encounters and conflicts with settlers. However, many Palestinians have difficulties in finding employment in the West Bank often resort to employment in settlements. The settlements are often a vital source of employment, as they are the only recourse in an environment with limited opportunities (Cali and Miaari, 2015).

### C. Designating Palestinian Lands as “Green Zones”


Another policy of restricting Palestinians from utilizing their lands is the policy of transferring their lands to Jewish ownership. A popular method by the Israeli planning authorities is the “green zone” land designation, see Fig. 10.

Under this policy, the Israeli authorities designate any vacant or un-expropriated Palestinian land as green zones, practically limiting them to agricultural use, although the true purpose is to prevent any Palestinian development and to guarantee no physical obstacles on the lands, such as Palestinian building structures, that would obstruct the process of building Israeli settlements.

Communities in East Jerusalem are fragmented with regards to their urban structure due to the Israeli policy of designating open spaces as green areas which restrict Palestinians' use of those lands. This policy restricts Palestinians from building on those lands or even using them for agricultural purposes (El-Atrash, 2015). Israel depends on the method of declaring vacant holy Palestinian “green lands” national parks to expropriate lands and deny Arabs of their rights from using their own lands. In reality, the Israeli Municipality forges Jewish history by transforming the lands into so-called “Talmudic” parks or to build new settlements, especially near Al-Aqsa Mosque and the historical Walls of Jerusalem, in addition to areas surrounding and overlooking the Old City. **The purpose of these parks is as follows (Palestinian Ministry of Education, 2017):**

1. Promoting the fake Talmud narrative of Jerusalem's history
2. Confiscating lands that were intended for expanding Arab neighbourhoods
3. Disconnecting the Arab neighbourhoods from Al -Aqsa Mosque
4. Providing an excuse to demolish Palestinian homes that are on those lands.

Fig. 10 Natural Environment 'Open/green' areas in Jerusalem



#### D. The Town Planning Scheme (TPS) 2000

The TPS 2000 is another method of land expropriation. It is used by the Israeli Municipality for the purpose of administering municipal planning. The main incentive for the TPS is for restricting development, designating lands in relation to population growth and expected demand, and to define infrastructure, such as road networks. Three main tools are used by the Israeli planning authorities to restrict construction for Palestinians: failure to formulate a TPS, delaying the preparation of the TPS plan, or formulating the TPS that restricts the building capacities of Palestinians. Surprisingly, since 1967 and the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, no all-inclusive local TPS plan has been authorized for Palestinian neighbourhoods. Considering how difficult it is to gain approval of building permits, thousands of Palestinians have no choice but to resort to illegal construction (Badil, 2014).

Despite a TPS being approved, the Municipality has deferred and substantially restricted these plans for Palestinian neighbourhoods. As an example, the Israeli Municipality is officially obligated to respond to a TPS application within three years of receiving it. However, it took the municipal authorities thirteen years to approve the plan for the town of Shu'fat in 1996. Furthermore, the TPS referred to the construction of approximately 17,000 residential buildings, to which only 500 buildings were approved. Similarly, in Beit Safafa the TPS plan submitted in 1977 was also delayed for thirteen years, where approval was granted in 1990. Likewise, in a mixed Jewish and Arab neighbourhood of Abu Tor, the plan was approved after a 12-year delay, and in Ras Al-Amud, the TPS has still not received approval. The application was submitted in 1987 (Imseis, 2000).

Most of the TPS 2000 are guidelines for planning, with the exception of a Mandatory Map that establishes the use of land and serves as a blueprint for other planning purposes for the City of Jerusalem up to the year 2020.

There are additional documents that will be required for submission, but only after the TPS is accepted. However, the Mandatory Map is required before the plan gains approval. The TPS expands the boundaries of West Jerusalem by approximately 142 km<sup>2</sup>. Based on this new plan, the majority of lands in East Jerusalem is recorded as built-up areas and almost 24.4% of lands are recorded as green open spaces (ARIJ, 2012).

The TPS map illustrates Palestinian areas as green empty expanses of land connected to one another, where in reality, these areas are Palestinian enclaves and are separated by Israeli settlements and highways, built for the purpose of linking settlements to each other, and by open spaces or "unplanned areas". The roads that once connected Palestinian enclaves to the business hub in East Jerusalem were all destroyed by Israeli authorities. Once the scheme is approved, the Jerusalem Municipality will be permitted to utilize approximately 38.8% of land in East Jerusalem that had previously been frozen by the Municipality to implement state projects. The details of the scheme consist of all the state projects that will be executed on the land. Projects on this land are restricted to certain Jewish institutions, with the exception of a hospital and a higher education institution (Miftah, 2005).

Unsurprisingly, the procedure for a TPS plan severely affects growth and development in Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, particularly in reference to the housing crisis. The Israeli Municipality severely restricts construction and development for Palestinians in East Jerusalem in order to increase the Jewish presence and create an Arab minority. The municipal authorities grant a large number of building permits for the Jewish population, while granting a fraction of that to the Arab population, which is often inconsistent with the growing rate of the Palestinian population. Restrictions on land use are imposed on Palestinians where they are forced to build houses illegally, live with other families, or live in makeshift homes.

## E. Demolition Orders

The Israeli Municipality grants permission to demolish Palestinian homes for two reasons. First, the homes have not been built legally and have no permits to build them. Second, demolished homes are claimed to be owned by offenders or individuals suspected of a crime against the Israeli state. According to official records by B'Tselem, between 2001 and 2004, 664 homes had been demolished leaving 4,182 people homeless. Between 2014 and mid-2018, 47 homes were demolished, 16 buildings were rendered uninhabitable, 5 apartments were sealed by official order, and 298 people, including 132 minors, were left homeless (B'Tselem, 2018).

The impact of home demolitions on Palestinians is severe. It causes significant hardships for the families affected. They become psychologically distressed from the loss of their homes, heavily burdened with debt, and in many cases, with legal fees if they have hired attorneys. The Municipality also penalizes the families whose homes they have demolished, sometimes even granting them prison sentences. Children are often the most affected by the demolitions and the consequences they face afterwards. Almost immediately, children are forced to leave school for a short time and have limited access to basic health care services and access to clean water. In the long-run, children may also face psychological distress and reduced school performance.

## F. Revocation of Residency Rights of Palestinians

Since the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel has sought to considerably decrease the number of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. The various ways in which the Israeli government attempts this has previously been described. However, there is another method the Israeli Ministry of Interior has pursued: revoking the residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites. Those who are unable to provide documentation and evidence of their residency in Jerusalem in the past, are being compelled to leave Jerusalem. They are also prohibited from living with family who are residents of Jerusalem and lose their social benefits as well. The Ministry never published information regarding the need to provide evidence of residency in the past and present. Moreover, they have not been warned in any way that by leaving Jerusalem, they would lose their residency rights along with their homes in the City of Jerusalem.

The policy of revoking residency rights of Palestinians Jerusalemites leads to the forcible expulsion of Palestinians out of Jerusalem. This is considered a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and a significant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

## **IPCC's ROLE IN CHANGING URBAN PLANNING POLICIES IN PALESTINIAN NEIGHBOURHOODS**

Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have attempted to change Israel's discriminatory planning policies in Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. The International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPCC) is one such organization striving to help the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem with transforming urban planning policies, economically developing disadvantaged Palestinian areas, pressing forward planning policies, supporting and demanding the urban rights of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and in Area C, promoting planning projects with the community's participation, as well as providing urban leadership training and capacity building to local stakeholders.

IPCC monitors and documents violations against the urban rights of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and in Area C, and works with communities to raise awareness regarding their civil, economic, cultural, political, and social rights in both East Jerusalem and Area C. Workshops, meetings, campaigns, and cultural events are organized and held with the participation of Palestinian communities, to increase Palestinians' awareness regarding the concept of urban planning and management of public spaces. Educational materials such as brochures, pamphlets, and reports are published and distributed to the public that are aimed at keeping the public knowledgeable and well-informed, especially in regard to the discriminatory urban policies of Israel that weaken the rights and identity of Palestinians.

Additionally, IPCC maintains and engages a social media presence pertaining to the awareness campaigns, workshops, meetings with appropriate officials, and community events they organize.

IPCC legally intervenes to support Palestinian communities and individuals in East Jerusalem and Area C in matters relating to home demolition orders, land expropriation, communities and individuals at risk of forcible displacement, and the discriminatory urban planning policies. IPCC campaigns with the local community on the development of homes, buildings, road networks, and schools and helps them in preparing master plans for their neighbourhoods. Together, they submit all necessary documents to the appropriate Israeli municipal authorities.

***CHAPTER FOUR:***

***JERUSALEM IN RELATION TO  
OTHER PALESTINIAN CITIES***

# JERUSALEM IN RELATION TO OTHER PALESTINIAN CITIES

## OVERVIEW

The British Mandate fostered social cultural mobility, as new urban elites emerged as a result of turning Jerusalem into the administrative centre of the British Mandate. Coastal cities became the gateway to the outside world and Jaffa developed as the economic centre during that period. The coastal cities in general were more culturally open than the mountain areas, where traditional elites controlled the social order (Tamari, 2005).

The end of the British Mandate coincided with the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948. One of the major impacts of the 1948 war was the loss of the Arab demographic and cultural character of the coastal cities, and loss of the urban culture these cities started to take shape. The urban and intellectual elite left historical Palestine to become the diaspora, rejecting the mountains cities, which were considered conservative and dominated by traditional families.

After Al-Nakba, mountain cities in the area defined as a West Bank took the lead and introduced different patterns of urbanization. Nablus emerged as an economic and political centre. Its economy was based on a feudal land system (with the surrounding villages) and traditional manufacturing. Refugees fled from rural areas, mainly coastal villages between Jaffa and Al-Majdal (Ashkelon of today), to the Gaza Strip, which was under the Egyptian rule and lacked any political economic function.

## PALESTINIAN CITIES

### *Population*

24 % of the West Bank population (2,513,283 estimates 2010) live in 14 cities, 11 of them form an urban centre for Governorates: Jerusalem (237,301 inhabitants), Hebron (133,715 inhabitants) and Nablus (177,387 inhabitants) are the largest cities (Jerusalem Statistical yearbook, 2009; PCBS, 2010). Four cities of the West Bank had a population of 40,000 to 50,000 (Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Al-Bireh), Ramallah and Bethlehem had a population of less than 30,000, five cities had a population of less than 20,000 (Jericho, Beit Jala, Beit Sahur). Under the Palestinian Authority two new governorates were formed: Tubas (17,000) and Salfit (9,000). The criteria of number of inhabitants was not a major consideration to define urban centre. According to the PCBS 2007 census, 472 localities in the West Bank and 33 in Gaza strip were counted, of which 113 were urban, 362 rural and 28 refugee camps.

The total population of Gaza city is 483,742, Khan Younis 193,532, Rafah 170,144 and Deir Al-Balah 66,010, refugee camps within these cities are include and form the majority of the population.

## **HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN URBANISM**

The 19<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the first seeds of modernity under the Ottoman period, the introduction of modern transportation and communication means in order to connect it with Istanbul: in 1892 a railroad was established between Jerusalem and Jaffa Port (to transport pilgrims and goods); wider roads appropriate were built between Jerusalem and Jaffa (1870), Nablus (1907) and southwards toward Hebron (via Bethlehem); and in the 1870s telegraph lines connected Jerusalem with Egypt, Beirut, and Istanbul and from there onward to Europe; in addition, various postal services (Ottoman, Russian, German, Austrian, French and Italian) were established (Scholch, 1990: 240).

### **Ramallah and Bethlehem**

In the early Ottoman times (1516-1918), Ramallah is mentioned as a village in conurbation with two others: Al-Bireh and Beit Unia. It has always been recorded as a mixed city that housed both Christians and Muslims. In the same century the Ottomans recorded the city as a prosperous agricultural town at the core of other villages that depended on it and its connections to Jerusalem especially that it had become a feeder city for the capital (Dumper and Stanley, 2007).

Ramallah/Al-Bireh had a few thousand inhabitants by the beginning of the twentieth century that by the year 1912 had grown to 5,000. The British Mandate brought significant prosperity and development to Ramallah and Al-Bireh. This is especially based on the fact that the mandatory bureaucracy needed trained staff that spoke both Arabic and English, and Ramallah graduates were readily capable of taking the jobs. In addition, the city served as a leisure spot for diplomats and bureaucrats, especially with its close location to Jerusalem, ,

its moderate weather, its springs and garden restaurants. Meanwhile, Palestinian emigration increased, and the remittance flowed back into the city increasing spending on education, land and real estate.

With time Ramallah expanded and grew in various fields. In 1807, the first Greek Orthodox Church was built, and in 1869, the Friends School for Girls opened. In 1875 the Protestants established a school for boys, and in 1891 the Lutheran German Girls School was created.

Numerous other schools were built in Ramallah which offered educational opportunities, English language trainings and attracted students from the region to live and study in town. This helped build networks with Europe and America and Ramallah graduates started to look for economic opportunities abroad. Therefore, both Ramallah and Al-Bireh suffered from emigration mainly to the USA since late 19th century. Palestinian communities were already established in the US, and the money made abroad by the locals was often invested in the city's development of its education sector (Dumper and Stanley, 2007).

## **1948 - THE RESHAPING OF PALESTINIAN URBANISM BY REFUGEES**

### **Ramallah/Bethlehem**

In 1948, major changes to the urban structure and fabric of both Ramallah and Al-Bireh took place especially that it received urban refugees from Lod and Jaffa, as well as rural refugees from the village of Lifta in West Jerusalem, and the villages of Deir Tarif and Beit Nabala east of Ramla. Most of the refugees have settled in Ramallah and have played a major role in the economic and social life of the city

until today. With the loss of major Palestinian cities (e.g. Haifa, Jaffa and Ramla) to Israeli occupation, the conurbation of Ramallah/Al-Bireh became one of the largest cities in what was left of Palestine.

The refugees that poured into Ramallah settled in four major Refugee Camps (Qalandiya, Al Amari, Qadoura, and Al-Jalazon). Today those camps house some 30,000 Palestinians. This resulted in a big change in the fabric of the city expanding it from a small town to a bigger city, with new traditions, eating habits, less traditional social relations and with regional and international connections (encyclopaedia). UNRWA's training colleges, local civil society institutions and different voluntary activities were formed to help the refugees and helped mark the city as a key location for civil society organizing and social action.

Bethlehem physically integrated into the city refugee camps nearby, which became socially accepted and integrated into national movements. National elites emerged from the refugee population.

### **GAZA: THE INTERMEDIATE CENTRE**

The Palestinian national leader Yasser Arafat, chose Gaza as its first provincial headquarters, following the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 and the Gaza-Jericho autonomy agreement (1994) and the interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza strip (1995). The newly established Palestinian Legislative Council held its inaugural session in Gaza in March 1996. Gaza became the administrative centre of the Palestinian Authority, and the seat of its executive, parliamentary authority, which was a major infrastructure project implemented in Gaza. An international airport opened in 1998 (near Rafah city south of Gaza Strip) as well as a sea port (north of Gaza City) where the initial phase completed in 2000 (Sharab, 2006).

The West Bank was a secondary administrative centre of the PA was spread in the late 1990s early 2000s between different cities. For example, the Ministry of Local Government was located in Jericho, the Ministry of Economy in Nablus, the Ministry of Waqf in the Old City of Jerusalem, the Ministry of Tourism in Bethlehem. Other ministries were located in Al Ram, a Palestinian suburb adjacent to the Municipal boundaries of Jerusalem.

The chairman of the PLO and PA, Yasser Arafat, realized the importance of extending his political power on the West Bank cities. Except for his visits to some West Bank cities, they were largely neglected by the PA. Only after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 and the Israeli destruction of the PA institutions and infrastructure projects, Arafat moved the centre of the PA to Ramallah. Ministries and public institutions moved from Jerusalem's suburbs and other cities to Ramallah. Since 2005 the economic centrality of Ramallah replaced the two traditional economic centres of the West Bank, Nablus and Hebron (beside Jerusalem which already lost its centrality since 1993).

### **RAMALLAH: The EMERGING OF A METROPOLITAN CITY**

Ramallah is a satellite city of Jerusalem 6 kilometres north of the city. Even though it has its own governorate, it is part of Metropolitan Jerusalem and part of a sub-metropolitan region of cities, municipally fragmented but serving as a functional and spatial urban unit. Referring to Ramallah today, people mix between Ramallah and Al-Bireh, a conurbation of two twin towns. The first is a Christian city, north-west of Jerusalem, and the second is Muslim. Both towns depended on Jerusalem as their services centre until they were separated from the city by the Israeli Separation Barrier.

## Under Israeli Occupation

The suburbanization of Jerusalem and its expansion in the mid-1980s and early 1990s was to the direction of Ramallah, mainly around the main road connecting the two cities and, at a later stage, to the West of this main road. This expansion created a contiguous built-up area between the two cities. The Palestinian Authority shifted the city from a small town to an administrative and economic centre of the emerging Palestinian self-rule government.

## Recent Developments in Ramallah (After Oslo)

At an early stage of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Ramallah was considered a secondary centre, as Gaza was the main administrative centre of the PA. Only in 1995, when the Oslo B Agreement was signed and presidential and parliamentary elections for the West Bank and Gaza were held in January 1996, sovereign institutions were established in Ramallah as a branch of the PA institutions in Gaza, where the President of the PA had his headquarter back then.

The policy of the PA then was to allocate some of the institutions in the suburbs of Jerusalem, in areas under the PA civil responsibility. Ministries and public institutions were first based in the Dahiyat Al-Bareed neighbourhood north of Jerusalem, just outside of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. This is based on the Palestinian political demand of Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state and locating some of the institutions close to Jerusalem was considered as a step towards achieving this political aspiration. The PA institutions both in Gaza and Ramallah considered Jerusalem as their permanent address, for this reason, the PA refused to build public institutions and preferred to rent buildings, assuming that at the

end of the interim agreement, Jerusalem would be the capital of an independent Palestinian state and institutions would be built there. Diplomatic missions to the PA, however, were mostly located in Ramallah.

## SECOND INTIFADA – THE DECLINE OF CITIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF RAMALLAH AS A NATIONAL CORE

In September 2000, the Second Intifada broke out. Most of the PA institutions in Gaza were bombarded and severely damaged by Israel. The Israeli policy behind such actions was to weaken the security and functional ability of the PA and resulted in the restriction of movement between Gaza and the West Bank. The President and the PA institutions then operated mainly from Ramallah, where the PA institutions were moved to from Jerusalem's suburbs, assuming that Israel will not re-occupy Area 'A'. Therefore, this was an act to protect these institutions.

## Closure

### *Jerusalem*

The Israeli closure imposed on Jerusalem contributed to the decline of the city as a metropolitan centre in the West Bank. The suburbs of Jerusalem and later Ramallah took over the economic and service functions that Jerusalem provided prior to the installation of checkpoints and the Separation Barrier preventing the West Bankers from accessing Jerusalem.

## Peripheral cities

Since 2005, Ramallah witnessed vast development mainly in real estate and services, in addition to economic growth with the hopes of a resumption of peace negotiations and continuous international support to the PA. In 2003, however, the PA decided to stop renting offices and to construct its government compound in Ramallah. Other ministries, like the Ministry of Finance, are already operating from buildings owned by the PA government.

## JERUSALEM: THE SHRINKING CITY AND ENDING THE CENTRALITY

Since Israel occupied East Jerusalem, aside from the termination of their sovereign institutions, the Palestinians have been accorded semi-autonomy in fields related to their lives, such as health and education. Private schools, for example, were not required to adopt an Israeli curriculum and continued to employ the Jordanian education scheme taught in the West Bank until it was replaced with Palestinian curricula following establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Admittedly, Israel attempted in the beginning of the 1970s to impose Israeli curricula in public schools, but parents refused to send their children to those schools, forcing the Israeli authorities to retreat from their decision. Similarly, Jerusalem preserved its health system after the occupation through the services of Palestinian hospitals, which remained independent from the Israeli Health Ministry. Furthermore, Jordan continued to control of the Waqf that administers the Haram Ash-Sharif as well as most properties and real estate in the Old City and some commercial buildings and offices outside the walls in East Jerusalem's commercial-business centre along Sultan Suleiman and Salah Eddin Streets (Dumper, 1997).

Palestinian influence and independence in Jerusalem began to strengthen at the end of the 1970s. From the beginning of the 1980s, the process of establishing civil society organizations and service institutions accelerated due to PLO support and financing allocated at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1974. Several universities, cultural centres, social services institutions and media centres were established. The Israeli motive behind "allowing" such institutions to exist rested on the false assessment that their existence would lead to the formation of a Palestinian leadership comprised of West Bank and Gaza Strip residents as an alternative to the PLO. However, those institutions effectively formed an arm of the PLO, especially during the First Intifada (1987-1992). Indeed, the role of the PLO increased to the point of replacing the role of the traditional leaderships and weakening Jordan's role in important institutions such as the Waqf Department, syndicates and unions. Those institutions ended their affiliation with Jordan when it declared disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, and the resulting vacuum was filled by the PLO (Dumper, 1997).

The West Bank and Gaza Strip's importance increased following the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, when the conflict and its leadership moved from "outsiders" (PLO exiles at first in Lebanon, later Tunisia) to the "insiders" (personalities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories). It is possible to state that during this period Jerusalem was transformed into the undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories due to its position as the centre of representative political and service institutions, in addition to its commercial centrality and its status as an important metropolitan centre for the entire West Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip. The decision in 1991 to hold an international conference for peace in the Middle East (the Madrid Peace Conference),

followed by an agreement on a formula for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, and the acceptance by the Tunis-based PLO leadership of a delegation that included insider Jerusalem personalities known for their loyalty to the PLO, transformed Jerusalem into the headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team. That headquarters became the diplomatic and political address of the Palestinians (the Orient House building north of the Old City).

The year 1992 saw the launch of the so-called Washington talks. They were something of a smoke screen since while they were being conducted, other direct secret negotiations were going on in Oslo between Israelis and official representatives of the PLO from Tunis; the parties succeeded in reaching a Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993. The two sides agreed to include the issue of the future of Jerusalem as one of the final status issues and accepted the participation of Jerusalemites in the election process for the Self-Governing Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The DOP stipulated that an agreement on the future of Jerusalem would be reached in the final phase among the issues postponed for this phase, which are the issues of settlements, the refugees, borders and security areas, and water. An agreement over these issues was supposed to be reached within no later than three years from the commencement of the interim (1993 Oslo) phase (Abbas, 1995). This was an important benchmark not only for the seeming agreement to discuss Jerusalem; it also represented a turning point in moving the political weight of the outsiders into the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and weakening the role played by the inside leadership prior to establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Al-Qaq, 1997). Agreements to eventually discuss the city notwithstanding,

year after year Jerusalem's status declined as the hub of Palestinian life.

Firstly, in 1993 Israel imposed a military closure over Jerusalem that all but eliminated its role as a West Bank centre: all Palestinians were banned from entering Jerusalem for shopping, working, or receiving services except those who live within the Israeli-defined municipal boundary of the city. Secondly, the consequences of closure on the mobility of West Bankers, and the restrictions on PA operations in the city, have effectively forced the PA to site its national institutions outside of East Jerusalem in Ramallah.

In June 1994, just after Israel signed the Oslo B Accord (May 1994) and the PA was founded, Israel began passing laws barring Palestinian institutions' activities in East Jerusalem, in contravention to its agreement with the PLO. After the Israeli Knesset passed this law in its session on June 26, 1994, Israeli authorities, instructed by Premier Yitzhak Rabin, began curtailing Palestinian activities in Jerusalem, and the Israeli security apparatuses set "criteria" in accordance with which the operations of Palestinian institutions were monitored. Such criteria included the nature of the activity, the activity's governmental character (sovereignty), its linkage to the PA's budget, its affiliation with the official Palestinian administrative system, usage of official titles, and usage of the PA's emblem (Klein, 1999; Cohen, 2007: 56). Israel enforced these regulations, particularly in regard to areas related to sovereignty and the power of the Palestinian police and preventive security services. At the end of 1994, Israel began working on removing from Jerusalem institutions affiliated with the PA, such as the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and

Reconstruction (PECDAR), and the Palestinian Housing Council (Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

On the diplomatic level, Israel undertook measures to stop European diplomatic visits to Orient House. Reacting to the European Union's decision that European foreign ministers visiting the region make official visits to Orient House, Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin decided not to bar foreign ministers and ministers from visiting Orient House, but he refused to meet with any who did. In light of this decision, it is possible to say that the work of the Orient House was reduced to following up on the issue of Jerusalem, and seeking to keep the issue of Jerusalem and its future on the political agenda--including the agendas of diplomatic visits, which continued at Orient House on the level of consulates in Jerusalem and representative offices to the PA. During the period following the Oslo Accords, the Orient House worked on following up legal issues pertaining to land and real estate confiscation, house demolition, and health, cultural and athletic services, in addition to assisting individual cases and supporting small projects undertaken by institutions in Jerusalem (Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

After Benjamin Netanyahu won the 1996 election, he continued efforts undertaken earlier by Rabin and Peres concerning curtailing Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and barring any signs of sovereignty. He worked on solidifying the Israeli annexation and sovereignty in the occupied East Jerusalem through enforcing police presence and opening new police stations, allocating budgets for developing East Jerusalem, and building settlements, especially on Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa). Moreover, Netanyahu took the decision to open the tunnel that passed parallel to the eastern wall of the Haram Ash-Sharif (Klein, 1999).

The construction of the separation barrier, which began in 2003 and has not yet been completed, reified the closure policy which began 10 years earlier.

severing the city geographically and functionally from the rest of the West Bank. The route of the barrier, ignoring both the municipal boundary and the 1948 Armistice Line, aims to include as many Settlements and as much open land as possible whilst excluding as many Palestinian neighbourhoods as possible, in order to establish a Greater 'Jewish' Metropolitan Jerusalem and rule out any possibility of a divided or shared city between two states.

### **URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS UNDER THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY**

Palestinian cities have witnessed a rapid development since Oslo 1993-4, social, demographic, economic and spatial changes resulted from the political process and the shifting of functional responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian cities differ in their local identity and culture, level of urbanization and social structure. The emergence of Ramallah as a new administrative and economic centre affected other cities mainly Jerusalem which became physically isolated from the West Bank and its hinterland. The Israeli closure policy since 1993 and the erection of the Separation Barrier stopped Jerusalem from functioning as a metropolitan city for the Palestinians. National institutions, services provision institutions as well as cultural and media ones were forced to leave the city and others left voluntary due to the harsh restriction of entering the city by West Bankers.

In September 2000, the second Intifada broke out. Most of the PA institution in Gaza was bombarded and severely damaged by Israel.

The Israeli policy behind such actions was to weaken the security and functional ability of the PA and resulted in the restriction of movement between Gaza and the West Bank. The president and the PA institutions then operated mainly from Ramallah. Ministries and public institution moved from Jerusalem's suburbs and other cities to Ramallah in the belief that Israel would not reoccupy Area A. This created a second administrative centre.

After the 2006 elections, Hamas instigated rule in the Gaza strip thereby maintaining Gaza City as an administrative centre. Following Hamas's election into office and the resultant conflict in 2007 Israel enacted a blockade banning almost all exports and imports into the region. Consequently, the Gaza Strip relied on imports through tunnels under the Egypt border. This dramatically restricted development in the region and the ability of Gaza to function as a metropolitan city, a function that was not made easier by Israel's heavy bombardment of infrastructure during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. Despite establishing a comprehensive system of governance in the region Hamas's label as a terrorist organization by many international bodies has focused diplomatic attention to Ramallah as the main Palestinian administrative centre.

Archaeological excavations provided proof that the city's roots go back 5,000 years as crossroads for travellers and pilgrims heading to Jericho and Jerusalem. Remains were excavated in the city and were dated to the Roman and Byzantine eras in Palestine (64 BC – AD 636). The cycles of eras in the city appear to have been a Canaanite settlement, a Roman site with some 1000 inhabitants, and a similar number of inhabitants in the Islamic era.

However, the foundation of the city of Ramallah is known locally to have taken place in the middle of the 16th century by Rashed Haddadin who had led his small caravan across the arid hills of Jordan to a location not far from Jerusalem and settled in the midst of prehistoric caves and two Roman villages. On this spot new dwellings were built. At that time, he was not aware that he was laying the foundations

for a new, promising town in the heart of Palestine called Ramallah. Haddadin decided to return to his hometown Al-Karak shortly after arriving in Ramallah after hearing about the death of his adversary. His five sons, Sabra, Ibrahim, Jiries, Shqeir, and Hassan, made up their minds to stay in Ramallah. They each had several children, and, in time, the children's families grew into extended families, and became the ancestors of today's Ramallah population.

## **EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND GROWTH**

With time Ramallah expanded and grew in various fields. In 1807, the first Greek Orthodox Church was built, and in 1869, the Friends School for Girls opened. In 1875 the Protestants established a school for boys, and in 1891 the Lutheran German Girls School was created.

Numerous other schools were built in Ramallah which offered educational opportunities, English language trainings and attracted students from the region to live and study in town. This helped to build networks with Europe and America and Ramallah graduates started to look for economic opportunities abroad. Therefore, both Ramallah and Al-Bireh suffered from emigration mainly to the USA since late 19<sup>th</sup> century that Ramallah/Al-Bireh communities were already established in the US,

and the money made abroad by the locals was often invested in the city's further development of its education sector.

Ramallah was converted by the Turkish government in 1902 into a city and its district included 30 surrounding towns and villages. Dignitary Ahmad Murad from Jerusalem was appointed the first governor of Ramallah. In 1908 Ramallah became a city, and dignitary Elias Odeh became its first mayor. The municipal council included one representative from each extended family (Ramallah Municipality). Ramallah/Al-Bireh had a few thousand inhabitants by the beginning of the twentieth century that by the year 1912, 5,000 inhabitants were counted.

During the British Mandate in Palestine between 1917 and 1948, significant prosperity and development were brought to Ramallah/Al-Bireh. This is especially why the mandatory bureaucracy needed trained staff that speaks both Arabic and English, and Ramallah graduates were readily capable of taking the jobs. In addition, the city served as a leisure spot for diplomats and bureaucrats especially with its close location to Jerusalem, its moderate weather, its springs and garden restaurants. Meanwhile, Palestinian emigration increased, and the remittance flowed back into the city increasing spending on education, land and real estate.

In 1948, major changes to the urban structure and fabric of both Ramallah and Al-Bireh took place especially that it received urban refugees from Loud and Jaffa, as well as rural refugees from the village of Lifta in West Jerusalem, and the villages of Deir Tarif and Beit Nabala east of Ramla. Most of the refugees have settled in Ramallah and have played a major role in the economic and social life of the city until today. With the loss of major Palestinian cities (e.g. Haifa,

Jaffa and Ramla) to Israeli occupation, the conurbation of Ramallah/Al-Bireh became one the largest cities in what was left of Palestine.

### **RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN RAMALLAH (AFTER OSLO)**

The fragmentation of the Palestinian territories through checkpoints, closure, and road blockades contributed to moving many of the functions to Ramallah. Restriction of movement between Palestinian localities and cities forced many Palestinians to reside in Ramallah.

Most of these people work for the PA institutions which are considered the largest employer of 165,000 Palestinians; 60 % of which are in the West Bank and the rest in Gaza. At this period many international organizations moved physically from Jerusalem to Ramallah. This includes UN agencies which kept Jerusalem as their centre, while their main operations are run from Ramallah. Today, all banks and companies' headquarters are located in Ramallah, some of which moved from other Palestinian cities like Nablus and Hebron.

The PA institutions both in Gaza and Ramallah considered Jerusalem as their permanent address, for this reason, the PA refused to build public institutions and preferred to rent buildings, assuming that at the end of the interim agreement, Jerusalem will be the capital and institutions will be built there. In 2003, however, the PA decided to stop renting offices and to construct its government compound in Ramallah, which is under construction today. Other ministries like the Ministry of finance are already operating from buildings owned by the PA government.

Since 2005, Ramallah witnessed vast development mainly in real estate and services, in addition to economic growth with the hopes to resume negotiations and the continuous international support to the PA in Ramallah. Ramallah emerged as an administrative centre for the PA, the metropolitan centre for the entire West Bank, and the economic and commercial centre of West Bank.

### **RAMALLAH ATTRACTING POPULATION AND INNER MIGRATION**

Conservative estimates indicate that, between 1996 and 2006, 8,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites migrated to Ramallah. This is even with the construction of the Israeli Separation Barrier which separates both cities from each other and complicates access to their city.

A recent survey by the International Peace and Cooperation Centre in Jerusalem shows that 16.5% of employed Palestinian Jerusalemites cross the Barrier every day to work in Ramallah, 40% of which are from the upper class. The salaries that Palestinians earn in Ramallah are 24.6% higher than in Jerusalem. Due to this, as well as the fact that Ramallah has been flourishing as the new financial capital with a trendy style of life, Palestinian Jerusalemites from the middle and upper classes are moving to Ramallah where they get better housing, better jobs, higher salaries, a richer social and cultural life, and access to better public facilities.

This is while rural migration from Palestine to Ramallah continues, and the fact that the city started to attract educated Israeli Palestinians as well. Students and young couples move to the city to find a job and experience the open life style.

Housing projects and cooperatives, hotels and high-rise offices exist in the city today defining its skyline and new restaurants, bars and dance clubs have contributed to the transformation of Ramallah into a vibrant city. These facts cause continuous daily shifts in the built environment of Ramallah, which grew up the main hill towards its twin city Al-Bireh causing both cities to become seamless. The greater Ramallah/Al-Bireh metropolitan is estimated in 2007 to be home to 140,000 people.

### **DEALING WITH DEVELOPMENT AND RAPID URBANIZATION**

In dealing with the rapid changes that have been taking place in the last decade, Ramallah has followed the following approaches:

Strengthening of inner-town neighbourhoods and streets which is the most dominant case in many Arab cities

- Suburbanization like this is the case with Rawabi north of Ramallah
- Growth and expansion to fill the gaps between adjacent cities, which is a less dominant approach than the first two, especially in the case of Jerusalem and its hinterland in Ramallah and the designation of Palestinian territories as areas A, B and C, which left most of the major cities West Bank fragmented and isolated from their hinterland and surroundings.

The first two approaches were the most dominant in the case of Ramallah. Construction in the neighbourhoods within both Ramallah and Al-Bireh has been intensified and gaps were being filled to provide a supply for both housing and cultural and administrative activities.

Recently, a new approach of suburbanization has taken place when the Minister of Local Government approved in 2009 the master plan for the first planned Palestinian city, *Rawabi*, as a suburb of Ramallah. Bayti, the developer of the project (jointly owned by Qatar government-owned Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company and Ramallah-based Massar International) finalized preparations to launch the construction of about 5,000 housing units some 9 km north of Ramallah as a contribution to the improvement of quality of life of the Palestinian population, especially in Ramallah.

The project is a result of a public-private partnership between the PA and the developer Bayti and is thought to be significant in providing jobs for Palestinians in addition to its main goal of providing affordable housing to alleviate the housing shortage, and supporting the private sector and its contribution to Palestinian economy. The master plan of *Rawabi* aimed at integrating high planning and design principles, sustainable environmental practices, appropriate architectural features, creative use of public and green spaces, and ease of access considerations (The ultimate ME business source, 2009).

In the same year, the master plan of another new suburb north-west of Ramallah, *Al-Rayhan*, has been approved.

It is an initiative of the Palestinian Investment Fund, a government investment arm. The area of the project is 250 dunums with 1,600 planned housing units for which Palestinian buyers will have mortgage access. The costs of this project have reached \$500 million.

It is worth mentioning that the Palestinian Investment fund has been implementing a number of large-scale projects in Ramallah with both local and international investment companies, one of which is the *Irsal Centre* project whose costs reach \$400 million.

***CHAPTER FIVE:***

***IPCC's PLANNING  
EXPERIENCE***

# IPCC'S PLANNING EXPERIENCE

The lack of zoning and planning for Palestinian neighbourhoods is a major impediment to development in East Jerusalem, due to the Israeli restrictions and partisan urban planning policies. The Israeli Municipality has only developed general town scheme plans which restrict land use by Palestinians in East Jerusalem leading to halting development and causing physical fragmentation, environmental degradation, and social disintegration

## IPCC INTERVENTION

IPCC has been working since 2007 through its project called "Focus on Urban Intervention to Reduce Tension in East Jerusalem", supported by the UK Consulate General Conflict Prevention Program, to sustain and empower the Palestinian existence in East Jerusalem and secure their right to the city through several means:

- Support urban planning, social empowerment of Palestinian neighbourhoods aiming to save "unlicensed" buildings from demolition.
- Increase building density and percentages and provide expansion areas of built-up neighbourhoods.
- Provide housing solutions and allocating land for public space for community services and infrastructure.
- Identify land for economic activities: such as employment area, tourism, commercial, and IT.

IPCC initiatives aim to facilitate the immediate improvement of living conditions and ease displacement pressures, while securing growth opportunities for Palestinian communities, thus contributing towards conflict mitigation and social stability.

IPCC adopts an innovative dual political and technical approach focusing on advocacy to freeze demolition, urban planning support for communities to cater for natural growth and expansion as well as in-fill densification, development of public space, and the development of the urban economy.

IPCC has identified 32 sites that require immediate planning intervention and through its three projects funded by the UK Consulate General, the EU, and the Belgium government, IPCC is engaged in planning intervention in 12 neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem at the level of detailed planning.

Two levels of planning were carried out: (a) outline plans of a sub neighbourhood, and (b) general plans combining a cluster of outlines in the same neighbourhood.

## **A. Outline Plans**

Two examples will be presented in this chapter: Ashkareyeh (south and centre) and Wadi Qaddum and Ras Al-Amud/Abu Swai

### **Ashkareyeh**

Ashqareyeh lies west of the main Jerusalem-Ramallah Road between Shu'fat and Beit Hanina with a total san area of 1,117 dunum with more than 3,000 inhabitants. The area includes three unplanned blocks with a total area of 116dunum(south/Shu'fat, Center and north), these are mostly undeveloped and contain only 50 informal buildings without permits. The remaining area contains 484 buildings and has approved Outline Plans although these allocate unnecessarily low building rights

### **Ashkareyeh (South part/Shu'fat)**

#### ***Planning Schemes***

IPCC prepared alternatives for the zoning of the area and different alternatives are being prepared for building typologies for the area (such as separate housing, raw housing, etc.), and for each alternative an analysis is prepared as well as calculation, drawings and sometimes 3D sketches for the numbers of housing units, parking, building percentages, and the levels and entrances.

#### ***Meetings with the Community***

Alternatives were presented to landowners' representatives of the (Abu Khdeir extended family); the owners expressed their concern to minimize the land confiscated for the national park and to consider it part of the 40% land allocation needed for the plan. IPCC prepared and presented to the Municipality a full analysis of the area, the need to develop the area, the proportions for the deduction, and the need to enlarge the proposed area. The Municipality agreed to reduce the size of the national park from 35 dunums to 17 dunums and remaining 18 dunums can be added to the development polygon which can be allocated for residential use.

Negotiations with the community have not been completed regarding the size of the commercial area. IPCC has suggested that the community also consider establishing a committee where the committee would be responsible of developing the area in consultation with community members. This will help the community to be better prepared for meetings with municipal officials.



## Ashkareyeh (Centre /Beit Hanina)

### **Site info:**

24 dunums  
-120 residents in 25 housing units of which 23 are considered informal.

### ***Planning Schemes***

Advanced planning alternatives were prepared for area upon discussions with the Jerusalem Municipality and the community, where consultants worked on the plan:

The landscape architect has been working on the site

The road engineer finished sections and levels for area

### ***Meetings with the Community***

Several meetings were conducted with landowners and the Municipality:

The borders of the site were finalized with the Municipality. At the beginning of the process, the Municipality had demanded the areas be incorporated with the surrounding site, which was left without an outline plan. However, this would only complicate the plan. After a thorough analysis was presented to the Municipality, the plan for the development of the proposed area's borders were finalized, and an agreement between the Municipality and the community was reached.

IPCC received the initial approval for the plan: The Municipality had imposed some restraints and requested some amendments be made regarding the linear park. IPCC met with the community to relay the new information and issues raised by the Municipality. Finally, the community reached an agreement and accepted the amendments.



### Site info:

**532 dunums  
12,000 residents in 1,140 housing units of which  
800 are considered informal.**

Four outline plans were completed for the neighbourhoods of Abu Swai, Wadi Qaddum, Al-Hara, Al-Foqa, Al-Tahta and Hai Sweih. Surveys of the socio-economic indicators for the existing buildings and structures were updated recently. The outline plans package includes alternatives for land use, planning program and a neighbourhood profile.

### *Detailed Planning Level*

IPCC, in cooperation with the community representatives, agreed to work on a detailed plan for Al-Hara Al-Tahta, where people have the most demolition orders, and thereby to enable them to obtain building permits.

A success story in this area will encourage the other areas to believe in the planning process and cooperate. The borders of this plan were rechecked according to the approved plans within as well as the surrounding the area.

The area of the detailed plan is 162 dunums. The advanced building survey for the detailed plan was completed. Plans and detailed sketches which aim to solve the problems in the existing buildings - regarding the setbacks and building percentages which do not relate to what is currently allowed or can be allowed regarding the existing infrastructure - are prepared and discussed with the Municipality and the community.

Built up area maps were prepared (Based on 3d multi-vision and on surveys for the built up and the vacant land), followed by a field survey to check its accuracy.

The 162 dunums plan was divided into 5 blocks, to study each block development and land allocation for public use. Each block is studied in context with the other blocks and separately has a plan, sections and detailed sketches to explain the building percentages, deductions, and setbacks.

The most challenging block in the plan is “Hay As-Salaymeh”, a block completely surrounded by the Eastern ring road, where a bridge is planned and approved to go above the neighbourhood. Therefore, this block needs an additional study and design.

**IPCC plans for the area tried to renovate and rehabilitate the area according to these principles:**

- Regulate the existing built-up area
- Benefit from the steep slopes of the area and highlight the neighbourhood’s topography through mixed use zones, long promenade and parks to benefit from the view which this topography offers.
- Adopt “Bethlehem” old road as the main access for the neighbourhood. This road will be developed as a commercial spine for the area with organized parking spaces.

A 3D-model was prepared for the area and for the Eastern ring road.

***Landownership information***

Vacant land survey was completed to find title deeds/ ownership based on several meetings with a surveyor from the area.

***Meetings with Community***

Several meetings were conducted with various communities, where each community’s needs differed from the other and were dependent on legal actions taken by Israeli authorities against housing structures in each community. Meetings with the Municipality were arranged so that the community members could submit their legal documents proving their structures are legally built and to reach a final agreement on the borders and use of the lands.

## B. General Structural Plan

### "Jabal Al-Mukabber and Sawahireh Gharbiyeh"



#### *Background*

The "Jabal Al-Mukabber and Sawahireh Gharbiyeh" neighbourhood lies in the southern part of East Jerusalem and the Old City, the target area covers 3,630 dunum and around 1,852 buildings (3,708 housing units) with more than 20,000 inhabitants. The majority of inhabitants are of Bedouin origin, from the As-Sawahreh tribes. The area is bordered by the Kidron Valley (Wadi Al-Nar), Silwan, Wadi Qaddum and At-Thuri from the north, Sur Baher from the south, the Barrier, As-Sawahreh Al-Sharqiyeh and Talpiot from the East. The Nofzion settlement lies within this area, and it is also adjacent to the Armon Hanatsov settlement. This area was chosen for its high potential for development.

A large part of it is zoned for development on the master plan 2020 and with building percentages that reach 160-180% of building permits.

It suffers from several obstacles such as: some of the approved outline plans within the area have limited building percentage up to 35% only and a large proportion of the area is designated as an open green no build' area. The area is also fragmented by Israeli settlements the Separation Barrier and the proposed ring road. IPCC developed a general outline plan for the area, which aims to guide the growth and 'land development for the current period and for the long term.

## ***Progress***

### **1. Initialization with Community**

No formal body exists within the area, so IPCC contacted key persons, who are heads of families (Mukhtar) and some well-known, influential community members within the area. When the idea for planning was proposed, the people contacted by IPCC showed willingness to cooperate and acceptance of the initiative. This may be due to increased number of demolitions within the area. Already, some people have asked for administrative and legal assistance, such as a letter they can use to freeze demolition orders on their houses.

### **2. Public Awareness Lectures**

IPCC Conducted several awareness lectures on different targeted communities.

### **3. Survey and analysis**

IPCC completed a detailed survey of the area and its surroundings. The information collected on social, economic and urban factors will guide allocation of public services and help contextualize the plan within its surroundings. Results from the survey have been digitized and inserted in a report.

### **4. Generation of Planning Program**

A planning program has been developed using the comprehensive survey data. The program provides a guide to the needs of the neighbourhood and consequent land allocation addressing educational, commercial, open space and parking requirements, taking into consideration three urban typologies; rural, semi urban and urban.

### **5. Tours to the planning area**

A tour was made to the area by the planning team with UN-Habitat on 8 Jan 2014. Another tour was made to identify tribe's names with one of area representatives and many others to study area by IPCC planning team.

## **6. Urban Analysis**

A set of studies were conducted to analyse the urban situation, highlight problems, and generate possible solutions and opportunities for development. These studies were the basis in order to prepare a sectorial assessment report. The following studies have been completed:

- Road networks including main and bypass roads, and those those serve as a connection between metropolitan and local levels.
- Analysis of the existing plans including the approved and proposed plans, including the master plan 2020 and Sinan Pasha's (Suliman the Magnificent's court architect) plan for Al-Sawahireh Al-Gharbiyeh during the Ottoman Period.
- Spatial analysis of the urban system in area surrounded by the Separation Barrier
- GIS survey maps and planning conclusions
- SWOT analysis for area including strengths and related opportunities, and weaknesses and related threats
- Transport network including assessment of :
  - Main entry points and connections
  - Road categorization into main, secondary, and tertiary streets
  - Street access: illustrating the effectiveness of the current street network according to building access to main, secondary, tertiary streets
- A ground map showing built up area vs. public open spaces
- Map of all undeveloped plots with an area equal to or more than 1 dunum to highlight areas of possible development
- Map of green spaces: a classification of parks, agricultural areas, and private land.
- A 3D model for the entire area


## 7. Zoning Plan

The aim of the general plan is to speed up the urbanization of as-Sawahreh in order to absorb the growth of this area and the surrounding neighbourhoods. The residential capacity of the neighbourhood will reach up to approximately 50,000 residents in 2040 and it will provide residential development opportunities, economic as well as recreational facilities.

The plan suggests rehabilitation and intensification of the existing residential areas according to the population density and it will mostly provide areas of rights for higher buildings on the undeveloped lands for new residential projects. Moreover, it will also connect the area with the Commercial Business District (CBD) and strengthen the contiguity with the Old City basin.

The plan also suggests an employment area on the edge of the area developed (around 200 dunums) with access from the American road. This area will provide many business and job opportunities for East Jerusalem. The employment area is connected to the commercial strip around the American road and it will provide a place for light industries, workshops, and logistics.

Also, the Wadi Al-Nar valley will be protected and developed through eco-tourism plans which will integrate the Bedouin culture of as-Sawahreh. Wadi Al-Nar park will be connected to the surrounding public green areas and the Old City basin, nearby housing areas in this neighbourhood and surrounding neighbourhoods will have direct access to it.



## I) Five Local Outline Plans

### *Background*

The boundaries of five planning areas were established with community representatives. Through a meeting with the community, 10 planning areas were chosen for outline planning. Of these, IPCC chose five areas as the priority areas according to the extent of community cooperation, the number of houses under threat of demolition and the availability of development areas.

The five planning areas are distributed throughout Jabal Al-Mukabber. The area of each plan is between 100-250 dunum (following the Municipality's guidelines). In total the plans cover 960 dunums with a total number of buildings reaching close to 500 (by experience IPCC found that a planning area up to 200 dunums is more workable, in order to discuss it with the Municipality, as well as for community negotiations). Two plans are in the northern part of the neighbourhood, one in the central and two in the south. The building percentage allowed in these areas is 50% maximum, but in practice people built above 100% and, in many cases, more than 160%. Some buildings (about 10%) are built in what is considered "a green public space" and thus marked for demolition.

### *Progress*

1. Initialization with Community and awareness meetings

IPCC has established contact with a general committee for Jabal Al-Mukabber and independent contact with individual residents and land owners.

2. Advanced Survey and analysis

IPCC completed an advanced survey for each building using "bird's eye" and aerial photos and the Jerusalem Municipality GIS database. Data was collected on the number of floors, plot areas, housing units, entrances, parking inside and outside the plots, setback, land use (current situation and in the Jerusalem master plan 2020). Site visits were made to verify the findings.

The following analytical maps were prepared:

1. Building height
2. Car parking availability
3. Accessibility
4. Building density
5. Transportation network.

### *3. Preparing Planning Programs*

Five planning program drafts for the five planning areas were prepared using the comprehensive survey data. The programs provide a guide to the needs of the neighbourhoods and subsequent land allocation for public use, mainly addressing educational, commercial, open space and parking requirements, taking in consideration three urban typologies (rural, semi urban and urban)

### *4. Urban Analysis*

A set of detailed studies were conducted to analyse the urban situation of the five planning areas, highlight problems, and generate possible solutions and opportunities for development within these areas. IPCC chose two areas from the five outline plans prepared for Jabal Al-Mukabber to advance them to detailed levels. The development of both plans followed a similar procedure, which maintained both community support for the initiative and advancement towards authorization through the Israeli planning system

# CHAPTER SIX: IPCC PLANNING PROGRAM AT CITY LEVEL



# IPCC PLANNING PROGRAM AT CITY LEVEL

## PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

Jerusalem is a rich and diverse city. Culturally and historically it has been the centre of business, education, recreational, family and community life, but with long neglect and lack of support the living conditions in the city are deteriorating year after year. For a long time, East Jerusalem has been suffering from deprivation, social exclusion and lack of or insufficient services.

Hence, this program will provide the necessary and much needed framework in order to identify East Jerusalem's current and future urban needs so as to bridge the gap in the different sectors of education, health, recreation, economic and infrastructure. The program focusses on creating more interaction between the different Palestinian neighbourhoods on "a city level" in terms of facilities and institutions. Any planning initiative for Jerusalem will need such a program in order to cover the shortage in the services needed. To provide for the future needs is the first step in this program.

The Program at City Level is an intervention to be used as a framework and a first step which will support all sorts of planning in East Jerusalem. It will estimate, based on the size of the current population of Palestinians in East Jerusalem as well as the distribution of the different age groups, the need of public facilities on the city level and the neighbourhoods.

## THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING

Since its occupation in 1967, there were no housing projects initiated by the Israeli government for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, while "nearly 200,000 Israeli settlers reside in settlements established in occupied East Jerusalem, which has been unlawfully annexed to Israel; 35% of the annexed areas were expropriated and allocated to settlements". These settlement housing projects are initiated by the government and only available for Israelis.

The Israeli law "Jerusalem as a Centre of Life" which was approved by the Israeli Knesset in 1996, specifies that anyone is subject to losing his or her right to live in Jerusalem, if they do not prove that municipal Jerusalem is their "centre of life." That is, every Palestinian resident has to pay dwelling and other taxes and to prove he is working and living within the municipal boundaries and education of children is conducted inside Jerusalem. Their status as residents provides certain social services and entitlement benefits, including health insurance and the welfare system.

Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are relatively poor. It is estimated by the Israeli National Insurance Institute that 75.3% of East Jerusalem residents live under the poverty line, with more than 80% of them being children! The welfare offices in East Jerusalem handle on average about 120 cases per day.

There is a huge need for affordable housing projects in East Jerusalem, as more than one third of the existing stock is in danger of demolition and there will be a need for more than 100,000 new housing units for Palestinians in East Jerusalem in the coming thirty years to absorb the growth of population alone.

In order to do so it is important to change land use to residential housing and at the same time also change some of the planning regulations and raise building percentages of the current residential land uses.

Palestinian homes, on the other hand, are built by the owners themselves and on their private lands. They do not get any support from the government. On the contrary, the Israeli government tries all sorts of ways and laws to make this process difficult and sometimes impossible with the loan policy, costly planning and licensing procedures, in addition to many limiting zoning and building laws as well as the trivial building rights when building is allowed. The Jerusalem Institute of Israeli (JIIS) Statistics asserts that the supply of housing units in East Jerusalem at the end of year 2012 would be 52,105, while the UN estimates that 28-44% of all housing units are unlicensed. According to Municipality data this figure is rising, and the shortage increases about 1,500 housing unit every year. The Israeli planning authorities however only license an average of 400 houses a year.

Under Israeli law, the inhabitants of “unlicensed houses” may be subject to fines, demolition and even imprisonment. Indeed, official data suggests there are between 10,500-11,500 outstanding demolition orders. Dwelling densities in East Jerusalem at 1.9 persons per room are higher than all other Palestinian areas. Over 600 Palestinian homes were demolished in East Jerusalem between the years 1993 and 2005, with the excuse of building “illegally”. Between the year 2004 and 2008, 402 houses were demolished in East Jerusalem and 1,399 people left their houses.

In the year 2008, 89 houses were demolished and 404 people left their houses.

In addition to the shortage in licensed houses, homes marked for demolition, homes in need of rehabilitation and renovation to be adequate for living, there is also the issue of housing units needed for future needs of the growing young population of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The estimated housing units needed till 2030 are an extra of about 57 thousand housing units (with an expected family size of 4.8) (see table 7). Therefore, a land area of about 8,000 dunum is needed. In a simple estimation, this entails average building right of 160% which is about 14 apartments per dunum. For the year 2050, it is estimated that there will be a need for more than 118,000 housing unit, which in turn it needs a land area no less than 16,000 dunums.

The availability of land is just one side of the housing dilemma for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Affordability is certainly another aspect, since housing prices in Jerusalem are very high compared to family income in general. Also, land ownership and registration is in many ways an obstacle against developing housing projects there and another major issue is the financing of loans for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, which is very low in quantity and in the size of the loan. IPCC conducted a full study called “East Jerusalem Housing Review 2013” which discussed in detail these issues.

**Table 7: Housing needs projection (IPCC)**

Year	Population	Household	Shortage	Average building rights
2015	393,198	67,793	28-44% of all housing units are unlicensed, shortage increases about 1,500 housing unit every year	<b>Mostly:</b> 25% - 75% 4 apartments buildings per dunum 9,884.3 dunums
2030	600,801	125,167	57,000 extra housing units needed	<b>Presumed:</b> 160% 14 apartments per dunum Area needed about 8,000 dunum (just for housing)
2050	1,023,617	243,718	118,000 extra housing unit needed	<b>Presumed:</b> 160% 14 apartments per dunum Area needed about 16,000 dunum (just for housing)

## PAVING THE FUTURE: EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

The regionally and locally approved and proposed plans by the Israeli planning authorities for Palestinian neighbourhoods enforce the village houses as a Palestinian preference, but these are a luxury Palestinians in East Jerusalem cannot afford anymore due to the scarcity of land available for housing on one hand, and the high prices of lands and apartments on the other. Moreover, the family size will decrease, and the demand on housing will increase, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The Palestinian family size in East Jerusalem is still relatively high at 5.6 persons per family in 2007, decreased from 5.9 persons per family in 1997. About 50% of the Palestinian families in East Jerusalem are families of 5 or less. It is expected to decrease more, and, in this report, it is estimated that the family size will reach 4.8 in 2030, and 4.2 in 2050.

Education is a right and a service which needs the proper facilities and locations, provided by the government through the Municipality. The problem with providing this service in East Jerusalem is land ownership. The Jerusalem Municipality requires the allocation of land for building schools from privately owned land by the Palestinian community and it also requires the transfer of the ownership of such land to the Municipality in order for it to allocate the financial resources to build the facilities. This issue is discouraging to the Palestinian community for fear that giving up their land for the Municipality will allow the use of this land for other purposes and other people than the Palestinians - a thing which the Palestinian community does not tolerate.

At the same time there are many plots of land in East Jerusalem which the Municipality reserved for educational and other public purposes but have been vacant for a long time and were not developed, while there is a huge gap in the educational facilities needed for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. A severe shortage of educational facilities remains the most pressing problem affecting the provision and quality of education in East Jerusalem.




**There is a shortage of at least 1,000 classrooms at all levels in East Jerusalem**

Table 8 illustrates the exact number of classrooms needed for each educational level for the current population of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The calculations are made according to the Israeli standards and the age groups.

**Table 8: Different educational level needs**

Item	Standards	Needs 2015	
		Unit	Quantity
Nursery / Kindergarten	to serve 70% of children ages (0-4)	Classes	1,142
	about 34,272 children	Dunums	571.0
Elementary and preparatory School	to serve 100% of children aged (5-14)	Classes	2,216
	about 66,471 children	Dunums	1,108.0
Secondary School	to serve at least 80% of children ages (15-18)	Classes	709
	about 21,271 children	Dunums	354.5
Total	to serve at least 86% of children ages (0-18)	Classes	4,067
	about 122,014 children	Dunums	2,033.5

Fig. 12 Educational Facilities in East Jerusalem



**Table 9: Educational Facilities in East Jerusalem**

Supervising body	2009-2010			
	Students	Classes	% Students	% Classes
Israeli Ministry of Education/Municipality	42,271	1,242	50.6%	43.4%
Islamic Waqf	12,338	479	14.8%	16.7%
Private	22,438	904	26.9%	31.6%
UNRWA	2,697	97	3.2%	3.4%
Other bodies*	3,764	138	4.5%	4.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>83,508</b>	<b>2,860</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

(\*) Investors who open schools with financial support from the Municipality. The schools are known as Sakhnin schools, and to date total eighteen Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem Municipality was obligated to build new classrooms for Palestinians in East Jerusalem according to a Supreme Court ruling. Between August 2012 and September 2013, there were 67 new classrooms constructed, where 75 other classrooms are under construction, and 110 are in the planning process, making it a total of 252 new classrooms. This number still does not come close to the shortage of another 1,000 classrooms. IPCC surveys in the neighbourhoods showed that about 70% of kindergartens are provided by the private sector, most of which are one or two classrooms within residential buildings, which serve the close community.

The failings of the system are the result of decades of underinvestment by the Israeli authorities, which continues to spend approximately half as much per student in Palestinian schools as Jewish schools. The lack of improvement to the educational system is undermining Palestinian development in East Jerusalem and has considerably damaging implications for the long term. Attendance is another concern in East Jerusalem, as it is low with high annual dropout rates. In total 36% of students fail to complete 12 years of schooling. Preschool attendance is particularly low with only 31% of children aged between 3-4 attended kindergartens in 2012.

**Table 10: Future projections for the different educational level needed for the year 2030**

Item	Standards	Unit	Needs 2030	Deficiency*
			Quantity	Quantity
Nursery / Kindergarten	to serve 70% of children ages (0-4)	Classes	1,635	
	about 49,039 children	Dunums	817.5	
Elementary and preparatory School	to serve at least 100% of children ages (5-14)	Classes	3,170	2,759 class
	about 95,112 children	Dunums	1,585.0	1,379.5 dunum
Secondary School	to serve at least 80% of children ages (15-18)	Classes	1,015	
	about 30,436 children	Dunums	507.5	
Total	at least 86% of children ages (0-18)	<b>Classes</b>	<b>5,820</b>	<b>2,759</b>
	about 174,587 children	<b>Dunums</b>	<b>2,910.0</b>	<b>1,379.5</b>


**\*Deficiency includes the needs between years 2015-2030 in addition to the shortage between the existing and needs in 2015**

East Jerusalemites have to suffer from the current shortage in the educational facilities and at the same time worry about the future of their children, who will need even more facilities. IPCC's projections indicate that after covering the current gap, there will be a need for 1,260 school classrooms in addition to 493 kindergarten classes by the year 2030 (see Table 11).

### **GREEN FOR DEVELOPMENT NOT FOR RESTRICTION**

Urban dwellers thrive for green and open spaces to decrease the pressure of dense life, but for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, sadly, the open spaces are usually the way for the Israeli planning authorities to control land in Jerusalem and to prevent Palestinian development and natural expansion. In total, 14.75% of land in East Jerusalem is designated for this purpose surrounding the Palestinian neighbourhoods and limiting their expansion, see Fig.13.

**Fig. 13: Public open space according to Jerusalem 2000 plan**



Government can classify any land - including private land- as a green area. Green areas are land areas that forbid development. These classifications are meant to hinder Palestinian development, and in some cases, the land is eventually transformed into a Jewish settlement. On occasions lands with no development plans are declared green areas and later reclassified to be used for Jewish development.

Despite this vast allocation of land for public open space the, Palestinian neighbourhoods for example lack playgrounds for children. Moreover, West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks compared to East Jerusalem which only has 45. In Fig.14 one can distinguish East Jerusalem neighbourhoods from West Jerusalem neighbourhoods by looking at the sum of playgrounds in the neighbourhoods.


Small playground in Silwan, ©IPCC



**Table 11: Population Needs from open spaces and playgrounds**

Item	Standards	Needs 2015	
		Unit	Quantity
<b>Open Public Spaces</b>	5.0 square meters per person	Dunums	1,966.0
<b>Playgrounds</b>	One play ground for 2,000 residents (one third of the population + use schools)	Playground	54
		Dunum	108.0
<b>Small Stadium</b>	Small stadium for 5,000 - 8,000 residents (one third of the population)	Small stadiums	20
		Dunum	104.0
<b>Stadium</b>	For population over 10,000	Stadiums	5
		Dunum	75.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>For total population of 393,198</b>	<b>Dunums</b>	<b>2,253.0</b>

**Fig. 14: Distribution of playgrounds in West and East Jerusalem for part of city**



There is definitely a need for public open spaces for the use of the residents and their indulgence. The Jerusalem Municipality's standards indicate the need for 5m<sup>2</sup> per person for the public open space, in addition to playgrounds and stadiums. Table 12 shows the need of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem of 2,114 dunums for public open spaces and playgrounds, while the analysis from BIMKOM's zoning table (in Appendix page 144) indicates that within the existing Palestinian neighbourhoods the allocation for public open spaces was 10,475 dunums for this purpose.

Future projections of the needs as shown in Table 13 below show that there will be an extra need for less than 2,000 dunums for open spaces and playgrounds. This still is a very small percentage of what is designated for this use currently! According to a study Nir Hasson published in Ha'aretz: "there is an average of one playground per 1,000 residents in the city's Jewish neighbourhoods, compared to one per 30,000 in Shu'fat and Beit Hanina".

**Table 12: Future projection for population needs for open spaces and playgrounds for the year 2030**

Item	Standards	Unit	Needs 2030	Deficiency*
			Quantity	Quantity
Playgrounds	One play ground for 2,000 residents (one third of the population + use schools)	Playground	90	85
		Dunum	180.0	170.0
Small Stadium	Small stadium for 5,000 - 8,000 residents (one third of the population)	Small stadiums	20	
		Dunum	140.0	300.0
Stadium	For population over 10,000	Stadiums	15	dunums
		Dunum	180.0	
Open Public Spaces	5m <sup>2</sup> per person	Dunums	3,004.0	1,800.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>For total population of 600,801</b>	<b>Dunums</b>	<b>3,5004.0</b>	<b>2,185.0</b>

**\*Deficiency includes the needs between years 2015-2030 in addition to the shortage between the existing and needs in 2015.**

## HEALTHCARE

East Jerusalem’s hospitals are greatly overstretched. Largely due to their provision of specialist treatment for the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, patients who accounted for 71.7% of total users in 2010. The inability of hospitals to accommodate patients, in some cases led to hospitals renting hotel rooms. A financial crisis has now emerged since the Palestinian Authority (PA) have been unable to pay hospital fees and grown to a debt of \$14.9 million.

Palestinians use hospitals both in East and West Jerusalem. Since East Jerusalem hospitals are at times insufficient, East Jerusalemites are given permission to enter and receive treatment in West Jerusalem hospitals.

This has led to a problem regarding emergency care units that, despite being required to do so, have not been set up in East Jerusalem, partly due to Israeli restrictions.

East Jerusalem's hospital networks contain six hospitals with a total of 510 beds. Maqased Islamic Charitable Hospital (220 beds) is the only hospital that has a cardiologic and heart surgery department in East Jerusalem. Despite the well-equipped cardiologic and heart department in Ramallah hospital and the specialized hospital in Nablus, alongside several dialysis units in the hospitals in Ramallah, Jericho and Tulkarem, people prefer to go to al Maqased hospital for treatment.


Auguste Victoria Hospital (100 beds) is the only hospital in the West Bank that has a dialysis department and a cancer treatment centre. St. John's Ophthalmic Hospital (70 beds) is the only ophthalmic hospital in the West Bank, while St. Joseph Hospital (70 beds) is known for neurological surgery. The Palestine Red Crescent Maternity Hospital (30 beds) is specialized in deliveries and the Princess Basma Centre for Disabled Children (including 20 rehabilitation beds for children) offers physiotherapy services for handicapped children and houses a special school to train physically handicapped children, see Fig.15.

Specialist clinics are in short supply. There are only four mother-and-child health centres and the shortage of psychiatric clinics mean that only 10-15% of those requiring care are able to receive it. Based on surveys by IPCC in the neighbourhoods, they show that on average, mother-and-child-care centres and the local clinics in East Jerusalem serve 5,000 persons instead of the average 1,000 persons or less (see table 13).

**Table 13: Population Health needs according to standards**

Item	Standards	Needs 2015	
		Unit	Quantity
Clinics	Mother and child care units 750 - 1,000 person per unit	Unit	360
		Dunums built up area	360.0
	Local clinics 1,000 - 1,500 person per unit	Unit	120
		Dunums built up area	120.0
	Specialized clinic for population over 10,000	Unit	18
		Dunums built up area	36.0

Fig. 15: Distribution of Health centers in East Jerusalem (IPCC, 2017)



The needs of the population only increase as the population increases. Table 14 below shows the projections in the needs of health care facilities for the year 2030, with an extra of 241 new mother-and-child-care units, about 80 local units and 12 more specialized units are required.

**Table 14: Future projection for the population Health needs according to standards for the year 2030**

Item	Standards	Needs 2030	Deficiency*
		Unit Quantity	Quantity
Clinics	Mother and child care units	601	400
	Unit Dunums built up area	601.0	400.0
	Local clinics	200	190
	Unit Dunums built up area	200.0	190.0
	Specialized clinic for popu- lation over 10,000	30	25
	Unit Dunums built up area	60.0	50.0

**\*Deficiency includes the needs between years 2015-2030 in addition to the shortage between the existing and needs in 2015**

## PUBLIC FACILITIES, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SERVICES

The Palestinian community in East Jerusalem is very young since about 39% of it are children under the age of 18. Another 55% are adults between the ages of 18 and 60.

East Jerusalem’s public cultural and recreational

facilities dwindle in comparison to West Jerusalem. For example, West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks compared to only 45 in East Jerusalem, 34 swimming pools compared to 3 in East Jerusalem, 26 public libraries compared to a mere 2 in East Jerusalem; and 531 sports facilities compared to only 33 in East Jerusalem. For the year 2030 there will an extra need of another 240 dunums for such facilities (see Table 15).

**Table 15: Public buildings need according to standards**

Item	Standards	Unit	Needs 2015	Needs 2030	Deficiency*
			Quantity	Quantity	Quantity
Public build-	1.0 square meters per person (post office, fire brigade,)	Dunums built up area	360.0	600.8	>250.0

**\*Deficiency includes the needs between years 2015-2030 in addition to the shortage between the existing and needs in 2015.**

## INFRASTRUCTURE

Instead of immediately confiscating private land, the Israeli government will reclassify land and then return what is not necessary, a slow confiscation process. For example, the Israeli government chooses to build a road in a village over private property. The government would reclassify the land as state property and take what is needed from the private owner and return whatever is not used without compensation, if the owner lost 40% or less of his or her land. Access to water and sewage networks is inadequate in many neighbourhoods. A study conducted by the Municipality in 2010 found that East Jerusalem required 50 km of new sewage network.

The road and transport network are primarily informal. The majority of streets do not have lighting or sidewalks. Public transport is poorly connected and cannot access many areas due to insufficient roads. According to IPCC research, as explained in its book “Jerusalem Urban Fabric”, the road network in the Jerusalem Governorate consists of 466 kilometres of roads, of which 37 kilometres are main roads connecting towns and villages with each other and with the city of Jerusalem. Another 25.5 kilometres are regional roads, 268.1 are access and local roads, and 135.4 are bypass roads. Main roads consist of two or more lanes with fair to good pavements, while secondary roads consist of one lane (and are considered dangerous for two directional traffic flows) with, in general, very poor to poor pavements.

The road network in East Jerusalem, which indirectly serves the Israeli population and other Israeli interests, is in very poor to fair condition regarding its serviceability. This means that, when observing the geometric profile in relation to its use, there is increased presence of potholes, corrugations, and pavement cracks and at the same time a lack of road signs, lights and guard-rails that would ensure road safety. Most of the roads do not have street lighting, little more than 50% of the roads have sidewalks and curbs, few have shoulders, and very few have signs or markings. The roads within the Central Business Governorate (CBD) area in East Jerusalem are of poor to fair quality and there are almost no users of bicycles, as the road network in the city is highly car-oriented.

An IPCC survey showed that more than 90% of inside neighbourhood roads are unsecure. They have no retaining walls, no pavement for sidewalks, are very narrow without pavement or with pavement which is in bad condition. When planning a road network, the sides of a road are usually deducted from the standard range set by the Municipality due to the high sloped roads. East Jerusalem residents are required to pay taxes like all city residents. However, they do not receive the same services as residents of West Jerusalem neighbourhoods.

**Table 16: Roads and connections need**

Item	Standards	Unit	Needs 2015
			Quantity
Roads and connections	18% - 23% of polygon area	Dunums	1,764.0 - 2,254.0

In the past years new roads were constructed to improve the connection between Israeli settlements and the Israeli state. Road No. 1, the fly-over and the bridge next to French Hill and the tunnel road at Mt. Scopus are examples of the enormous investments by Israel for its own interests. This road infrastructure is well-maintained and receives high priority by the Israeli authorities. The level of maintenance of all the internal roads serving Palestinian areas is quite low, and will, in general, receive maintenance only when the road has completely deteriorated.

The Jerusalem Municipality has continuously failed to invest significantly in infrastructure and services (such as roads, sidewalks, water and sewage systems) in Jerusalem's Palestinian neighbourhoods. Since the annexation of Jerusalem, the Municipality has built almost no new school, public building, or medical clinic for Palestinians. The lion's share of investment has been dedicated to the city's Jewish areas. The lack of investment has left infrastructure in East Jerusalem in a state of deterioration:

- Entire Palestinian neighbourhoods are not connected to a sewage system and do not have paved roads or sidewalks;
- Almost 90 percent of the sewage pipes, roads, and sidewalks are found in West Jerusalem;
- West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks, East Jerusalem has 45;
- West Jerusalem has 34 swimming pools, East Jerusalem has three;
- West Jerusalem has 26 libraries, East Jerusalem has two;
- West Jerusalem has 531 sports facilities, East Jerusalem has 33.

## **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Two consequences have arisen as a result of the restrictions on, and obstacles to, development in East Jerusalem:

- First, living conditions have stagnated and in many ways worsened. According to official data 78% of East Jerusalem families are below the poverty line.
- Second, families, businesses, and institutions have gradually moved out of the city. Since 1999 more than 5,000 establishments have closed or moved. It is estimated that at least 50,000 residents already live in areas beyond the Separation Barrier and thousands more are living in Ramallah and other West Bank towns.

## **POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT**

Despite the planning restrictions in East Jerusalem, there are still some development opportunities for Palestinians. Through its' work in East Jerusalem since 2007, IPCC has recognized many undeveloped neighbourhoods with land in need of development and suitable for medium to large projects. The largest are in the Addaseh, Ashqarieh, Jabal Al-Mukabber neighbourhoods, in addition to smaller ones within the crowded Palestinian neighbourhoods.

One more important issue for consideration in terms of development are the area allocated for public use and open spaces in already approved plans that are currently neglected. While landownership is an issue that has to be investigated and negotiated, these lands are a stock waiting for development.

There is a severely unequal distribution of public facilities and housing opportunities between East and West Jerusalem. In the health sector alone, a staggering gap exists, with 4 mother-and-child-centres in East Jerusalem and 25 in West Jerusalem. Similar discrepancies exist for most services.

**Table 17: Complete planning program for existing population**

Item	Standards	N e e d s 2015		Existing	Shortage 2015
		Unit	Quantity	Quantity	Quantity
Nursery / Kindergarten	to serve 70% of children ages (0-4)	Classes	1,142	3,007	1,006 503.0 dunum
	about 34,272 children	Dunums	571.0		
Elementary and preparatory School	to serve at least 100% of children ages (5-14)	Classes	2,216		
	about 93,060 children	Dunums	1,108.0		
Secondary School	to serve at least 80% of children ages (15-18)	Classes	709		
	about 27,864 children	Dunums	354.5		
Public buildings	1.0 square meters per person	Dunums built up area	360	-	-
	(post office, fire brigade...)				
Clinics	Mother and child care units 750 - 1,000 person per unit	Unit	360	>100	<160
		Dunums built up area	360.0		
	Local clinics 1,000 - 1,500 person per unit	Unit	120	>30	<90
		Dunums built up area	120.0		
	Specialized clinic for population over 10,000	Unit	18	>5	<13
		Dunums built up area	36.0		
Playgrounds	One play ground for 2,000 residents (one third of the population + use schools)	Playground	54	> 14	<50
		Dunum	108.0	> 28.0	<80.0
Small Stadium	Small stadium for 5,000 - 8,000 residents (one third of the population)	Small stadiums	20	> 5 sport playgrounds	< 2 0 0 . 0 dunum
		Dunum	140.0		
Stadium	For population over 10,000	Stadiums	5	> 1 0 . 0 dunums	
		Dunum	75.0		
Open Public Spaces	5.0 square meters per person	Dunums	1,800.0	10,475	Exceed the standards  But lacks inside the neighbourhoods
Roads and connections	18% - 23% of polygon area	Dunums	1,764.0-2,254.0		
Commercial	1.5 square meters per person	Dunums built up area	570.0		

**Table 18: Planning program for 2030 for a population of 600,801 residents**

Item	Standards		Needs 2030	Deficien- cy*	
		Unit	Quantity	Quantity	
Nursery / Kindergarten	to serve 70% of children ages (0-4) about 49,039 children	Classes	1,635	2759 class 1 3 7 9 . 5 dunum	
		Dunums	817.5		
Elementary and pre- paratory School	to serve at least 100% of children ages (5-14) about 95,112 children	Classes	3,170		
		Dunums	1,585.0		
Secondary School	to serve at least 80% of children ages (15-18) about 30,436 children	Classes	1,015		
		Dunums	507.5		
Public buildings	1.0 square meters per person (post office, fire brigade,)	Dunums built up area	600.8		>250 400
Clinics	Mother and child care units	Unit	601		
		Dunums built up area	601.0		400.0
	Local clinics	Unit	200	190	
		Dunums built up area	200.0	1700.0	
	Specialized clinic for population over 10,000	Unit	30	25	
		Dunums built up area	60.0	50.0	
Playgrounds	One play ground for 2,000 residents (one third of the population + use schools)	Playground	90	85	
		Dunum	180.0	170.0	
Small Stadium	Small stadium for 5,000 - 8,000 resi- dents (one third of the population)	Small stadi- ums	20	3 0 0 . 0 dunum	
		Dunum	140.0		
Stadium	For population over 10,000	Stadiums	15		
		Dunum	180.0		
Open Public Spaces	5.0 square meters per person	Dunums	3,004.0	1,800.0	
Commercial	1.5 square meters per person	Dunums built up area	901.2	331.0	

**\*Deficiency includes the needs between years 2015-2030 in addition to the shortage between the existing and needs in 2015**

## PLANNING FOR A GROWING POPULATION IN EAST JERUSALEM

According to the “Association of Civil Rights in Israel”, at the end of year 2011 the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem was 360,882, with a 2.9% annual growth. It is estimated that the current Palestinian population is 426,533 living in East Jerusalem. It is a young population where the median is just 19.4-year-old, a bit higher than a decade ago (18.4 years).

For the purpose of this Program at City-Level report, the calculations for the services and requirements are made for a total population of 393,198 people. This number is the base of the future projections and the needs accordingly, with an age distribution as indicated in the table 20 below. At annual growth of 2.9%, decreasing 0.1% every 10 years until it reaches 2.6% in the year 2050, the population of East Jerusalem will increase from 393,000 to 600,000 thousand by 2030.

Household size is expected to decrease in line with West Bank trends. By 2030 the average household size is expected to decrease to around 4.8 person per household, which implies that household growth will be higher than population growth. By 2030, the number of households is expected to grow to around 125,167 (see Table 20 below). Consequently, it is expected that the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem will exceed 1 million in the year 2050, the average household size is expected to decrease again to around 4.2 person per household. Accordingly, the number of households is expected to double in the twenty years between 2030 and 2050. Thus, the planning for the growing population of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is essential.

On the other hand, it is expected that the median age will increase from the current of 19.4 to 24.2 in the year 2030 due to the increase in the life expectancy, which will affect the percentages of the different age groups. This will continue to increase to 25.2 in the year 2050.

**Table 19: East Jerusalem population projections by numbers and percentages till 2050**

<b>Numbers</b>						
<b>Year</b>	<b>(0-4)</b>	<b>(5-18)</b>	<b>(19-30)</b>	<b>(&lt;30)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Households</b>
<b>2015</b>	53,475	101,642	105,810	132,272	393,198	67,793
<b>2020</b>	58,607	111,397	128,171	155,441	453,616	82,476
<b>2025</b>	64,232	122,088	155,259	181,738	523,317	99,679
<b>2030</b>	70,055	133,156	187,160	210,430	600,801	125,167
<b>2035</b>	77,211	146,757	223,466	242,324	689,757	148,335
<b>2040</b>	84,684	160,962	262,967	279,428	788,040	175,120
<b>2045</b>	93,848	178,380	306,445	321,655	900,328	206,972
<b>2050</b>	103,498	196,723	351,893	371,502	1,023,617	243,718
<b>Percentages</b>						
<b>YEAR</b>	<b>(0-4)</b>	<b>(5-18)</b>	<b>(19-30)</b>	<b>(&lt;30)</b>	<b>Total</b>	
<b>2015</b>	13.6	25.9	26.9	33.6	100.0	
<b>2020</b>	12.9	24.6	28.3	34.2	100.0	
<b>2025</b>	12.3	23.3	29.7	34.7	100.0	
<b>2030</b>	11.7	22.2	31.2	34.9	100.0	
<b>2035</b>	11.2	21.3	32.4	35.1	100.0	
<b>2040</b>	10.7	20.4	33.4	35.5	100.0	
<b>2045</b>	10.4	19.8	34.0	35.8	100.0	
<b>2050</b>	10.1	19.2	34.4	36.3	100.0	

## Physical Planning In East Jerusalem

Palestinians in East Jerusalem live in 14 neighbourhoods in addition to the Old City; some of these neighbourhoods - although within the municipal border - are separated by the Separation Barrier and their inhabitants have to cross a checkpoint to reach their place of work, education and other services on the other side of the Barrier. Regarding the planning in East Jerusalem, there are two main things to consider: The approved plans by the Municipality in the area (of all levels) and the Jerusalem master plan 2020.

The general tendency of the master plans is usually unjust towards the Palestinian communities in Jerusalem.


According to BIMKOM's analysis of the approved plans for East Jerusalem, Palestinians live in an area less than 10 km<sup>2</sup> which is about 14% of the total area of East Jerusalem (see Figure 17 and Table 20 below). While the Israeli settlements dominate with more than 200,000 settlers within annexed Jerusalem and more than 100,000 in the surrounding areas, about one third of East Jerusalem is confiscated for settlement building and 40% of private land is designated as green area where development is not allowed.

**Table 20: Zoning designations according to "BIMKOM" analysis of approved plans**

Zoning Area	Dunum
Open Spaces	10,474.5
Residential	9,844.3
Roads	5,621.6
Public Buildings and Institutions	1,863.6
Area for Future Planning	458.5
Commercial Areas	281.0
Mixed Residential and Commercial	73.6
Cemeteries	172.4
Hotels	144.0
Engineering Facilities	86.9
Light Rail	81.6
Other*	8,198.0
<b>Total Area of Survey</b>	<b>37,300.0</b>

\* Unplanned areas or areas planned for Israeli Institutions, the Atarot Industrial Zone, the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives

**Fig.17: Percentages of zoning areas in East Jerusalem (based on BIMKOM's analysis)**



The facts show an unequal allocation of public services between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem municipal expenditures and investments which lead to a severe lack in these services in East Jerusalem, despite Palestinians representing about 37% of residents in Jerusalem. The Municipality's allocation of services does not even come close to fair distribution. For example, in the Jerusalem Municipality budget for 2012, the average budget for the Jewish student was 25,000 NIS per student compared to just 12,000 NIS per Palestinian student. According to the "The Association for Civil Rights in Israel" in a comparison between the services the Jerusalem Municipality provides to West and East Jerusalem, there are 18 welfare offices in West Jerusalem compared to just 5 in East Jerusalem, while the post offices are 42 to just 9 in East Jerusalem. The average building rights are 75-125% in the west compared to just 25-50% in the east.

The UN General Assembly in 1948. Article 25 (1) states:

"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control." Unfortunately, it is quite clear even to the observing eye that there is a shortage in many of the essential needs of the basic living conditions in East Jerusalem, starting from adequate housing and the space allowed for this purpose to the infrastructure especially the road networks and roads condition, reaching all sorts of services which are mostly insufficient when they do exist. In this program, the different public needs in terms of social and physical infrastructure of the city needed, will be examined; evaluation of the needs of the current population and a projection for future needs will be calculated.

According to a BIMKOM analysis (see Table 21 and Figure 6) the reserve of land in the approved plans for future development for East Jerusalem Palestinian neighbourhoods is 458.5 dunums, less than 0.7% of the total area of Jerusalem. This constitutes an area so small that it is less than what is needed to close the gap in the shortage of the kindergarten education level class rooms needed according to the Municipality standards.

## WAY FORWARD

Building upon its projects pertaining to urban spatial planning and zoning, IPCC has identified specific sites within East Jerusalem ready for housing construction projects, as well as opportunities for the development of urban public space and urban economy.

Through its continuous dialogue with the international donor community, IPCC feels there is an appetite and indeed in some cases funds allocated for East Jerusalem which are currently untapped, either due to lack of a robust implementation mechanism, a complicated planning and permit procedure, snared with politics, or simply a lack of information about available opportunities and implementation mechanism.

### **Actions needed:**

1. Intensive international engagement with the various Israeli authorities could contribute positively towards plans approval.
2. Upscale planning initiative to include additional 8 neighbourhoods.
3. Development of 3 thematic general plans for East Jerusalem at city level on the topics of:
  - a. Housing and affordable housing schemes for East Jerusalem,
  - b. Plan for public space development, employment and commercial areas,

- c. Urban Regeneration plan for the CBD (including the Old City markets - contiguity between the Old City and Salah Eddin).

4. Initiate a comprehensive action plan identifying the planning, legal and financial mechanism for implementation and timeframe.

## CONCLUSION

The IPCC planning work have provided the legal and technical groundwork for a vast amount of development in East Jerusalem. In total, over 8,000 new housing units have been planned, in addition to new public infrastructure, services and facilities to meet the future demand according to international standards. When implemented, such development will go a long way to addressing East Jerusalem's critical shortage of housing and public infrastructure and will provide an enormous boost to the city's economy. Community attitude to planning has positively changed, from denial to engagement. Palestinians continue to associate planning with the occupation (denial of permits, house demolitions and settlements) and are hence highly suspicious of any planning activity. This is the first programme to promote planning as a tool with which to defend the Palestinian right to the city. Since 2007, hundreds of community members have attended awareness workshops, open days and meetings organized by IPCC. At least 8 communities of the planned neighbourhoods now have elected representative committees. Communities now much better understand the potential of planning to drive development and their central role in steering it.

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